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The research conducted in this thesis is based on information that was publicly 
available as of 31 December 2020. Whilst there have been developments in 
relation to the UK government’s Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and 
Veterans) Bill and the imposition of sanctions on senior International Criminal 
Court personnel by the United States of America since then, the research is 




This thesis will discuss the responses of the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom to allegations that their personnel have committed war crimes 
in the context of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, and Iraq, respectively. This 
will be done in order to assess the extent to which these responses have 
complied with the principle of complementarity as found at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). This is a topic of importance since such allegations have 
been subject to ICC scrutiny in recent years, and compliance with the principle 
of complementarity is a way in which both States can avoid further scrutiny. The 
discussion in relation to the United States centres around an analysis of criminal 
law applicable to allegations under scrutiny by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP); an examination of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
on the treatment of detainees in US armed forces custody, as well as the 
Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report on the CIA’s detention and 
interrogation program; before discussing the criminal investigation process in 
the United States. The discussion of the United Kingdom will also analyse the 
framework of law applicable to the crimes under OTP scrutiny, before 
discussing the extent to which the Baha Mousa Report demonstrates that the 
UK has complied with the principle of complementarity. The analysis of the UK 
also includes chapters discussing the impact of the Iraq Historic Allegations 
Team, and the potential impact of legislation aimed at preventing vexatious 
prosecutions. The thesis concludes by arguing whether the analysis of the 
situation in these two States is reflective of how the principle of complementarity 
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This thesis will discuss the extent to which States comply with the principle of 
complementarity as found within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute states: 
 
“Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted 
under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court”1 
 
Commentary has suggested that without the principle of complementarity, the 
ICC would not be able to successfully fulfil their mandate.2 It is therefore 
essential to discuss the extent to which States comply with the principle of 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 17(1). Unwillingness is defined in Article 17(2), and inability in 
Article 17(3). 
2 See, for example: Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery 
to Implement International Criminal Law’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869, 
870; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
(ICC, September 2003) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 4; Assembly 
of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on complementarity’ (29 November 2019) ICC Doc 
ICC/ASP/18/25 <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/ICC-ASP-18-25-ENG.pdf> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 4. For further discussion of the principle of complementarity, 
see infra Chapter One. 
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complementarity in order to assess the extent to which the ICC is capable of 
fulfilling their mandate as set out in the Preamble to the Rome Statute.3  
 
The discussion in this thesis will therefore concentrate on the responses to 
allegations of war crimes of two States who have faced scrutiny from the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) for such crimes in the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom. The analysis to be conducted examines the conduct of 
two of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and, as 
will be shown in the next section, two States with different relationships to the 
ICC – the UK having ratified the Rome Statute and the US having not done so. 
This introduction will set out the rationale for the choice of these two States; the 
methodology to be employed; and the aims of the research. 
 
1. Why This Thesis Discusses the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom 
 
There are multiple reasons for discussing the conduct of the two States 
selected, the most notable of which is the fact that both States have been 
subject to scrutiny by the OTP in recent years. The ICC Appeals Chamber 
approved the OTP’s request to open an investigation into the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan in March 2020,4 a request which included allegations of war crimes 
committed by US personnel.5 This approval came after the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had previously decided that an investigation would not be in the interests of 
justice.6 In their investigation request, the OTP allege that members of the US 
military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were responsible for ‘the war 
crime of torture and cruel treatment pursuant to article 8(2)(c)(i)’ of the Rome 
 
3 Rome Statute (n 1) Preamble 
4 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Judgment on the appeal against the decision 
on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) 
ICC-02/17-138 (5 March 2020) 
5 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15”) ICC-02/17-7-Red (20 November 2017), 
paras 187-252 
6 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan) ICC-02/17-33 (12 April 2019) 
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Statute,7 ‘the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, pursuant to article 8(2)(c)(ii)’,8  and ‘the 
war crime of rape and other forms of sexual violence pursuant to article 
8(2)(e)(vi)’.9 
 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the OTP has launched two investigations 
into alleged war crimes committed by members of the armed forces in Iraq. The 
first of these preliminary examinations was closed on 9 February 2006 on the 
basis that the crimes alleged did not meet the gravity threshold under the Rome 
Statute required for the OTP to investigate alleged offences.10 The second 
Preliminary Examination was launched on 13 May 2014 following receipt of a 
communication by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
and Public Interest Lawyers.11 This Preliminary Examination was ultimately 
closed on 9 December 2020,12 despite the OTP stating that there were 
‘numerous concerns with respect to how specific decisions on certain matters 
were arrived at’,13 and concluding that: 
 
“on the basis of the information available, there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that, at a minimum, the following war crimes have been 
committed by members of UK armed forces: wilful killing/murder under 
 
7 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 5) para 191 
8 ibid para 204 
9 ibid para 207 
10 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘OTP letter to senders re Iraq 9 February 2006’ (International 
Criminal Court, 9 February 2006) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/04d143c8-19fb-466c-
ab77-4cdb2fdebef7/143682/otp_letter_to_senders_re_iraq_9_february_2006.pdf> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021) 8-9 
11 International Criminal Court, ‘Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq’ (International Criminal Court, 13 
May 2014) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021); European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and 
Public Interest Lawyers, ‘Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court: The Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving 
Systematic Detainee Abuse in Iraq from 2003-2008’ (European Center for Constitutional and 
Human Rights, 10 January 2014) 
<https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Juristische_Dokumente/January_2014_Communication_by_EC
CHR_and_PIL_to_ICC_OTP_re_Iraq_UK__public_version_.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
12 International Criminal Court, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq/United Kingdom’ (International 
Criminal Court, 9 December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201209-otp-
statement-iraq-uk> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
13 ibid 
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article 8(2)(a)(i)) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); torture and inhuman/cruel treatment 
under article 8(2)(a)(ii) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); outrages upon personal 
dignity under article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or article 8(2)(c)(ii)); rape and/or other 
forms of sexual violence under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or article 8(2)(e)(vi)).”14 
 
The fact that both States have been subject to ICC scrutiny serves to justify a 
discussion of whether the domestic processes employed by each satisfy the 
principle of complementarity since, as stated previously, the ICC can only act in 
situations where States do not comply with the principle of complementarity. 
Adherence with the principle of complementarity in such circumstances should 
be in the interests of both States, since as will be discussed further, both States 
reject the idea that they should be subject to ICC scrutiny. 
 
It should be noted that despite the United States not having ratified the Rome 
Statute, compliance with the principle of complementarity would serve to 
prevent further ICC scrutiny. For example. Akande argues that the principle of 
complementarity serves to limit the potential jurisdiction over the nationals of 
States which have not ratified the Rome Statute,15 stating that ‘the 
complementarity principle requires the ICC to defer to the exercise of national 
jurisdiction by non-parties to the same extent that it requires deferral to the 
jurisdiction of parties.’16 Additionally, former State Department Legal Advisor 
John Bellinger has argued that the United States should provide information on 
investigations that have been carried out in order to avoid further ICC scrutiny.17 
Furthermore, the OTP themselves, in their Afghanistan investigation request, 
have indicated that their assessment of the admissibility of any cases before the 
ICC may change if such information is provided.18 The Appeals Chamber have 
 
14 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (International Criminal Court, 9 
December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 71 
15 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618, 647-48 
16 ibid 647 
17 John Bellinger, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Trump Administration’ (Lawfare, 27 
March 2018) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-criminal-court-and-trump-
administration> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
18 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 5) para 296 
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also noted that the admissibility of any case before the ICC may be subject to 
admissibility challenge under Article 19 of the Rome Statute.19 
 
The second reason for examining the conduct of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America is that both States are permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC),20 which means that both States are in 
a position to influence the situations the OTP can investigate. Under Article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, can refer situations to the ICC.21 Such referrals have occurred on two 
previous occasions in relation to Darfur and Libya.22 However, as Trahan notes, 
such a referral does not mean that the OTP is obliged to launch an 
investigation.23 Furthermore, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the UNSC 
can act to defer investigations and prosecutions at the ICC for a year.24 This 
power has been used as a result of concerns by the United States that their 
personnel could be held liable for any crimes committed in the course of UN 
peacekeeping missions.25 Lastly, it is possible that UNSC permanent members 
could use their veto under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter to prevent action 
being taken under either of the two situations discussed above.26 As a result of 
these powers to influence the ICC’s investigative focus, it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which States on the Security Council address allegations 
of crimes which fall within the scope of the Rome Statute. 
 
19 Afghanistan Appeal Chamber Judgment (n 4) para 44 
20 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, Article 23 
21 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 13(b); ibid Chapter VII 
22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593; 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970 
23 Jennifer Trahan, ‘The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the U.N. 
Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 417, 423-24 
24 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 16 
25 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422; United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1487 (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1487. For discussion 
of these resolutions, which have been subject to controversy, see Trahan (n 23) 437-47; 
Mohamed El Zeidy, ‘The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 1503; Neha Jain, ‘A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash Between 
the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 16(2) European Journal of 
International Law 239; and Roberto Lavalle, ‘A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The Action by the 
United Nations Security Council to Narrow the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 195 
26 UN Charter (n 20) Article 27(3) 
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The third reason why this analysis focuses on the US and the UK is because it 
addresses the conduct of both an ICC member State in the United Kingdom, 
and a non-ICC member State in the United States. This means that, at least to 
some degree, it may be possible to determine the extent to which Rome Statute 
ratification affects State compliance with the principle of complementarity. 
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC is only able to assert jurisdiction in situations 
where alleged offences have either been referred to the ICC by the UNSC,27 
where crimes have taken place in a member State,28 or where crimes have 
been committed by a member state national.29 In the case of the UK, ICC 
jurisdiction therefore arises because the UK has ratified the Rome Statute. In 
the case of the United States, ICC jurisdiction arises because Afghanistan has 
ratified the Rome Statute. The decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber also noted in 
respect of the United States that ‘the potential cases arising from the incidents 
presented by the Prosecution appear to be admissible’.30 
 
The difference in the relationship between the two States and the ICC is notable 
because whilst both States reject the notion that they should be subject to ICC 
scrutiny, they do so for different reasons. The UK has taken the position that 
ICC jurisdiction is unnecessary because they would investigate any case which 
could form the basis of ICC jurisdiction. For example, when seeking to 
implement the Rome Statute into UK law, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued 
that ‘British service personnel will never be prosecuted by the International 
Criminal Court because any bona fide allegation will be pursued by the British 
authorities.’31 Furthermore, upon the announcement of the OTP’s Preliminary 
Examination in May 2014, Attorney General Dominic Grieve stated: 
 
“British troops are some of the best in the world and we expect them to 
operate to the highest standards, in line with both domestic and 
international law. In my experience the vast majority of our armed forces 
 
27 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 13(b) 
28 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 12(2)(a) 
29 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 12(2)(b) 
30 Afghanistan PTC Decision (n 6) para 79 
31 HC Deb 3 April 2001 vol 366 col 222 
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meet those expectations. Where allegations have been made that 
individuals may have broken those laws, they are being comprehensively 
investigated.”32 
 
The position of the United States, which has had a relationship with the ICC that 
has included periods of hostility,33 has rejected the assertion of ICC jurisdiction 
based on the fact that it is not a party to the Rome Statute. For example, in 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, Ambassador David 
Scheffer, who led the US negotiating team at the Rome Conference, stated, 
‘Our position is clear. Official actions of a non-party state should not be subject 
to the Court’s jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by 
means of Security Council action under the U.N. Charter.’34 This position has 
 
32 Attorney General’s Office and Dominic Grieve, ‘Statement on ICC preliminary examination 
into Iraq allegations’ (Attorney General’s Office, 13 May 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-icc-preliminary-examination-into-iraq-
allegations> (Last accessed 15 May 2021). Foreign Secretary William Hague also stated prior to 
the Preliminary Examination being opened that ‘These allegations are either under investigation 
or have been dealt with in a variety of ways.’: BBC News, ‘William Hague rejects Iraq ‘abuse’ 
complaint to ICC’ (BBC News, 12 January 2014) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25703723> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
33 For discussion of the objectives of the United States at negotiations for the Rome Statute, see 
David J Scheffer, ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 American 
Journal of International Law 12. For a discussion of the relationship between the US and the 
ICC in the Clinton Administration, see Eric P Schwartz, ‘The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: The Case for “Dexterous Multilateralism”’ (2003) 4(1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 223. For discussion of the relationship between the US and the ICC during the 
Bush Administration, see for example: John P Cerone, ‘Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of 
US Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ (2007) 18(2) European Journal 
of International Law 277, 293-305; and Andrea Birdsall, ‘The Monster That We Need to Slay – 
Global Governance, the United States, and the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 16 Global 
Governance 451, 457-64. For a discussion of the relationship between the US and the ICC 
during the Obama Administration, see Megan A Fairlie, ‘The United States and the International 
Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage’ (2011) 29 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 528. For the views of the Trump Administration, see for example, 
White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly | New York, NY’ (White House, 25 September 2018) 
<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-
session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Michael 
R Pompeo, ‘ICC Decision on Afghanistan’ (United States Department of State, 5 March 2020) 
<https://2017-2021.state.gov/icc-decision-on-afghanistan//index.html> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021); and Michael R Pompeo, ‘Actions to Protect U.S. Personnel from Illegitimate Investigation 
by the International Criminal Court’ (United States Department of State, 2 September 2020) 
<https://2017-2021.state.gov/actions-to-protect-u-s-personnel-from-illegitimate-investigation-by-
the-international-criminal-court//index.html> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
34 Subcommittee on International Operations, ‘Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. 
National Interest?’ (Senate Hearing 105-724, 23 July 1998) 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50976/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50976.pdf> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 13. The objection to ICC jurisdiction over US personnel was just 
one of a number of concerns that the US had to the Rome Statute. For a discussion of these 
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remained constant with the Secretary of State under the Trump Administration, 
Mike Pompeo, stating in October 2019 that: 
 
“The United States is not a party to the ICC’s Rome Statute and has 
consistently voiced its unequivocal objections to any attempts to assert 
ICC jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. An investigation by the ICC of U.S. 
personnel would be unjustified and unwarranted”35 
 
It will therefore be prudent to examine to what extent the actions taken by the 
two States to address allegations of international crimes are different, as this 
will provide an insight as to the importance they place on the principle of 
complementarity. 
 
The final reason for discussing the conduct of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America is that both States have well-established judicial 
systems. For example, in the 2020 Freedom House Freedom in the World 
Report, the United States scored 11 out of 16 points on the rule of law,36 and 
the United Kingdom 14 out of 16.37 The scores of both the US and the UK are 
substantially higher than scores in other States where the ICC has launched 
investigations. For example, Libya scored 0 points,38 and the Report stated that 
‘the national judicial system has essentially collapsed, with courts unable to 
function in much of the country’.39 The Democratic Republic of Congo also 
scored 0 points with the Report noting that ‘soldiers and police regularly commit 
serious human rights abuses, including rape and other physical attacks, and 
 
concerns, see, for example, Jordan J Paust, ‘The U.S. and the ICC: No More Excuses’ (2013) 
12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 563, 563-68. 
35 Michael R Pompeo, ‘U.S. Policy on the International Criminal Court Remains Unchanged’ 
(United States Department of State, 9 October 2019) <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-policy-
on-the-international-criminal-court-remains-unchanged/index.html> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021) 
36 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: United States’ (Freedom House) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2020> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021) 
37 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: United Kingdom’ (Freedom House) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2020> (Last accessed 15 
May 2021) 
38 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: Libya’ (Freedom House) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-world/2020> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
39 ibid 
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high-ranking officials enjoy impunity for crimes.’40 The Central African Republic 
scored 1 point and it was stated that ‘impunity for violence, economic crimes, 
and human rights violations remained widespread in 2019.’41 The discussion in 
this study may therefore serve to provide an insight as to how the 
complementarity regime applies in States which should be both willing and able 




The research conducted in this thesis is doctrinal in nature. Hutchinson and 
Duncan state the following in relation to doctrinal research: 
 
“The doctrinal research methodology is much more than ‘scholarship’. It 
is the location and analysis of the primary documents of the law in order 
to establish the nature and parameters of the law. That is the crux of the 
doctrinal method. The ‘screening criteria’ for legal primary materials are 
necessarily more rule bound and intricate. Doctrinal research also 
requires a trained expert in legal doctrine to read and analyse the law – 
the primary sources: the legislation and case law. Doctrinal research is 
not simply the locating of secondary information. It includes the intricate 
step of ‘reading, analysing and linking’ the new information to the known 
body of law.”42 
 
The research presented in this thesis, which discusses information available as 
of 31 December 2020, consists of an examination of a wide range of sources. 
These sources include the Reports of the United States Senate to be discussed 
in Chapter Three, and the Baha Mousa Report to be discussed in Chapter Five, 
as well as other related documents. Additionally, this thesis will also discuss 
 
40 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Freedom 
House) <https://freedomhouse.org/country/democratic-republic-congo/freedom-world/2020> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
41 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: Central African Republic’ (Freedom House) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/central-african-republic/freedom-world/2020> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021) 
42 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 113 
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reports and statements of United Nations human rights bodies, the reports of 
the OTP, relevant criminal law cases in both the domestic and international 
settings, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and official 
statements of government representatives in the UK and US. Additionally, it will 
also be necessary to examine secondary sources to supplement the analysis of 
primary sources conducted. This will occur through the examination of 
academic commentary, statements of non-governmental organisations, and 
media coverage of the contents examined within the thesis. 
 
This thesis will serve to critique the investigative steps taken by the United 
States and United Kingdom to address specific allegations of criminal 
misconduct in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and assess whether they 
comply with the principle of complementarity. Any recommendations on how to 
improve the principle of complementarity should be the result of studies 
examining a broader array of situations subject to ICC scrutiny. 
 
3. Research Aims and Focus 
 
In order to accomplish the ultimate aim of this study, which is to explore the 
extent to which the United States of America and the United Kingdom have 
complied with the principle of complementarity, it will be necessary to discuss 
the following issues: 
 
• The importance of the principle of complementarity and any potential 
scope for conflict between the aims of States and the ICC; 
• The criminal offences under US and UK law applicable to allegations 
which have been subject to ICC scrutiny; 
• The non-criminal investigative processes which have been deployed by 
the United States and the UK addressing the conduct which forms the 
basis of ICC scrutiny; 
• The criminal investigation processes which have been utilised by the UK 
and the US to address alleged war crimes, and; 
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• How complementarity affects the interaction between the ICC and both 




This thesis will be split into three parts. Part One, consisting of a single chapter 
will address the first research aim, which is to discuss the principle of 
complementarity. As well as setting out in further detail what the principle of 
complementarity requires from States, the Chapter will discuss the relationship 
between complementarity and primacy, which had served as the basis of 
jurisdiction at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR);43 the 
relationship between ordinary crimes (those crimes found within the legal 
systems of States) and international crimes; and whether the use of non-
criminal justice mechanisms are compatible with the principle of 
complementarity. 
 
The following two parts of the thesis, each of which analyses one of the States 
being discussed, will seek to address the remaining research objectives. Part 
Two, which consists of three chapters, will investigate the United States and 
actions that they have taken to address alleged war crimes which took place in 
relation to the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The first of these chapters, Chapter 
Two, will discuss a selection of crimes applicable to the US military and CIA 
personnel in order to demonstrate whether the US is able to prosecute the 
offences being scrutinised by the ICC in a manner which reflects their 
seriousness. Chapter Three will examine two reports of the United States 
Senate, the Senate Armed Services Committee Report into the Department of 
Defense’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Senate Intelligence 
Committee Report into the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The 
discussion in this Chapter will seek to examine whether it is possible for non-
 
43 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827, as 
amended, Article 9(2); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955, as 
amended, Article 8(2) 
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criminal investigation processes to form part of the process through which a 
State can argue that it has complied with the principle of complementarity. In 
this case, such an examination is important since the two United States Senate 
Reports were cited by the OTP in their Afghanistan investigation request on 
numerous occasions.44 The final chapter in Part Two, Chapter Four, will 
address criminal investigation processes that have been employed by the 
United States in order to assess the extent to which the US is willing to carry out 
such measures. Additionally, other measures, such as the use of clemency and 
a policy to not prosecute those who have relied in good faith on defective legal 
advice, will be discussed in order to assess the extent to which the United 
States is willing to conduct such investigations. 
 
Part Three, which consists of four chapters, will discuss the processes 
employed by the United Kingdom to address alleged war crimes committed in 
the armed conflict in Iraq. Chapter Five will discuss a range of offences 
applicable to the alleged conduct which was examined by the OTP in their 
preliminary examination. The purpose of this section, as is the case with 
Chapter Two’s discussion of offences under US law, is to assess the extent to 
which the UK can conduct investigations or prosecutions into alleged war 
crimes. Chapter Six will discuss the Baha Mousa Report, which is one of two 
Reports commissioned by the UK government to examine allegations of 
detainee abuse in Iraq – the other being the Al Sweady Report – in order to 
assess the extent to which this particular non-criminal investigative process can 
contribute to the process of complying with the principle of complementarity. 
Chapter Seven will discuss the work of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
(IHAT), a criminal investigative body created by the UK government in 2010 to 
investigate allegations of misconduct by UK forces in Iraq. The purpose of this 
Chapter is to address the extent to which the UK was willing to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions into offences which took place in Iraq. Finally, 
Chapter Eight will examine the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and 
Veterans) Bill, introduced by the UK government to ‘protect our veterans against 
 
44 See OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 5) generally 
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repeated reinvestigations’,45 and which seeks to impose a presumption against 
prosecution, which can be overridden only in exceptional circumstances, in 
relation to crimes committed on overseas operations more than five years 
ago.46 This discussion will assess the extent to which the UK is truly willing to 
investigate alleged offences which took place in Iraq, since the government has 
confirmed that the Bill could apply to alleged offences taking place in Iraq.47
 
45 Ministry of Defence, Johnny Mercer and Ben Wallace, ‘Armed Forces protected from 
vexatious claims in important step’ (Ministry of Defence, 18 March 2020) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/armed-forces-protected-from-vexatious-claims-in-
important-step> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
46 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) HC Bill (2019-21) [117] cls 1-3 





Chapter One: The Principle of Complementarity 
 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) ‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.1 Under Article 
17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is unable to assert its jurisdiction unless a 
State is willing and able to do so itself.2 This means that the relationship 
between the ICC and its State parties is integral to ensure the smooth operation 
of the Court. In her dissenting opinion in the Kenyatta admissibility appeal, 
Judge Ušacka stated that ‘complementarity reinforces the principle of 
international law that it is the sovereign right of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction; but it also ensures that the Court can step in to give effect 
to the goals of international criminal justice’.3 This shows how complementarity 
is designed to balance the interests of the ICC with the interests of States. 
 
However, this balancing act is one which has caused controversy in the ICC’s 
assertion of their jurisdiction as, amongst other things, the ICC has been 
accused of prolonging the conflict in the Côte d’Ivoire,4 and acting too quickly,5 
as well as too inconsistently in Libya.6 This may act to the detriment of the Court 
because, as stated in a 2003 document published by the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP), ‘the absence of trials by the ICC, as a consequence of the 
effective functioning of national systems, would be a major success’.7 Acting in 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Preamble 
2 ibid, Article 17 
3 Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka) ICC-01/09-02/11-
342 (20 September 2011), para 19 
4 Mike McGovern, ‘The Ivorian Endgame’ (Foreign Affairs, 14 April 2011) 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2011-04-14/ivorian-endgame> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021) 
5 Payam Akhavan, ‘Complementarity Conundrums’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1043, 1052-54 
6 Nidal Nabil Jurdi, ‘The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court in Practice: 
Is it Truly Serving the Purpose? Some Lessons from Libya’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 199, 215 
7 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
(International Criminal Court, September 2003) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-
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a way which could be described as being too quick or inconsistent would serve 
to potentially deprive States of the opportunity to show that their judiciaries do 
function effectively. This may indicate that the interests of States are not always 
be aligned with the OTP’s strategic priorities. 
 
In order to provide a basis for the analysis to be conducted in Chapters Two-
Eight on the approaches taken by the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom in relation to alleged war crimes, this chapter will analyse three 
aspects of the principle of complementarity which highlight reasons why the 
interests of States and the OTP may not always be aligned. These are: (i) the 
relationship between primacy and complementarity, (ii) the difference between 
ordinary and international crimes, and (iii) the acceptability of alternative justice 
mechanisms. 
 
1. The Relationship between Primacy and Complementarity 
 
Ever since the initial draft of the Rome Statute was published by the 
International Law Commission, the ICC was intended to be complementary to 
domestic jurisdictions,8 and this has been emphasised in both the Preamble to 
the Rome Statute,9 before being further emphasised in Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.10 This constitutes a change from the situation that existed at the 
tribunals established by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, in the form of International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).11 Article 9(2) 
of the ICTY Statute states that ‘the International Tribunal shall have primacy 
over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal 
 
de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021), 4 
8 International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
46th Session’ (2 May – 22 July 1994) UN Doc A/49/10, 27 
9 Rome Statute (n 1) Preamble 
10 Ibid, Article 17 
11 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827, as 
amended; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted under United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955, as amended; 
Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, Chapter VII 
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may formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the 
International Tribunal’.12 The relationship between these two concepts is one 
that has been subject to much academic commentary regarding whether there 
are differences between these two principles or not. Gioia, for example, argues 
that the primacy of the ICTR and ICTY was ‘an application ante litteram of the 
complementarity principle to the situations experienced in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda’.13  
 
This means that whilst it can be argued that there are similarities between the 
concepts of primacy and complementarity, it is not clear to what extent that this 
is the case. Brown, for example, argues that the reason the ICTY and ICTR 
were granted primacy was because it was necessary in order to help ensure 
international peace and security,14 and that the weaknesses of those tribunals 
meant that an alternative to primacy was required for the ICC to be 
successful.15 In addition, it is doubtful whether numerous States would have 
made clear their support for the principle of complementarity during the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference if complementarity was the same as the principle of 
primacy which existed in two pre-existing international tribunals.16 Furthermore, 
the Rome Statute states that if a State informs the ICC that they are carrying 
out an investigation into a situation the ICC is interested in, the OTP must defer 
to the State’s investigatory process unless the Pre-Trial Chamber decides to 
authorise an investigation.17 This is in contrast to the position under the ICTY 
 
12 ICTY Statute (n 11) Article 9(2). Article 8(2) of the ICTR Statute (n 11) makes a similar 
statement in relation to the ICTR. 
13 Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International Law: The Principle 
of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 1095, 1116 
14 Bartram S Brown, ‘Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National 
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals’ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 383, 
407 
15 ibid 430-31 
16 For numerous examples of States supporting the use of the principle of complementarity at 
the Rome Conference, see United Nations General Assembly, ‘United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ UN 
Doc A/CONF.183/13 (Vol II), 64-129. State support for the concept of the principle of 
complementarity will be discussed further infra 30-31 in the context of a discussion of the 
distinction between ordinary and international crimes. 
17 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 18(2) 
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and ICTR Statutes which state that the Tribunals could make States defer their 
jurisdiction over international crimes.18 
 
A consideration of any potential similarities between the principle of 
complementarity and primacy is important, since this study involves the 
discussion of a State, in the United States of America, which has not ratified the 
Rome Statute and rejects the idea that non-ICC Member States can be subject 
to the Rome Statute except in instances referred by the United Nations Security 
Council.19 Additionally, Newton argues that following an Article 98 agreement 
entered into by the United States and Afghanistan: 
 
“There is simply no credible argument that Afghanistan had any lawful 
authority to prosecute American forces for any acts committed on or after 
May 28, 2003. Acts that were literally committed “on the territory” of 
Afghanistan could therefore not lawfully be delegated to the ICC based 
on the principle of transferred territoriality that is the bedrock of Article 12 
authority over the nationals of non-States Parties.”20 
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber stated that whilst such arguments are not relevant in 
the context of a decision concerning whether to open an investigation or not, 
they may be relevant in the context of a challenge to ICC jurisdiction under 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute.21 However, despite this, it does seem clear why 
non-parties to the Rome Statute may perceive complementarity and primacy to 
 
18 ICTY Statute (n 11) Article 9(2); ICTR Statute (n 11) Article 8(2) 
19 Subcommittee on International Operations, ‘Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. 
National Interest?’ (Senate Hearing 105-724, 23 July 1998) 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50976/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50976.pdf> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021), 13 
20 Michael A Newton, ‘How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms’ (2016) 49 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 371, 408. A similar argument was advanced during 
proceedings before the Appeals Chamber in relation to the OTP’s appeal against the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s decision not to authorise an investigation into Afghanistan: Situation in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (Transcript of hearing, 5 December 2019) ICC-02/17-T-002-ENG (5 
December 2019), 101-04. For an opposing view, see, for example, Cormier, who argues that 
the act of agreeing to a Status of Forces Agreement does not restrict the ICC’s ability to assume 
jurisdiction in the Afghanistan situation: Monique Cormier, ‘Can the ICC Exercise Jurisdiction 
over US Nationals for Crimes Committed in the Afghanistan Situation?’ (2018) 16 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1043, 1060-61. 
21 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Judgment on the appeal against the decision 
on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) 
ICC-02/17-38 (5 March 2020), para 44 
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be one and the same if the end result is that the ICC is able to assert 
jurisdiction. The remainder of this section will discuss the effects of the same 
person and conduct test and the idea of positive complementarity to further 
discuss the application of the principle of complementarity. 
 
a. The Same Person and Conduct Test 
 
The first area in which the practice of the ICC in relation to the principle of 
complementarity bears similarities with primacy is in relation to cases where 
States have already commenced investigations or prosecutions in relation to 
international crimes. Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that a case is 
inadmissible before the ICC unless a State is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution’.22 However, in the case of Lubanga, it 
was stated that ‘the Chamber considers that it is a conditio sine qua non for a 
case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national 
proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject 
of the case before the court’.23 This meant that the Pre-Trial Chamber held that 
the case against Lubanga was admissible before the ICC as charges in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo did not address the alleged use of child 
soldiers.24 A further application of this test can be seen in the case of Simone 
Gbagbo, who had been charged with offences including ‘economic crimes’,25 
and ‘crimes against the state’,26 which were held not to amount to the same 




22 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 17(1) 
23 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant 
of arrest, Article 58) ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red (10 February 2006), para 31 
24 ibid para 39 
25 Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo (Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the 
case against Simone Gbagbo) ICC-02/11-01/12/12-47-Red (11 December 2014), para 47 
26 ibid para 48 
27 ibid paras 47-48 
28 Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo (Judgment on the appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 December 2014 entitled “Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to 
the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo”) ICC-02/11-01/12-75-Red (27 May 2015), 
para 71 
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Whilst Lubanga’s eventual conviction was praised by Koh on the basis that it 
‘highlights the brutal practice of conscripting and using children to fight in armed 
conflict’,29 the consequences of the same person and conduct test have been 
criticised. Heller, for example, criticises the decision reached in Lubanga on the 
basis that the ICC’s interest in the conscription of child soldiers ignores the 
interests of victims by prioritising conscription over alleged sexual crimes 
committed, which is stated to run contrary to the ICC’s stated aims of 
safeguarding the rights of victims.30 In addition, Heller further argues that 
because States emerging from conflicts may be unable to conduct wide-ranging 
prosecutions, it may be a better use of their resources to conduct only selective 
prosecutions.31 Finally, Heller argues that the test set out in Lubanga ‘means 
that states are completely at the mercy of the OTP. If the OTP is sufficiently 
committed to prosecuting a suspect itself, it will almost always be able to do so. 
This is not complementarity – it is primacy’.32 
 
Furthermore, the same person element of the test set out in Lubanga has been 
criticised on the basis that it discriminates against States employing practices 
that had been employed by previous international criminal tribunals. Smith, for 
example states ‘Lubanga effectively eliminates the option of adopting an ICTY-
style “pyramidial” prosecutorial strategy’.33 In addition, Heller argues that the 
rejection of Kenya’s argument that cases before the ICC should be inadmissible 
on the basis of a pyramid strategy by both Pre-Trial Chamber II and the Appeals 
 
29 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘International Criminal Justice 5.0’ (2013) 38(2) Yale Journal of 
International Law 525, 538. This is an important view because Koh served as the legal advisor 
for the United States State Department at a time when the Obama Administration sought to 
strengthen its relationship with the ICC: United States Department of State, ‘U.S. Engagement 
With the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference’ (US Department 
of State, 25 June 2010) <https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/143178.htm> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
30 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 637, 654 
31 ibid 658. See Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Gravity Threshold under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 35 for an explanation of why 
selective prosecutions have to be employed by the ICC. 
32 Heller (n 30) 649 
33 Stephen Eliot Smith, ‘Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC’s Initial Lubanga Decision and 
its Regressive Consequences’ (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 331, 343. Cassese 
describes the pyramidal strategy stating, ‘in this approach, the prosecution would first target 
lower-level suspects, and then gradually move on to military commanders and political and 
military leaders’: Antonio Cassese, ‘The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality’ (2004) 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 585, 586. 
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Chamber meant that it was ‘very unlikely’ that any of the ICC would accept such 
a strategy.34 
 
It must be noted though that it is unclear to what extent these assertions are 
accurate, as the Appeals Chamber in Ruto stated that: 
 
“Kenya’s assertions that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not believe it even 
though there was no evidence contradicting Kenya’s submissions, and 
that the Chamber adopted a hostile attitude and made erroneous findings 
on the basis of Kenya’s legal submissions is equally unfounded. 
Nowhere in the Impugned Decision did the Pre-Trial Chamber find that 
Kenya was not to be trusted. The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the 
Admissibility Challenge not because it did not trust Kenya or doubted its 
intentions, but rather because Kenya failed to discharge its burden to 
provide sufficient evidence to establish that it was investigating the three 
suspects.”35 
 
Additionally, in the Simone Gbagbo case, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that it 
could not determine what the focus of the investigation against Gbagbo was, 
and what steps Côte d’Ivoire had taken to investigate.36 This means that it may 
be possible to argue that the Lubanga decision may not be as damaging as it 
first appears, as in individual cases the ICC has attempted to make it clear that 
they have reached their decisions as a result of the conduct of the State in 
question. 
 
The OTP’s 2019-21 Strategic Plan also states that: 
 
 
34 Heller (n 30) 644 
35 Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”) ICC-01/09-01/11-307 (30 August 2011), para 84. It is also 
unclear whether Kenya was truly committed to the exercise of justice – see Chandra Lekha 
Sriram and Stephen Brown, ‘Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and 
Impact’ (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 219. 
36 Gbagbo (n 25) para 76 
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“when appropriate, the Office will consider bringing cases against 
notorious or mid-level perpetrators who are directly involved in the 
commission of crimes, to provide deeper and broader accountability and 
also to ultimately have a better prospect of conviction in potential 
subsequent cases against higher-level accused.”37 
 
In response to the draft version of this plan, Whiting stated: 
 
“This strategy recognizes that given the challenges facing the court, 
sometimes less is more and the court cannot succeed without fulfilling its 
core mission of successfully prosecuting perpetrators of Rome Statute 
crimes. Moreover, the strategy recognizes that the ICC is a nascent 
tribunal and needs to build its legitimacy and competence over time by 
proving it can bring successful cases.”38 
 
It therefore appears clear that the ICC is open to a pyramidial approach to 
prosecutions, and the recently published Independent Expert Review into the 
ICC has recommended that such an approach be taken in some 
circumstances.39 The Independent Expert Review did however note that there 
was a wider context to the pursuit of lower level perpetrators stating that ‘it is 
critical that their participation in the overall criminal conduct constitutes part of a 
strategic plan that is designed to facilitate the subsequent prosecution of those 
in leadership positions.’40 Exactly how the OTP manages its prosecutorial policy 
to adapt to such an approach will have to be examined in the coming years. 
This is especially the case in relation to the application of the principle of 
complementarity, as States will have to be allowed the time to fully implement 
 
37 Office of the Prosecutor ‘Strategic Plan: 2019-2021’ (International Criminal Court, 17 July 
2019) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726-strategic-plan-eng.pdf> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021), 20 
38 Alex Whiting, ‘ICC Prosecutor Signals Important Strategy Shift in New Policy Document’ (Just 
Security, 17 May 2019) <https://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecutor-signals-important-
strategy-shift-in-new-policy-document/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
39 Panel of Independent Experts, ‘Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court 
and the Rome Statute System Final Report’ (ICC Assembly of States Parties, 30 September 
2020) <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/IER-Final-Report-ENG.pdf> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021), para R233 
40 ibid para 670 
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their own prosecutorial strategies before the OTP/ICC will be able to accurately 
assess the extent to which a State has conducted its own investigations and 
prosecutions. The approach taken by the OTP will also have to reconcile the 
fact that the Independent Expert Review also recommended that ‘the OTP 
should not have regard to prospective national proceedings and focus solely on 
whether national proceedings are or were ongoing.’41 
 
As a result of these findings, the OTP should take a more pragmatic approach 
towards determining whether State investigations have complied with the 
principle of complementarity and base prosecutorial decisions on whether 
States have tried to address allegations involving the alleged perpetration of 
international crimes. Factors which may have to be considered in this regard 
are the length of time which has elapsed since the alleged crimes took place, 
whether States have attempted to address past wrongdoing, the extent to which 
a State has a functioning judicial system and whether any crimes that were 
committed were the result of official State policy. These factors will be 
discussed in the remainder of this Chapter. 
 
b. The ICC and Positive Complementarity 
 
The very fact that the criticism of the ICC’s application of the principle of 
complementarity exists suggests that it may be necessary for the ICC and the 
OTP to consider whether criminal prosecutions are the sole way to satisfy the 
principle of complementarity. This is important because, as Rodman notes, the 
ICC’s lack of enforcement mechanisms mean that the ICC’s effectiveness is 
highly dependent on State cooperation which may not always be forthcoming.42 
Such a policy shift may also be essential if the OTP is to keep to its commitment 
of taking a positive approach to complementarity.43 Burke-White states: 
 
 
41 ibid para R262 
42 Kenneth A Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics’ (2014) 12 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 437, 440-41 
43 For an example of this commitment, see Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Strategic Plan: 2016 – 
2018’ (International Criminal Court, 16 November 2015) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/EN-
OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 57 
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“Applied in practice, a policy of positive complementarity means that the 
OTP would actively encourage investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction by States where there 
is reason to believe that such States may be able or willing to undertake 
genuine investigations and prosecutions and where the active 
encouragement of national proceedings offers a resource-effective 
means of ending impunity.”44 
 
Koh states that this principle ‘underscores the importance of institution-building 
that can serve developing and post-conflict societies well’,45 and that it 
‘empowers local populations to take ownership of the accountability process 
and to bear direct witness to the lesson that grave international crimes carry 
consequences’.46  
 
However, the extent to which any notion of positive complementarity is positive 
for the ICC’s smooth operation is doubtful. On one hand, such a notion may be 
seen by some States as the ICC getting too involved in their affairs. This means 
that despite the ICC’s intentions to encourage the use of domestic jurisdiction, 
they may in fact be seen as attempting to assert primacy. Brighton, for instance, 
highlights that in the Kenya cases, the ICC may have acted in a manner which 
suggests that Kenya was not acting in good faith in regards to their investigatory 
processes.47 From the document submitted by the Kenyan government in 
support of their appeal in Ruto, it is clear that the Kenyan government felt that 
key arguments in relation to its domestic investigation processes had not been 
considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber.48 They even refer to the finding that 
investigations were not ongoing as being ‘irrational’.49 This shows that there are 
 
44 William W Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome 
System of Justice’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59, 62 
45 Koh (n 29) 538 
46 ibid 
47 Claire Brighton, ‘Avoiding Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in the 
Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 12 International Criminal 
Law Review 629, 657-59 
48 Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (Document in Support of the “Appeal of the 
Government of Kenya against the Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) ICC-01/09-
01/11-135 (20 June 2011), paras 43-45 
49 ibid para 51. 
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feelings of distrust between the ICC and some of its members. Such a feeling 
may not be completely unwarranted, as O’Callaghan argues that the fact that 
the ICC has created a wide range of rules governing the principle of 
complementarity suggests that the ICC does not expect to be in a position 
where only States prosecute international crimes.50 
 
The arguments of the Kenyan Government that domestic reforms be considered 
by the ICC as a part of the process of determining admissibility marks a clear 
desire on the part of States for the ICC to take into account a wider variety of 
investigatory processes and reforms.51 This may be a particularly desirable 
outcome when Meernik’s findings that there are a number of reasons why 
States may choose to oppose the ICC’s activities rather than comply with them 
are considered.52 In situations where States are not naturally inclined to 
cooperate with the ICC, it surely is in the ICC and OTP’s best interests to 
consider a wider range of State activities when deciding whether 
complementarity has been complied with. 
 
There is another side to the argument that positive complementarity may be 
seen as encroaching too much on the rights of States - that complementarity 
may instead allow States to do whatever they like. Stahn, for example, argues 
that if the ICC is seen to defer all its authority to States on the basis of 
complementarity, it will be able to use this deference to justify its inactivity.53 It is 
also argued that such deference may serve to counter the interests of justice by 
either delaying justice or making it more difficult to obtain evidence.54 
Additionally, in the context of the closure of the OTP’s preliminary examination 
into the UK, Sterio argued that in future, States may be able to successfully 
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argue that they have complied with the principle of complementarity even where 
they have conducted inadequate investigations.55 
 
These factors mean that Burke-White’s vision of the threat of intervention by the 
ICC encouraging States to carry out their own prosecutions may be 
ineffective,56 depending on how the ICC decides to interpret their obligation to 
ensure that States carry out prosecutions where they have the capacity to do 
so. Consequently, the ICC must apply a careful balance between deferring to 
the interests of individual States and ensuring that international justice is seen 
to be done. 
 
In relation to domestic institution building, based on the Libya cases, it is 
unclear to what extent the ICC is truly committed to this notion. In Gaddafi, it 
was held that a case would be admissible before the ICC because Libya was 
not investigating the same conduct as the ICC were,57 because the Libyan 
judiciary was not in a position to be able to try Gaddafi because they were 
unable to take Gaddafi into custody,58 and because there had been difficulties in 
ensuring that Gaddafi had legal representation.59 However, in Al-Senussi, it was 
held that not only was Libya investigating the same case as the ICC,60 there 
was nothing that meant that Libya was unable to carry out its own prosecution 
of Al-Senussi.61 Both of these decisions were affirmed on appeal.62 
 
 
55 Milena Sterio, The ICC Prosecutor’s Final Report into the Iraq/UK Investigation: Concerns 
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concerns-over-complementarity-and-the-courts-future-legitimacy/> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021) 
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59 ibid paras 212-214 
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The decisions in these two Libya cases have been criticised for a number of 
reasons. The first of which is that the decisions were inconsistent: Jurdi argues 
that this was the case because the only material difference between Gaddafi 
and Al-Senussi was that Gaddafi was not in Libyan custody and Al-Senussi 
was.63 The Pre-Trial Chamber does attempt to address this point in Gaddafi by 
stating that there were specific crimes in Libya that Gaddafi could not be 
charged with but Al-Senussi could because of Al-Senussi’s formal role as the 
head of Libyan intelligence.64 Additionally, the Appeals Chamber in Gaddafi 
stated that Libya had not satisfactorily proven that the Al-Senussi and Gaddafi 
cases were linked.65 However, from the point of view of a State trying to emerge 
from a conflict and rebuild itself following the Gaddafi regime, it seems difficult 
to accept how seemingly opposite decisions can be reached in cases involving 
members of the same regime. 
 
The second point relates to the matter of timing, and if this had been dealt with 
better, the problems with inconsistency in relation to the Libya cases may never 
have arisen. Akhavan argues that the ICC was forced to consider the progress 
made in the Gaddafi case on the basis of evidence provided to the court almost 
a year prior to Libya providing information in the Al-Senussi admissibility 
challenge, meaning that Libya was able to illustrate a more advanced case in 
respect of Al-Senussi than they were for Gaddafi.66 Akhavan also states: 
 
“global justice and local justice run on different schedules… They not 
only occupy differing time zones, one ahead of the other, but also 
differing conceptions of time. The ICC often arrives on the scene as the 
ambulance and trauma surgeon, while a national system, as next of kin 




63 Jurdi (n 6) 215 
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If the ICC is only interested in short-term progress that has been made, then it 
is difficult to imagine how investigatory processes alone could satisfy the 
principle of complementarity in all circumstances. However, to counter this 
point, the OTP has been subject to criticism for keeping preliminary 
examinations open too long before making a decision regarding whether to 
launch an investigation,68 and for not completing its work in any State in the first 
18 years of the Court’s operation.69 This suggests that speedy intervention in a 
situation may not be a significant priority for the OTP, and that determining 
whether a State has complied with the principle of complementarity may not be 
as simple as long at the level of investigative activity in a given period of time. 
 
The final point in relation to the Libya cases is the role that due process played 
in ensuring that the Gaddafi case was admissible before the ICC in relation to 
the role played by the failure to ensure that Gaddafi had access to legal 
representation. This serves to show how the problems caused by inconsistency 
and timing are ultimately interlinked. Jurdi states that the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber attempted to impose unrealistic judicial standards on Libya at a time 
when Libya’s judiciary was ‘trying to restore and strengthen its role after years 
of tyrannical marginalization and political interference.’70 
 
It is important to note that the status of the judicial system in Libya has proven 
difficult to remedy. For example, in the 2011 Freedom House Freedom in the 
World Report for Libya, it is stated that ‘The judiciary as a whole remains 
subservient to the political leadership and regularly penalizes political dissent’,71 
but the 2017 Report states, ‘By the end of 2016 the country’s judicial system 
 
68 Independent Expert Review (n 39) para 706 
69 ibid para 686 
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trial’ because it may provide encouragement for States to improve and develop their own justice 
systems: Frederic Megret and Marika Giles Samson, ‘Holding the Line on Complementarity in 
Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials’ (2013) 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 571, 587 
71 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties (Rowman and Littlefield 2011), 396. This report covers Muammar Gaddafi’s final year 
in power in Libya. 
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had essentially collapsed, with courts across the country nonfunctional and 
impunity widespread.’72 
 
Therefore, whilst the ICC’s expectation that Libya would not be able to resolve 
its problems in relation to securing a fair trial in the Gaddafi case was 
understandable, it also raises the difficult question to answer of why they 
decided not to proceed in the Al-Senussi case when the Pre-Trial Chamber 
stated that ‘it appears that Mr Al-Senussi’s right to legal representation has 
been primarily prejudiced by the security situation in the country’.73 The Libya 
case therefore serves as an example of why the OTP should take a flexible 
approach regarding the potential timing of any investigation in order to ensure a 
consistent prosecutorial approach, and to provide States with the opportunity to 
try and address past crimes themselves. 
 
2. The Relationship between International and Ordinary Crimes 
 
The importance of the distinction between so-called ordinary (crimes as defined 
under domestic law) and international crimes in relation to the principle of 
complementarity cannot be diminished as the subject attracted considerable 
complaints during the negotiation process for what would become the Rome 
Statute. In Article 42(2)(a) of the original International Law Commission Draft 
Statute for the ICC, it was stated that a person who has already been tried 
could be retried by the ICC if ‘the acts in question were characterised by that 
court as an ordinary crime and not as a crime which is within the jurisdiction of 
the Court’.74 This follows the position set out in the Statutes for the ICTY and 
ICTR.75 This provision was ultimately not included in the final version of the 
Rome Statute as a number of States objected to the inclusion of such a clause 
in the Ad-Hoc Committee, the United Kingdom, for example, stated: 
 
 
72 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
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‘The United Kingdom suggests that the distinction between ordinary 
crimes and international criminal court crimes is not appropriate, nor that 
it is appropriate for the international court, as a court of last resort, to 
retry individuals in the circumstances envisaged in Article 42(2)(a).’76 
 
The distinction between international and ordinary crimes is important to the 
work that is to be carried out in this study, as the US, has not implemented the 
Rome Statute into federal law. In such circumstances, prosecutions for ordinary 
crimes therefore appear more likely.77 Additionally, in relation to the UK, 
information recently disclosed by the Ministry of Defence revealed that there 
has only been one prosecution under the International Criminal Court Act 2001 
for offences committed in Iraq.78 This demonstrates that the distinction between 
ordinary and international crimes is important in the context of the situations to 
be examined in this research as prosecutions have been carried out for both 
types of crimes. 
 
Furthermore, it must be recognised that it will not be possible for the ICC or 
States to prosecute all offences which may constitute violations of international 
criminal law. For example, a 2004 report published by the United Nations 
Secretary-General stated that: 
 
“in post-conflict countries, the vast majority of perpetrators of serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will never 
be tried, whether internationally or domestically. As such, prosecutorial 
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In the ICC context, the OTP has realised since the establishment of the Court 
that they do not have the capacity to prosecute all violations of international 
criminal law.80 This was also acknowledged in the Independent Expert Review 
of the ICC.81 This argument was also utilised by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the 
Afghanistan admissibility decision as part of their justification for why an 
investigation relating to the situation in Afghanistan would not be in the interests 
of justice.82 
 
For the purposes of assessing whether a State has complied with the principle 
of complementarity, the OTP should therefore assess the rationale of a State’s 
prosecutorial policy in relation to alleged violations of international criminal law, 
rather than necessarily whether prosecutions for specific offences under 
international law have taken place. This is particularly important since events 
organised under the auspices of the ICC Assembly of States Parties have seen 
the OTP criticised for adopting a complementarity policy based on the interests 
of the Court, rather than on the challenges faced by States.83 There is also such 
a need to focus on the actual practice of States because the desire of States 
expressed at the Rome Conference was that the ICC was not meant to be the 
primary means of ensuring accountability for international crimes. For example, 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine stated: 
 
“My country supports the idea that complementarity should be at the 
heart of the Court’s statute. We would be taking the wrong road if, as a 
result of the creation of the Court, States and national courts were to 
relinquish their primary responsibility for prosecuting the most heinous 
crimes. The Court should have to intervene – on its own initiative or on 
 
80 Office of the Prosecutor (n 7) 3 
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82 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan) ICC-02/17-33 (12 April 2019), para 95 
83 Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, ‘Informal information session – 24 June 2020: Complementarity and the 
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request – only in the event or on request – only in the event of a 
deliberate or involuntary failure on the part of national authorities, when 
States are no longer able to try those responsible, or when they seek to 
protect them, especially by using delaying tactics.”84 
 
The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy additionally stated: 
 
“The principle of “complementarity” ensures that the Court will only 
exercise jurisdiction where national systems are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute transgressors. ICC jurisdiction will not apply when a state 
genuinely investigates and prosecute those responsible for serious 
crimes. It will be in a sense a court of last resort – a final bulwark to 
ensure that those who commit heinous crimes do not go unpunished.”85 
 
The fact that this Chapter has illustrated numerous instances where the OTP 
has been criticised for its prosecutorial policy serves to highlight that the 
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principle of complementarity is not operating as envisaged at the Rome 
Conference. Therefore, there is a clear need for the Court to give greater 
consideration to State practice, especially in light of the OTP admitting that it 
does not have the resources to prosecute all international crimes. The 
remainder of this section will therefore examine the relationship between 
ordinary and international crimes at the ICC, as despite the Rome Statute 
including no reference to ordinary crimes, a debate continues in this area. This 
discussion will also extend to the application of defences, with reference to the 




Whilst Kleffner points out it is unclear exactly to what extent the crimes found 
within the Rome Statute have to be implemented at the domestic level,86 it is 
clear that commentators agree that some form of implementation of Rome 
Statute crimes is required for States to be able to fulfil their obligations under 
the principle of complementarity.87 Stahn, for example, states: 
 
“The complementarity test under Article 17 provides an incentive for 
States to enact implementing legislation which allows effective 
investigations and prosecutions at the domestic level. The very existence 
of complementarity has thus an impact on the repression of crimes under 
domestic criminal jurisdiction.”88 
 
This means that States have had to take measures to implement the Rome 
Statute into their domestic systems. Terracino states that whilst some States, 
such as the United Kingdom, have decided to implement the definitions of 
crimes under the Rome Statute directly into domestic law,89 other States such 
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as France and Ecuador took a broader approach to the ICC in relation to 
genocide,90 Bosnia and Herzegovina to war crimes,91 and the DRC and 
Ecuador to crimes against humanity.92 However, Terracino also points out that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina chose not to implement a clause on child conscription 
into their Criminal Code, despite its inclusion in the Rome Statute.93 
 
Under the principle of state sovereignty, States are able to exercise their legal 
powers as they choose to do so.94 Van der Wilt argues that it would be 
impossible to impose a uniform approach to all States, as the nature of crimes 
would be different depending on the location and circumstances they take place 
in.95 The ICC may therefore have to accept that States take a different approach 
to legislation depending on their circumstances, meaning that sometimes they 
will be forced to accept a situation that is considered to be less than perfect. 
Additionally, as shown in the last section on primacy, any attempt by the ICC to 
assert jurisdiction on the basis of differences between offences on the domestic 
and international levels may be met with resistance from States. 
 
However, the argument does still exist as to whether a decision by a State to 
prosecute for ordinary crimes as opposed to their international counterparts 
constitutes a failure of the State to comply with the principle of complementarity. 
This is an important issue as high-profile prosecutions for ordinary crimes that 
have previously taken place may not meet the ICC’s definitions of crimes. 
Heaphy and Pittman, for example, state that this would be the case with regards 
to the prosecution of William Calley for murder in relation to his involvement in 
the My Lai massacre as the elements of this crime were substantially different 
to the closest crime in the Rome Statute of wilful killing.96 
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It has been suggested that the potential for ICC jurisdiction will only arise in 
States where ordinary crimes are relied upon in circumstances where no crime 
exists that adequately encompasses the conduct subject to examination by the 
OTP.97 The ICC did, however’ address this issue in the case of Gaddafi, where 
the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that ‘a domestic investigation or prosecution for 
“ordinary crimes”, to the extent that the case covers the same conduct, shall be 
considered sufficient’,98 before going on to state that Gaddafi was being 
investigated for different conduct than the ICC was indicting him for.99  
 
Whilst this may address the problem of what happens if a State lacks the 
legislation that could prevent a prosecution from taking place for an international 
crime, it does not address the extent to which a State choosing to not prosecute 
for an international crime when it was capable to do so has breached the 
principle of complementarity. When emerging from a conflict, a State may 
choose to prosecute individuals for what could be perceived as lesser crimes, or 
even not to prosecute them at all. For example, a United Nations Report noted 
that during negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, the 
parties refused to allow for heavy punishments for FARC leaders, as ‘it would 
be unrealistic to expect guerrilla leaders to negotiate their own incarceration and 
reiterating that the essence of a political settlement was to ensure that the 
armed group was able to make the transition from armed conflict to politics.’100 
Additionally, in 2010, the President of the ICTY Patrick Robinson in 2010 stated, 
‘the Tribunal cannot, through the rendering of its judgements alone, bring peace 
and reconciliation to the region: other remedies should complement the criminal 
trials if lasting peace is to be achieved’.101 This means that the ICC seriously 
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needs to consider the context in which prosecutions occur, and whether 
intervention will promote or undermine the goals of international criminal justice. 
 
b. Defences under National Law 
 
Another factor which complicates the process of implementing international law 
domestically is the application of defences, as the transition between defences 
at the international level and the domestic level may have unintended 
consequences, which show that there are clear distinctions in the operation of 
the law at the national and international levels. This can be seen in the UK, as 
Cryer and Bekou state that because the International Criminal Court Act 2001 
relies upon domestic defences, the defence of duress is available for 
international crimes.102 Cryer states that the defence will not apply to 
international crimes involving murder due to the judgment of the House of Lords 
in Howe.103 This is a position which seems to reflect international criminal law, 
as the ICTY rejected the defence of duress to crimes against humanity in 
Erdemović.104 It is questionable though, based on the rationale behind the 
judgment in Howe, whether the defence should apply to international crimes at 
all. For example, in the course of his judgment justifying why duress should not 
be a defence to murder, Lord Griffiths stated: 
 
“We face a rising tide of violence and terrorism against which the law 
must stand firm recognising that its highest duty is to protect the freedom 
and lives of those that live under it. The sanctity of human life lies at the 
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Based on these comments, it is difficult to see how duress could possibly apply 
in English law to what the Rome Statute states are ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.106 
 
The potential availability of defences may, however, justify why a State such as 
the UK may choose to decide to not pursue a prosecution for an international 
crime even where such a crime has been committed. Under Article 17(1)(b) of 
the Rome Statute, the ICC is unable to assert jurisdiction in situations where: 
 
“The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute.”107 
 
In the context of prosecutions in England, the Full Code Test (FCT) states that 
prosecutors as part of their determination of whether there is ‘a realistic 
prospect of conviction’ consider the potential impact of any defences throughout 
the prosecution process.108 The FCT additionally states that ‘a case which does 
not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no matter how serious or 
sensitive it may be.’109 In the absence of prosecutions, States may choose to 
pursue other measures not involving prosecution, which may allow the truth to 
be discovered, and ensure that there is some sense of accountability for acts 
that have been committed.110 
 
3. The ICC and Alternative Investigation Mechanisms 
 
During the plenary debates at the 1998 Diplomatic Conference in Rome, 
Afghanistan urged States to leave open the possibility of accepting alternatives 
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to prosecution when a State has decided that it is better to simply move on from 
any past crimes that have been committed.111 However, in their policy paper on 
the interests of justice published in 2007, the OTP state that: 
 
“In relation to other forms of justice decided at the local level, the Office 
of the Prosecutor reiterates the need to integrate different approaches. 
All approaches can be complementary… The pursuit of criminal justice 
provides one part of the necessary response to serious crimes of 
international concern which, by itself may prove to be insufficient as the 
Office is conducting focused investigations and prosecutions. As such, it 
fully endorses the complementary role that can be played by domestic 
prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations programs, institutional reform 
and traditional justice mechanisms in the pursuit of a broader justice.” 112 
 
The OTP position that the use of alternative justice mechanisms are something 
that should take place alongside criminal investigation processes comes even 
though an informal experts paper published in 2003 states that ‘mechanisms 
other than prosecution for dealing with past abuses, including alternative forms 
of justice, may raise difficult questions for the OTP in interpreting its role and 
mandate’.113 The paper also stated that ‘past experience demonstrates that it 
would be arduous to attempt to develop a general doctrine on how to assess 
such situations. One must be alert to different contexts, including political, 
cultural, society-related and other factors’.114 It should, however, be noted that 
the OTP’s position has received judicial backing from the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
the Burundi admissibility decision, in which it was stated that ‘national 
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investigations that are not designed to result in criminal prosecutions do not 
meet the admissibility requirements under article 17(1) of the Statute.’115 
 
Scepticism surrounding the use of alternative justice mechanisms is 
understandable. Despite Gibson’s assertion in 2006 that the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was a factor in South Africa maintaining a 
stable democracy,116 other processes have not necessarily fared as well. For 
example, Roht-Arriaza states that the Rettig Commission was forced to sacrifice 
justice in order to obtain the truth about what had happened during the Pinochet 
regime.117  
 
This section will discuss the role of amnesties and truth commissions before 
discussing the need for clarity regarding the acceptability of non-criminal 
investigations under the principle of complementarity. This discussion is 
necessary to assess whether the non-judicial, non-criminal investigations to be 
discussed in later chapters can demonstrate that the United States and United 
Kingdom have complied with the principle of complementarity. Such an analysis 
is also essential because there is a need to consider more than just criminal 
prosecutions when discussing whether a State has sought to achieve a sense 
of justice for past wrongdoing. For example, in their 2004 Report on the rule of 
law and transitional justice, the UN Secretary-General stated that: 
 
“the international community has rushed to prescribe a particular formula 
for transitional justice, emphasizing either criminal prosecutions or truth-
telling without first affording victims and national constituencies the 
opportunity to consider and decide on the proper balance. The 
international community must see transitional justice in a way that 
extends well beyond courts and tribunals. The challenges of post-conflict 
environments necessitate an approach that balances a variety of goals, 
 
115 Situation in the Republic of Burundi (Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Republic of 
Burundi”) ICC-01/17-9-Red (9 November 2017), para 152 
116 James L Gibson, ‘The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa’ 
(2006) 50(3) Journal of Conflict Resolution 409, 410 
117 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Truth Commissions and Amnesties in Latin America: The Second 
Generation’ (1998) 92 American Society of International Law Proceedings 313, 313 
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including the pursuit of accountability, truth and reparation, the 
preservation of peace and the building of democracy and the rule of 
law.”118 
 
Additionally, a document published in 2013 by the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy states that: 
 
“Effective prosecution strategies for large-scale crimes often focus on the 
planners and organizers of crimes, rather than those of lower rank or 
responsibility. Therefore prosecutions cannot achieve meaningful justice 
in isolation. Implementing prosecution strategies with other initiatives, 
such as reparations programmes for victims, reconciliation and 
institutional reform – including vetting procedures and truth-seeking – 
can help fill the impunity gap by addressing crimes with large numbers of 
victims and perpetrators.”119 
 
This means that there is a clear need for an institution such as the ICC to 
consider a wider variety of mechanisms when deciding whether to launch an 
investigation since States have to juggle a wide range of competing interests in 




Stahn argues that a State which decides to impose an amnesty for crimes 
within the Rome Statute may have indicated that it was unwilling to prosecute, 
despite their obligations under Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute.120 Following 
the creation of the Rome Statute, Dugard stated that ‘Amnesty is no longer 
 
118 United Nations Security Council (n 79), para 25 
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accepted as the natural price for transition from repression to democracy’.121 
This is a trend illustrated by Roht-Arriaza who highlighted that in Latin America, 
States have been able to overcome past amnesty laws to pursue 
prosecutions.122  
 
However, Dugard states that the failure of the Rome Statute to include a 
provision on amnesties ‘allows prosecutions to proceed where they will not 
impede peace, but at the same time permits societies to ‘trade’ amnesty for 
peace where there is no alternative’.123 Stahn, however, argues that blanket 
amnesties would not be allowed under the Rome Statute as, ‘an amnesty law 
which impedes prosecution or which does not provide for an investigation 
cannot be invoked as a bar to ICC proceedings, because it does not even meet 
the basic requirements for inadmissibility under Article 17(1)(a) or (b)’.124  
 
The issue of amnesties is not one which has disappeared however, as despite 
Stahn’s assertion that allowing amnesties runs contrary to the notion that by 
choosing to join the ICC, States have recognised that individuals should be held 
responsible for their actions,125 States still employ amnesty laws. The 
Colombian Peace Agreement, for example, includes an amnesty provision 
which grants ‘the broadest possible amnesty’,126 and covers a wide range of 
crimes.127 The Agreement does, however, exclude specifically amnesties for 
crimes that are within the scope of the Rome Statute,128 a fact which was 
welcomed by the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.129 This may be a fact that is 
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reconcilable with the purposes of the Rome Statute though, as Stahn argues 
that Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute’s gravity requirement means that a 
difference can be drawn between amnesties being granted to those most 
responsible for international crimes and others who may also have been 
involved in such action.130 
 
It may be the case that amnesties do play an important role in ensuring peace 
and security, as Arsanjani states that ‘amnesties have sometimes been a critical 
component of a package for reaching settlement in a divided state’.131 It 
therefore must be asked whether an alternative approach to ICC jurisdiction 
would help to ensure that there is some sense of accountability for past actions, 
as ICC intervention has been subject to critique. This is illustrated by the case 
of Uganda, where Schabas and Ssenyonjo highlight that the ICC’s presence 
may have acted as an impediment to peace talks being brought to a successful 
conclusion,132 though they do credit the ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants with 
initiating peace talks.133 Additionally, Schabas argues that there are 
circumstances where a desire to continue with criminal prosecutions may lead 
to the extension of an armed conflict,134 an accusation which the ICC has faced 
in the Côte d’Ivoire.135 
 
However, in their discussion of the UK’s Overseas Operations (Service 
Personnel and Veterans) Bill, the OTP refer to the Bill as potentially applying an 
amnesty for crimes committed by UK forces in Iraq,136 and state that amnesties 
run contrary to international law.137 This suggests that the OTP is as yet 
unwilling to accept the application of amnesties for Rome Statute crimes.There 
 
130 Stahn (n 120) 707 
131 Mahnoush H Arsanjani, ‘The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws’ (1999) 
93 American Society of International Law Proceedings 65, 65 
132 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
Leaders: Prosecution or Amnesty?’ (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 361, 369-70; 
William A Schabas, ‘Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts’ (2008) 19 
Criminal Law Forum 5, 20-22.  
133 Ssenyonjo (n 132) 373; Schabas (n 132) 19-20 
134 Schabas (n 132) 22 
135 McGovern (n 4) 
136 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (Office of the Prosecutor, 9 
December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 489 
137 ibid para 478 
 42 
has, however, been limited ICC jurisprudence addressing the issue of 
amnesties, with the Appeals Chamber determining in the Gaddafi case that the 
amnesty which was the focus of the admissibility challenge did not apply to 
Gaddafi.138 The Court additionally stated in this March 2020 judgment that ‘For 
present purposes, it suffices to say only that international law is still in the 
developmental stage on the question of amnesties’.139 Close states that it would 
have been ‘imprudent’ for the Appeals Chamber to assess the applicability of 
amnesties any further.140 
  
b. Truth Commissions 
 
Stahn states that truth commissions serve several purposes: they enable States 
to be able to compile a more comprehensive range of past wrongdoings than 
may be possible through the criminal trial process,141 provide an opportunity to 
hear the voice of victims,142 and ensure that those who committed crimes are 
held to account.143 It is, however, still unclear whether the use of truth 
commissions is compatible with the principle of complementarity. A 2006 
document on truth commissions published by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights states that the ICC’s response to the 
establishment of a truth commission ‘is likely to be determined by whether there 
appears to be an intent to follow such a truth commission inquiry with judicial 
action, rather than to close the possibility of prosecution through the 
establishment of a non-judicial inquiry’.144 
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Robinson argues that the key to determining whether truth commissions can be 
used as an alternative to prosecution will depend upon the powers available to 
the truth commission, such as whether it has the power to allow amnesties, and 
whether options such as prosecution have been considered instead of or 
alongside the commission.145 Robinson, however, states that that it is unlikely 
that a process which introduces a blanket amnesty would be acceptable.146 
Additionally, Seibert-Fohr argues that if Article 17 of the Rome Statute required 
criminal investigations, ‘this would exclude only a truth commission mechanism 
that generally provides for criminal impunity independent of the outcome of the 
investigation.’147 Seibert-Fohr additionally argues that the scope of Article 17 
was never designed to ensure that investigations carried out had to be 
exclusively criminal in nature,148 and that as long as a State can prove that any 
decision to not prosecute in a situation where a truth commission was 
established to ensure peace, such a mechanism should satisfy the principle of 
complementarity if the commission does ensure that there is accountability.149 
 
Any move which may serve to undermine the validity of the use of truth 
commissions may serve to limit their effectiveness as Bisset argues that truth 
commissions may no longer be able to receive confidential information if this 
could then be requested by the ICC for use in a prosecution.150 Bisset 
additionally argues that the right to a fair trial may be jeopardised if self-
incriminating evidence submitted by an individual to a truth commission has to 
be handed to the ICC for use in a prosecution.151 This means that the issue of 
truth commissions may not be just about attempting to ensure peace, but also 
about protecting the rights of those who give evidence. 
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c. A Need for Clarity Regarding Non-Criminal Investigations 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber appears to have made it clear that complementarity can 
only be satisfied by a criminal investigation process, stating in the Burundi 
admissibility decision that: 
 
“the Chamber considers that a national investigation merely aimed at the 
gathering of evidence does not lead, in principle, to the inadmissibility of 
any cases before the Court, considering that, for the purposes of 
complementarity, an investigation must be carried out with a view to 
conducting criminal prosecutions… national investigations that are not 
designed to result in criminal prosecutions do not meet the admissibility 
requirements under article 17(1) of the Statute.”152 
 
Further clarity on the acceptability of non-criminal investigation processes would 
be welcomed since the United Nations encourages States to engage in non-
criminal processes. For example, in 2014, the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights welcomed the establishment of such a commission in 
Tunisia.153 Additionally, in the context of the UK, the United Nations Torture 
Committee has encouraged the UK to launch an overarching inquiry to examine 
allegations of mistreatment against Iraqi civilians.154  
 
Furthermore, when encouraging States to ratify the Rome Statute, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in September 1998 that: 
 
“It is inconceivable that… the Court would seek to substitute its 
judgement for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way to put 
a traumatic past behind it and build a better future. Some people seem to 
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imagine this Court will be composed of frivolous or malicious people, 
roaming the world in search of opportunities to undermine a peace 
process here, or prosecute a peacekeeper there. Nothing could be more 
improbable.”155 
 
In circumstances where States are acting in a manner endorsed by an 
international body such as the UN, it would be difficult to justify an OTP strategy 
involving the pursuit of prosecutions. This further serves to show that when 
considering State compliance with the principle of complementarity, the OTP 
should consider more than just prosecutorial activity. 
 
There is also a need to consider the actual practices of States when assessing 
compliance with the principle of complementarity. For example, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapters Three and Six, the use of non-criminal investigations 
has been a major element of the responses of the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom to allegations of war crimes. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, it may be possible to argue that there is a public policy justification for 
not prosecuting lower-ranking personnel for alleged criminal misconduct based 
on the fact the Baha Mousa Inquiry found at the start of the armed conflict in 
Iraq, ‘there was no proper MoD-endorsed doctrine on interrogation of prisoners 
of war that was generally available. The proper limits of interrogation had 
become confined to teaching materials at Chicksands’.156 Combined with the 
fact that the UK took steps to enact institutional reforms to ensure that abuses 
such as those in Iraq did not recur,157 and a finding by the OTP that the UK had 
investigated the responsibility of higher-ranking officials,158 it may be possible to 
argue that the UK has complied with the principle of complementarity. 
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This is something that has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, however, 
as the findings of non-criminal investigations may also serve to demonstrate 
why further criminal investigations are necessary. This can be seen in the case 
of Australia where in advance of the publication of the Brereton Report, which 
found that members of Australian Defence Force were responsible for the 
unlawful killing of Afghan civilians,159 the Australian government announced that  
allegations of criminal wrongdoing would be investigated.160 In the case of the 
United States, it was decided that decisions not to prosecute individuals would 
not be revisited following the publication of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s 
Report on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program,161 even though 
President Obama acknowledged that: 
 
“The report documents a troubling program involving enhanced 
interrogation techniques on terrorism suspects in secret facilities outside 
the United States, and it reinforces my long-held view that these harsh 
methods were not only inconsistent with our values as a nation, they did 
not serve our broader counterterrorism efforts or our national security 
interests. Moreover, these techniques did significant damage to 
America’s standing in the world and made it harder to pursue our 
interests with allies and partners. That is why I will continue to use my 
authority as President to make sure we never resort to those methods 
again.”162 
 
159 Christopher Knaus, ‘Australian special forces involved in murder of 39 Afghan civilians, war 
crimes report alleges’ (The Guardian, 19 November 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/19/australian-special-forces-involved-
in-of-39-afghan-civilians-war-crimes-report-alleges> (Last accessed 25 July 2021). For 
discussion of the Report in the context of the obligation to investigate under international law, 
see Durward Johnson and Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Duty to Investigate War Crimes’ (Lieber 
Institute, 22 December 2020) <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/duty-investigate-war-crimes/> (Last 
accessed 25 July 2021) 
160 Andrew Greene, ‘Special investigator appointed to prosecute Australian soldiers accused of 
Afghanistan war crimes’ (ABC News, 12 November 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-
11-12/prime-minister-update-defence-war-crimes-report/12875570> (Last accessed 25 July 
2021) 
161 Julian Hattem, ‘DOJ won’t reopen torture probe after CIA report’ (The Hill, 10 December 
2014) <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/226603-justice-department-wont-reopen-torture-
probes> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
162 White House, ‘Statement by the President Report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence’ (White House, 9 December 2014) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2014/12/09/statement-president-report-senate-select-committee-intelligence> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021) 
 47 
 
This serves to demonstrate that it is debateable that the United States has 
complied with the principle of complementarity.163 
 
In light of the OTP’s longstanding acknowledgement that it does not have the 
investigative resources to prosecute every alleged international crime, the OTP 
should assess whether non-criminal processes pursued by States are indicative 
of a desire to address past wrongdoing or are indicative of a State unwilling or 
unable to take action. If use of a non-judicial process highlights that a State 
should take action to hold those responsible for past misconduct to account, 
and the State then fails to do so, the OTP would be more than justified to take 
action. If, however, a State does take action designed to hold those responsible 
for the perpetration of crimes to account and to ensure such crimes do not 




This Chapter has shown that there are a number of reasons why it may be 
incumbent upon the ICC to assess a wider range of State conduct when 
determining whether a State has complied with the principle of complementarity. 
The first reason, as shown in the section on the relationship between 
complementarity and primacy is that the ICC’s interpretation of the Rome 
Statute may have given States the unintended impression that States are either 
incapable of prosecuting international crimes themselves, or may not be trusted 
to do so, despite Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute stating that the ICC could 
only assume jurisdiction over a case when a State was ‘unwilling or unable to 
do so’.164 The second major problem, as shown in the section examining the 
implementation of the Rome Statute into domestic law by States, is that the 
ability of States to prosecute international crimes is limited by the framework of 
their judicial system. It was also highlighted that States may choose, for public 
policy reasons, to use an alternative mechanism to ensure that there is some 
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sense of accountability for international crimes. The final major problem 
discovered in this Chapter, as shown in the final section, is that it is unclear 
whether the State can pursue non-criminal investigative mechanisms that it 
feels are in its best interests to prevent the recurrence of international crimes 
without potentially rendering cases admissible before the ICC. This is the case 
even though there is no reason, in principle, why such mechanisms do not 






Chapter Two: Criminal Law in the United States of America 
 
This Chapter will discuss the law applicable to the subject matter of the 
investigations currently being carried out by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) into the conduct of United States personnel in Afghanistan. This 
discussion of the scope of applicable law is necessary as Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute makes it clear that the ICC is able to assume jurisdiction in situations 
where a State is unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction themselves.1 As 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the principle of complementarity 
provides a means through which the United States can avoid further ICC 
scrutiny.2 In the Gaddafi Appeal Judgment, the Court stated if the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) and a State are investigating the same offences, then any 
case before the ICC would be inadmissible.3 The Court also stated that in 
situations where OTP and State focus is different, an assessment of whether 
the State’s investigatory process complies with the principle of complementarity 
will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.4 
 
As most of the evidence from which the OTP has based their allegations that 
US personnel have committed offences under the Rome Statute is not publicly 
available, this Chapter will focus on the extent to which the law dealing with 
specific offences alleged under the Rome Statute is compatible with offences 
found in US law (e.g. the crime of rape under the Rome Statute with sexual 
offences under US law). It is possible that this discussion exposes flaws in the 
legal framework of the United States may exist that limit them from discharging 
their obligations to carry out investigations or prosecutions. This may prevent 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
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the US from being able to conduct investigations or prosecutions in a manner 
that reflects the OTP’s focus.5 
 
This Chapter will include a discussion of both the law applicable to members of 
the armed forces, as found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),6 and 
federal criminal law.7 This dual focus is necessary as the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation at the ICC in relation to the 
situation in Afghanistan makes it clear that their investigation will focus both on 
the conduct of the armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).8 The 
OTP’s investigation request states that these alleged offences took place 
‘primarily in the period 2003-2004’.9 The offences to be examined include war 
crimes, torture and sexual offences.10  
 
1. The War Crimes Act 
 
In their request to investigate the conduct of US personnel in Afghanistan, the 
ICC allege that a number of war crimes in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict, as found in Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute,11 were committed. 
It is therefore necessary to discuss the war crimes legislation that does exist 
within the United States and assess whether any potential prosecutions under 
this Act would satisfy the ‘same conduct’ test set out by the ICC in Lubanga.12 
 
5 In the Gaddafi case, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that ‘it would not be appropriate to expect 
Libya’s investigation to cover exactly the same acts of murder and persecution mentioned in the 
Article 58 Decision as constituting instances of Mr Gaddafi’s alleged course of conduct. Instead, 
the chamber will assess whether the alleged domestic investigation addresses the same 
conduct underlying the Warrant of Arrest and Article 58 Decision’: Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi (Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi) ICC-01/11-
01/11-344-Red (31 May 2013), para 83. 
6 10 US Code Ch 47 
7 18 US Code 
8 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15”) ICC-02/17-7-Red (20 November 2017) 
88-124 
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CIA Torture’ (Human Rights Watch, 1 December 2015) 
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2021), 35-96 
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This section is not designed to include a substantive discussion of all the crimes 
relevant to the OTP’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing in Afghanistan, it is 
merely designed to provide an overview of the Act as a whole. Discussion of a 
selection of offences within the War Crimes Act that are relevant to the OTP’s 
investigation into Afghanistan will be included within the sections to follow on 
sexual offences and torture. 
 
The United States Congress has implemented war crimes legislation, which is 
now contained in Section 2441 of Title 18 of the United States Code.13 This 
legislation has been amended on multiple occasions, and because the last 
amendments, enacted as part of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,14 apply 
retroactively,15 it is necessary to state what conduct the legislation has 
prohibited under all its iterations. The initial version of the statute simply stated, 
‘Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a grave breach 
of the Geneva conventions… shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life 
or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be 
subject to the penalty of death’.16 
 
This brief definition of war crimes was expanded in 1997 to also include ‘a 
violation of common Article 3 of the international conventions signed at Geneva, 
12 August 1949’,17 as well as other provisions in relation to issues such as 
booby-traps,18 and violations of Hague Convention IV.19 The second articulation 
of war crimes in United States law is important, as this is the version of the War 
Crimes Act that would have applied had any prosecutions been brought for war 
crimes prior to the implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. In 
other words, this was the version of the Act in place in the period in which the 
OTP state that the alleged war crimes committed by US personnel ‘primarily’ 
took place.20 This is also an important consideration for determining the scope 
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of potential prosecutions the ICC, as this definition of war crimes was the one 
that existed at the time the Office of Legal Counsel produced memos which 
stated, amongst other things, that: 
 
“The victim must experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that is 
equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical 
injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting 
in a loss of significant body function will likely result. If that pain or 
suffering is psychological, that suffering must result from one of the acts 
set forth in the statute. In addition, these acts must cause long-term 
mental harm.”21 
 
Therefore, this would inform a decision on whether it was believed that those 
responsible for the creation of the policy should be held criminally liable for any 
offences under the Rome Statute that took place or whether individuals involved 
in interrogations had the mental element required for any crimes committed.22 It 
should be noted that there has been significant commentary concerning the 
OLC memos. For example, Markovic and Romm argue that the contents of the 
memos may give rise to responsibility for war crimes.23 Nowak also states that 
the contents of the initial OLC memos were ‘legally unsound’,24 and ‘clearly 
contradict the case law and practice of the competent international and regional 
human rights bodies’.25 Additionally, Koh stated that ‘the Bybee Opinion is 
 
21 Jay S Bybee, ‘Memorandum for Alberto R Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. 
Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A’ (Office of Legal Counsel, 1 August 2002) 
<https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 13. 
22 This is vital since Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute (n 1) states, ‘Unless otherwise provided, a 
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perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read’.26 It should 
be noted that not all discussion of the OLC memos has been critical. Posner 
and Vermeuele, for example, argued that ‘the memorandum’s arguments are 
standard lawyerly fare, routine stuff.’27 Furthermore, Flores states that ‘The 
Torture Memo properly cites an assortment of valid legal sources to support its 
conclusions and is replete with scholastic, critical analysis. In summary, John 
Yoo did not violate his ethical obligations as a lawyer in authoring the Torture 
Memo.’28 In a more balanced argument, Ku argues that they disagreed with the 
contents of the memos,29 ‘insistence on criminal punishment of the Bush 
lawyers for their legal advice is both wrong-headed and dangerous’.30 However, 
in what is a damning critique of the OLC’s memos, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee stated in their report examining the Department of Defense’s 
Detention and Interrogation Program that: 
 
“OLC opinions distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture laws, 
rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced 
Department of Defense determinations as to what interrogation 
techniques were legal for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. 
military personnel.”31 
 
Ultimately the issue of whether there have been prosecutions under any version 
of the War Crimes Act is a moot point because, as Corn and VanLandingham 
state, no prosecutions have been brought under the War Crimes Act at the 
federal level,32 and also raise that only two individuals have been charged with 
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war crimes in the military context.33 This means that any prosecutions under the 
War Crimes Act would have to be brought as a result of the amendments made 
following the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. This Act 
amended the section on breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, and instead requires that for a war crime to take place, there has 
to be a ‘grave breach of Common Article 3’.34 The Act states that the following 
offences are classified as grave breaches of Common Article 3: ‘Torture’,35 
‘Cruel or Inhuman Treatment’,36 ‘Performing Biological Experiments’,37 
‘Murder’,38 ‘Mutilation or Maiming’,39 ‘Intentionally Causing Serious Bodily 
Injury’,40 ‘Rape’,41 ‘Sexual Assault or Abuse’,42 and ‘Taking Hostages’.43 
 
Graham and Connolly state that the amended version of the War Crimes Act 
serves an essential purpose: 
 
“The MCA’s modification of the War Crimes Act added need clarity by 
specifying the exact portions of Common Article 3 that were enforceable 
under domestic criminal law. Without such clarification, any prosecution 
for a violation of Common Article 3 under the earlier version of the War 
Crimes Act would be susceptible to challenge for being unconstitutionally 
vague.”44 
 
Whilst these amendments do make it possible to bring charges that on the face 
of it appear to match some of the offences under examination by the ICC, the 
list is by no means complete. Scheffer, for example, stated the following about 
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the Military Commissions Act’s contribution to the law of war crimes in the 
United States: 
 
“The MCA decriminalized certain war crimes set forth in Common Article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for purposes of US prosecution and 
thus created an impunity gap in U.S. law. Specifically, the following 
violations described in Common Article 3 can no longer be prosecuted in 
U.S. courts following the nine-year period during which they had been 
criminalized: “violence to life and person”, murder “of all kinds” (as 
opposed to the limited and defined circumstances set forth in the MCA), 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment,” and “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.””45 
 
This is a potentially problematic situation, as it appears that the United States 
may be unable to conduct prosecutions into all the alleged offences being 
investigated by the OTP in a manner which reflects their status as international 
crimes. For example, one of the offences which the OTP has requested to 
investigate is outrages upon personal dignity under article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the 
Rome Statute.46 Cerone and Matheson suggest that a reason behind this lack 
of inclusion is that the US government believed that the term ‘outrages upon 
personal dignity’ lacked the clarity required in order to constitute criminal 
conduct.47 This was the case even though Matheson had observed that the 
United States Military had implemented the same wording internally and had not 
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objected to the earlier versions of the War Crimes Act.48 Additionally, Jenks 
highlights that there are significant differences between the offence of outrages 
upon personal dignity and the offence of ‘maltreatment of persons’ found within 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.49 
 
Whilst this may be a potential issue since the OTP is investigating allegations of 
outrages upon personal dignity, it does not necessarily mean that the United 
States has not complied with the principle of complementarity if it can show that 
it has conducted investigations or prosecutions in relation to the other crimes 
under investigation. The OTP stated in their investigation request that ‘the 
prosecution considers that the required degree of severity, humiliation and 
degradation has been met, since the alleged conduct described as torture and 
cruel treatment would also meet the threshold for humiliating and degrading 
treatment.’50 Additionally, in Gaddafi, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that ‘a 
domestic investigation or prosecution for “ordinary crimes”, to the extent that the 
case covers the same conduct, shall be considered sufficient.’51 
 
Pittman and Heaphy state that the Department of Defense would never allow 
the Department of Justice to assert jurisdiction over offences committed by 
active service personnel in order to try the offence federally.52 This may be the 
result of a culture that exists within the US military that war crimes are 
exclusively conducted by enemy forces. For example, the 2016 Department of 
Defense Law of War Manual cites the following provision from the Department 
of the Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare published in July 1956: 
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“The United States normally punishes war crimes as such only if they are 
committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving the interests of the 
enemy State. Violations of the law of war committed by persons subject 
to the military law of the United States will usually constitute violations of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under 
that Code.”53 
 
This suggests that there may be a reluctance from the US military to properly 
acknowledge the damage that the conduct of their troops may cause. This may 
affect the ability of the ICC to consider that the United States has complied with 
the principle of complementarity since the Preamble to the Rome Statute states 
that international crimes, such as war crimes, are ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.54 It therefore has to be 
considered whether a State prosecuting war crimes as different offences 
reflects the symbolic significance of these international crimes. Such a matter 
also merits consideration since in the Simone Gbagbo case, it was held that the 
prosecution of Gbagbo in the Côte d’Ivoire did not render the case at the ICC 
inadmissible.55 
 
The final factor which needs to be considered when discussing whether the 
United States has complied with the principle of complementarity with regards 
to its use, or lack thereof, of its war crimes legislation is the existence of a 
defence, implemented as part of the Detainee Treatment Act,56 for United 
States personnel who committed offences committed during authorised 
detention and interrogation operations but who had operated on the basis that 
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such operations were legal. This defence was subsequently clarified in the 
Military Conventions Act 2006, to clarify that the defence applies for offences 
committed between 11 September 2001 and 30 December 2005,57 and for 
offences that were ‘grounded’ within the provision on grave breaches of 
Common Article 3 contained within the War Crimes Act.58 The very fact that this 
defence, which excludes individuals from criminal responsibility for charges 
brought under war crimes legislation, exists may be another sign that the United 
States is unwilling to prosecute crimes in a manner which reflects their 
significance to the international community. 
 
2. Sexual Offences 
 
As part of their request to open an investigation into the conduct of United 
States personnel committed in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan, the OTP 
allege that offences were committed under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome 
Statute.59 The allegations in relation to rape against the United States military 
are the following: 
 
“The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that 
members of the US armed forces penetrated the anal opening of at least 
three detainees. Each of the victims was allegedly probed anally by 
means of cavity searches or with an unknown object, in circumstances of 
sexual humiliation, including stripped naked in front of others, 
photographed nude, blindfolded and shackled nude, and/or while being 
sexually molested.”60 
 
In relation to the alleged rape committed by the CIA, the OTP stated that ‘the 
information available also provides a reasonable basis to believe that CIA 
interrogators penetrated the anal opening of at least two detainees by the 
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coercive practices known as “rectal rehydration”, “rectal feeding” or “rectal 
examination”’.61 
 
Furthermore, the OTP stated, ‘the information available provides a reasonable 
basis to believe that 12 detainees in the custody of US armed forces and 8 
detainees in the custody of the CIA were subjected to abuse constituting “other 
forms of sexual violence” under the coercive circumstances of detention’.62 The 
OTP also argued that: 
 
“The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that the 
20 detainees concerned were subjected to acts involving forced nudity, 
often in combination with other techniques, including during 
interrogations; photographing detainees naked; public exposure to 
female soldiers while detainees showered; sexual humiliation; being 
shown pornographic material with a picture of the detainee’s mother; 
physical molestation; sexual assault by a female soldier; and beatings on 
testicles.”63 
 
Because of the varying nature of these offences, it will be necessary to deal 
with the law that may potentially be applicable to the military and the CIA in turn. 
This will be done by examining the law as it existed in 2003, as the OTP allege 
that crimes committed by US personnel were committed ‘primarily in the period 
2003-2004’.64 This is with the exception sexual offences under the War Crimes 
Act , since as referred to earlier, these provisions apply retroactively.65 This 
section will concentrate primarily on the allegations of rape, since as will be 
shown below, there are several potentially problematic aspects in relation to the 
law on rape within the United States. Additionally, the information provided for 
in the OTP’s initial investigation request is too limited to allow for a proper 
judgement to be made about what crimes may or may not have taken place and 
it would be unfair to speculate here. 
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a. The United States Military 
 
In the time period of the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan, there have 
been multiple versions of the law related to sexual offences included within the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The first of which, in effect until 2007, will be 
the version discussed in this section as this was the version that was applicable 





The crime of rape is defined as, ‘any person subject to this chapter who 
commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of 
rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct’.67 It is further stated that ‘penetration, however slight, is 
sufficient’.68 The Department of the Army’s Military Judges’ Handbook states 
that for the purposes of this definition of rape, ‘“Sexual intercourse” is any 
penetration, however slight of the female sex organ by the penis. An ejaculation 
is not required.’69  
 
This is potentially problematic, as in cases where the Office of the Prosecutor 
raise penetration as an issue, they do so in the context that US military 
personnel ‘penetrated the anal opening of at least three detainees’,70 and that 
victims were ‘probed anally by means of cavity searches or with an unknown 
object’,71 rather than any of the acts involving ‘penetration of the female sex 
organ by the penis’.72 This means that it seems highly unlikely that it would be 
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possible to successfully prosecute the offences alleged by the OTP as rape, 
and that any charge would have to be based on different offences. 
 
ii. Other Sexual Offences 
 
As is shown in the Criminal Law Deskbook published by the Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, the only other sexual offences which 
existed within the military justice system at the time the majority of the offences 
were committed were sodomy, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and 
indecent acts.73 This potentially poses problems because it is not clear that the 
other offences found within the UCMJ apply to the acts described by the OTP 
as forming their investigative focus. The definition of sodomy, under Article 125 
of the UCMJ states that: ‘Any person subject to this chapter who engages in 
unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or 
with an animal is guilty of Sodomy. Penetration, however slight is sufficient to 
complete the offense.’74 
 
The 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial explanation of this offence states in relation 
to unnatural carnal copulation: 
 
“It is unnatural carnal copulation for a person to take into that person’s 
mouth or anus the sexual organ of another person… or to place that 
person’s sexual organ in the mouth or anus of another person… or to 
have carnal copulation in any opening of the body, except the sexual 
parts, with another person.”75 
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Based on the information provided in the OTP’s request to open an 
investigation into the conduct of United States personnel, it is unlikely that the 
offence of sodomy could have been committed. 
 
This also appears to be the case in relation to the offence of indecent assault, 
which would have to be prosecuted under Article 134 of the UCMJ.76 As stated 
in the 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial, this offence requires that ‘the acts were 
done with the intent to gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused’.77 It is 
unclear that this was the case since the OTP states that the acts of rape 
committed were done ‘in circumstances of sexual humiliation’.78 This means 
that it would be unlikely that any offence would be committed for the purposes 
of sexual gratification, though a definitive determination would have to be made 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
It is also unlikely that a conviction for indecent exposure would be possible 
since the Manual for Courts-Martial states that this requires ‘That the accused 
exposed a certain part of the accused’s body to public view in an indecent 
manner’,79 and there is nothing to suggest that this was the case from the 
information provided in the OTP’s request to open an investigation. Finally, it is 
also unlikely that the information provided by the ICC would suggest that it is 
likely that a conviction for indecent acts would be possible since the Manual for 
Courts-Martial states, ‘“Indecent” signifies that form of immorality relating to 
sexual impurity which is not only grossly vulgar, obscene and repugnant to 
common propriety, but tends to excite lust and deprave the morals with respect 
to sexual relations.’80 Under the circumstances in which these acts were 
committed, referred to earlier, it seems questionable whether they could ever 
excite lust when it appears that the intent behind the acts was to cause 
embarrassment. This is especially the case when the OTP state that acts were 
 
76 10 US Code s.934 (2000) 
77 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial (n 75) Part IV, page 98 
78 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 8) para 209 
79 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial (n 75) Part IV, page 112 




committed ‘with the specific intention to sexually humiliate the detainees 
concerned’.81 
 
This means that it may not be possible for the United States to be able to 
prosecute alleged sexual offences in a manner which reflects the sexual nature 
of the crime. It is, however, possible for US authorities to conduct investigations 
or prosecutions for alternative offences. For example, one of the ‘lesser 
included offences’ for rape referred to in the 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial is 
assault under Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.82 It would be 
for the OTP and ICC to determine whether prosecutions for such an offence 
would satisfy the principle of complementarity. 
 
b. Federal law 
 
Under Federal law, there are two frameworks for sexual crimes that could apply. 
This includes a version of the offences of rape and sexual assault included 
within the War Crimes Act,83 and a version under Chapter 109A of Title 18 of 
the United States Code.84 
 
i. Chapter 109A – Aggravated Sexual Abuse 
 
Section 2241(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides the following 
definition for the crime of aggravated sexual abuse: 
 
“Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States or in a Federal prison, knowingly causes another person to 
engage in a sexual act – 
(1) By using force against that other person; or 
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(2) By threatening or placing that other person in fear that any 
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping; 
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any 
term of years or life, or both.”85 
 
In the context of this definition of aggravated sexual abuse, s.2246(2) of 
Chapter 109A of Title 18 of the US Code states that:  
 
“the term “sexual act means –  
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the 
anus, and for the purposes of this paragraph contact involving the 
penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; 
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the 
vulva, or the mouth and the anus; 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of 
another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to 
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person; or 
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia 
of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with 
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify 
the sexual desire of any person”86 
 
This means that, depending on the available evidence, it may be possible to 
prosecute individuals for rape providing that evidence existed to prove that the 
rectal hydration, feeding and examinations involved the use of force, and that 
the prerequisite intent existed. From the evidence provided in the OTP’s request 
to open an investigation, it appears that this will be the case - they state that 
one detainee was diagnosed with multiple medical issues as a result of their 
alleged mistreatment,87 and that such techniques were used in circumstances 
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that were not medically justifiable.88 Human Rights Watch additionally state that 
‘At least three types of sexual abuse charges may apply to CIA actions under 
federal law. This includes sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, and abusive 
sexual contact.’89 
 
ii. War Crimes Act 
 
Under the War Crimes Act, the crime of rape is defined as the following: 
 
“The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force 
wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the body of a 
person by penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of 
the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign 
object.”90 
 
As with the previous section on rape under Chapter 109A, it appears that the 
allegations made by the OTP in their request to open an investigation would 
constitute rape under the provisions of the War Crimes Act, as the available 
evidence suggests that force was used in order to penetrate the alleged victims’ 
anus. 
 
3. Torture and Cruel Treatment 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor allege that United States personnel are 
responsible for acts of torture and other cruel treatment under Article 8(2)(c)(i) 
of the Rome Statute,91 using 13 different methods including waterboarding, the 
exploitation of sexual taboos, sensory deprivation and incommunicado 
detention.92 As stated in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, the crime of torture 
under Article 8(2)(c)(i) has the following elements: 
 
88 ibid para 212 
89 Human Rights Watch (n 11) 85. Human Rights Watch further explain their reasoning for this 
at 85-87. 
90 18 US Code s.2441(d)(1)(G) 
91 Rome Statute (n 1) Article 8(2)(c)(i); OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 8) 90-100 





“1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering upon one or more persons. 
2. The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes 
as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation 
or coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
3. Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were 
civilians, medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active 
part in the hostilities. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established this status. 
5. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with 
an armed conflict not of an international character. 
6. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”93 
 
The first relevant offence under US law of relevance to this discussion is the 
offence of torture found within Chapter 113C of Title 18 of the United States 
Code,94 which states: 
 
““torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of 
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon 
another person within his custody or physical control;”95 
 
Following this implementation of this provision prohibiting torture, the United 
States stated in their first periodic report to the United Nations Torture 
Committee that all acts of torture were illegal under United States law: 
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“Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is 
categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state 
authority. Every act constituting torture under the Convention constitutes 
a criminal offence under the law of the United States”.96 
 
The second relevant offence is the war crime of torture which is found in 
s.2441(d)(1)(A) of the United States Code, which states that torture is: 
 
“The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, 
an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon 
another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, 
or any reason based on discrimination of any kind.”97 
 
The final relevant offence is the war crime of cruel or inhuman treatment found 
within s. 2241(d)(1)(B) of the United States Code which is defined as: 
 
“The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, 
an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), 
including serious physical abuse, upon another person within his custody 
or control.”98 
 
This section will address the requirements of mental and physical pain required 
for these offences, as well as the requirement of specific intent for the two 
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a. Physical Pain or Suffering 
 
When addressing the level of pain or suffering required for the crimes of torture 
or cruel treatment to have taken place, international criminal tribunals have 
been clear that this level depends on the circumstances of the case in question. 
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in Brđanin for example stated: 
 
“Acts inflicting physical pain may amount to torture even when they do 
not cause pain of the type accompanying serious injury. An act may give 
rise to a conviction for torture when it inflicts severe pain or suffering. 
Whether it does so is a fact-specific inquiry.”99 
 
The ICTY provided guidance on factors that to be considered when determining 
whether torture took place in the case of Krnojelac, stating: 
 
“When assessing the seriousness of the acts charged as torture, the Trial 
Chamber must take into account all the circumstances of the case, 
including the nature and context of the infliction of pain, the 
premeditation and institutionalisation of the ill-treatment, the physical 
condition of the victim, the manner and method used, and the position of 
inferiority of the victim. In particular, to the extent that an individual has 
been mistreated over a prolonged period of time, or that he or she has 
been subjected to repeated or various forms of mistreatment, the severity 
of the acts should be assessed as a whole to the extent that it can be 
shown that this lasting period or the repetition of acts are inter-related, 
follow a pattern or are directed towards the same prohibited goal.”100 
 
Since the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals has shown that the 
crime of torture is reliant on the facts of any given case, this section will discuss 
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whether the law on torture as found within the United States in relation to the 
harm required meets the standards of international law. 
 
In relation to the level of physical harm required to constitute torture or cruel or 
inhuman treatment, the only provision which specifically states what level of 
physical harm is required to commit an offence is for the crime of cruel or 
inhuman treatment, in which it is stated that: 
 
“The term “serious physical pain or suffering” shall be applied for the 
purposes of paragraph 1(B) as meaning bodily injury that involves –  
(i) A substantial risk of death; 
(ii) Extreme physical pain; 
(iii) A burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other 
than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or  
(iv) Significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 
member, organ or mental faculty.”101 
 
It is however clear that the United States has interpreted the level of physical 
pain required to commit the crime of cruel or inhuman treatment is lower than 
the level required for torture. For example, the 1 August 2002 Bybee Memo 
discussing the application of torture state that, ‘Because the acts inflicting 
torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though they might 
constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to 
the level of torture.’102 Additionally, in a memo dated 20 July 2007 by Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, it is stated that: 
 
“The context of the CIT offense in the War Crimes Act indicates that the 
term “serious” in the statute is generally directed at a less grave category 
of conditions than falls within the scope of the torture offense… as a 
general matter, a condition would not constitute “severe physical pain or 
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suffering” if it were not also to constitute “serious physical or mental pain 
or suffering.”103 
 
In this situation, it appears that even if the standards of physical harm required 
for the crimes of torture and cruel or inhuman treatment were the same, then 
very few acts would qualify as fulfilling the requirements of severe or serious 
harm. The Bybee Memo stated that: ‘Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult 
for the victim to endure. Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity 
akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ 
failure.’104 
 
However, in a December 2004 Memo, which replaced the 1 August 2002 Bybee 
Memo,105 Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin stated that: 
 
“We disagree with statements in the August 2002 Memorandum limiting 
“severe” pain under the statute to “excruciating and agonizing” pain… or 
to pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical 
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death.”106 
 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, in a May 2005 memo, stated that 
‘the meaning of “severe physical pain” is relatively straightforward; it denotes 
physical pain that is extreme in intensity and difficult to endure’,107 and:  
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““severe physical suffering” under the statute means a state or condition 
of physical distress, misery, affliction, or torment, usually involving 
physical pain, that is both extreme in its intensity and significantly 
protracted in duration or persistence over time.”108 
 
In relation to the use of the United States’ torture provisions, the prosecution of 
Chuckie Taylor is the only case which has resulted in a conviction for torture,109 
and in that case, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the conduct for 
which Taylor had been convicted was different from the type of conduct which 
was discussed in the Torture Memos.110 Carter stated that ‘it would be fair to 
say that criminal prosecutions for torture, rather than the underlying acts, are 
close to nonexistent.’111 It should, however, be noted that a Grand Jury indicted 
Sulejman Mujagic for torture prior to him being extradited to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to stand trial,112 and Michael Sang Correa has been indicted for 
alleged torture committed in The Gambia.113 
 
It is clear that the interpretation of torture presented in the Bybee Memo is not 
considered acceptable at the international level, as this section of the memo 
was cited by the defence in the ICTY case of Brđanin, and subsequently 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber on the basis that it in no way reflected the 
definition of torture as set out in either the Torture Convention or in customary 
international law.114 The court went so far as to specifically state, ‘No matter 
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how powerful or influential a country is, its practice does not automatically 
become customary international law.’115 
 
Carter argues that, following the issuing of a memo in 2004 that withdrew the 
2002 memo’s requirements for the level of physical harm required for torture to 
have taken place, the understanding of the level of physical harm required 
under United States law moved closer to the requirements of the Torture 
Convention and that by the time of the Obama Administration, the US 
interpretation was in line with these requirements.116 However, it is debateable 
that the Bush Administration did move closer to the requirements of the Torture 
Convention. Alvarez, and Sandholtz, for example, argue that withdrawal of the 
Bybee Memo’s position on torture did not necessarily represent a change in the 
Bush Administration’s policy on Torture, as replacement memos did not reject 
the arguments made by the Bybee Memo in relation to physical harm, they 
simply state that such arguments weren’t required.117  
 
Additionally, Ross argues that the comments of President Bush on the extent of 
executive power when signing the Detainee Treatment Act meant that the 
executive branch of the United States government was still of the belief that it 
could authorise conduct which may be classified as either torture or cruel or 
inhuman treatment.118 Furthermore, even after the signing of the Act, Steven 
Bradbury, the United States Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
issued a memo to the General Counsel for the CIA, stating that the use of six 
corrective and conditioning techniques did not meet the requirements for either 
physical or mental pain for the crimes of torture or cruel or inhuman 
treatment.119 These techniques are all included within the list of techniques 
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alleged by the OTP to have constituted torture or cruel treatment against those 
in the custody of the United States.120 
 
Ultimately, the interpretation of severe physical pain and suffering presented in 
the Torture Memos may not be relevant in deciding whether the crime of torture 
did take place. This is because the United States 11th Circuit of Appeals stated 
in Belfast:  
 
“the Torture Act contains a specific and unambiguous definition of torture 
that is derived from the definition provided in the CAT. The language of 
that statute – not an executive branch memorandum – is what controls 
the definition of the crime.”121 
 
However, the Court also stated that the memos were irrelevant in that case.122 
Therefore, if a case was brought in relation to a case involving alleged torture 
that took place when the memos were in force, that court may have a different 
opinion. 
 
b. Mental Pain or Suffering 
 
The Torture Act states that in relation to mental pain or suffering,123 it must have 
been the result of one of four types of action, as defined in 18 US Code s. 
2340(2): 
 
““severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm 
caused by or resulting from –  
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical 
pain or suffering; 
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(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or 
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to 
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality”124 
 
‘Severe mental pain or suffering’ carries the same definition for torture as a war 
crime under 18 US Code s. 2441.125 Additionally, the crime of cruel or inhuman 
treatment requires that ‘serious mental pain or suffering’ is caused by one of the 
four acts listed above.126 The United States government in their initial report to 
the Torture Committee explained why the Torture Act requires one of the four 
acts listed in 18 US Code s.2340(2) in order for torture to take place, stating: 
 
“As all legal systems recognize… assessment of mental pain and 
suffering can be a very subjective undertaking. There was some concern 
within the United States criminal justice community that in this respect 
the Convention’s definition regrettably fell short of the constitutionally 
required precision for defining criminal offences.”127 
 
However, rather than providing clarity in relation to the definition of mental pain 
and suffering, the United States definition of mental torture has proven to be 
problematic. Luban and Shue, for example state, ‘it includes a cramped, 
convoluted, and arbitrary definition of mental pain or suffering, so narrow that 
few techniques of mental torment qualify as torture under the law’.128 They 
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further argue that these requirements ‘have nothing to do with the basic 
definition of torture as severe pain or suffering’.129 Additionally, Carter argues 
that the definition of mental pain as adopted in the United States may not meet 
with international standards in relation to torture, arguing that rape may not give 
rise to the required type of mental pain for torture under US law despite the 
ICTY holding in Kunarac that rape can result in the level of mental harm 
required for torture under international law.130 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a number of the offences under 
investigation by the OTP could ever qualify as torture for the purposes of United 
States law, despite being classified as either torture or cruel or inhuman 
treatment by the OTP. The OTP, for example states: 
 
“A number of these interrogation techniques per se meet the threshold of 
severity and thus amount to torture or cruel treatment, as they 
necessarily cause severe pain or suffering. These include the use of 
sexual violence, severe isolation, suffocation by water or waterboarding, 
hooding under special conditions, threats of torture and the use of dogs 
to induce fear.”131 
 
It is difficult to see how an offence such as waterboarding involves the four 
factors required in order for mental harm to constitute torture under the Torture 
Act. Reyes, for example, states that typically the effects of waterboarding last 
for a relatively short period but the aspect that results in it becoming torture is a 
fear of recurrence.132 Additionally, a report jointly published by Physicians for 
Human Rights and Human Rights First states that ‘The experience of near-
suffocation is also associated with the development of predominantly respiratory 
panic attacks, high levels of depressive symptoms, and prolonged posttraumatic 
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stress disorder’.133 Furthermore, Ross argues that changes made to the 
threshold of mental harm required for the crime of cruel or inhuman treatment in 
the amended War Crimes Act for acts committed following the Act’s amendment 
(which will be discussed below) are an indication that the use of waterboarding 
and other similar actions had not constituted a violation of United States law.134 
 
It may therefore be difficult for the United States to be able to satisfy the 
principle of complementarity in relation to the allegations of torture by 
prosecuting such offences under the Torture Act since it appears that the 
alleged offences were not the result of any of the four forms of conduct required 
by the Torture Act. This is a matter of significance since the Torture Committee 
in their General Comment Number Two state that: 
 
“By defining the offence of torture as distinct from common assault or 
other crimes, the Committee considers that States Parties will directly 
advance the Convention’s overarching aim of preventing torture and ill-
treatment. Naming and defining this crime will promote the Convention’s 
aim, inter alia, by alerting everyone, including perpetrators, victims, and 
the public, to the special gravity of the crime of torture.”135 
 
This leaves the question of whether it would be possible to prosecute 
allegations of torture as such under the amended War Crimes Act since this 
also contains a provision on torture.136 However, reliance on this approach will 
not necessarily lead to different consequences since the Act states, ‘the term 
“severe mental pain or suffering” shall be applied for the purposes of 
paragraphs 1(A) and 1(B) in accordance with the meaning given that term in 
section 2340(2) of this title’.137 Therefore, the problems inherent within the 
Torture Act are inherent within the torture offence under the War Crimes Act. 
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This led Luban and Shue to state, ‘once again, the mental pain or suffering has 
completely disappeared, having been redefined as the harm that sometimes 
results from mental pain or suffering.’138 It may be the case that the United 
States is unable to prosecute in cases where the alleged harm is mental rather 
than physical, and therefore may not be able to satisfy the principle of 
complementarity unless prosecutions for other offences were deemed to comply 
with the same person or conduct test. 
 
c. Specific Intent 
 
The final issue to be discussed in this section is the matter of specific intent, 
which is required under the torture provisions contained within the Torture Act 
and the War Crimes Act. The Torture Act states: 
 
““torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of 
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon 
another person within his custody or physical control”.139 
 
The War Crimes Act torture provision states, that torture is the result of: 
 
“an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon 
another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, 
or any other reason based on discrimination of any kind.”140 
 
This inclusion of specific intent is reflective of an understanding issued by the 
United States at the time they ratified the Torture Convention, in which they 
stated that specific intent is required in order for an act of torture to have taken 
 
138 Luban and Shue (n 128) 848 
139 18 US Code s.2340(1) 




place.141 Hathaway, Nowlan and Spiegel argue that other State parties to the 
Torture Convention must have accepted the US’s belief that specific intent was 
a requirement for torture since they did not raise any objections to the US 
Understanding to the Torture Convention.142 If this is the case, it may be the 
case that United States law in relation to intent meets the standards of 
international law. As such, if a prosecution was to be carried out for torture, it 
would be difficult to argue that the intent requirements of the torture offence 
mean that a prosecution does not address the same conduct as any proposed 
prosecution at the ICC. 
 
However, it is not at all clear whether a simple conclusion could ever be 
reached in this situation, as Parry for example stated in relation to the United 
States Understanding to the Torture Convention, ‘These changes arguably 
reduce ambiguity, but even more so they create additional space for coercive 
practices by limiting the applicability of international law.’143 Additionally, King 
argues that the specific intent standard required by the United States is a higher 
standard than is the case in other States.144 This is also the case despite the 
fact that Carter points out that in the context of immigration law, the United 
States has implemented a standard in relation to their obligations under the 
Torture Convention that is contrary to the standards required by the ICTY as 
‘The courts interpret “specific intent” to mean an intent to achieve the result – in 
this case, the severe pain and suffering’.145  
 
Hathaway, Nowlan and Spiegel argue that the legislative history of the Torture 
Act in Congress suggests that ‘specific intent was properly understood to mean 
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that severe pain and suffering must be knowingly (not unintentionally) inflicted 
for a prohibited purpose.’146 The August 2002 Bybee memo stated that even 
though juries would be able to infer specific intent from knowledge on the part of 
a defendant that their actions will result from their actions,147 ‘because Section 
2340 requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to inflict severe pain, 
the infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s precise objective’.148 The 
2002 Bybee memo stated that in cases where an individual acts on a good faith 
belief that their actions do not break the law, there can be no specific intent.149   
 
In their report on the memoranda produced by the Office of Legal Counsel, the 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) stated that ‘we concluded that the 
memorandum erroneously suggested that an interrogator who inflicted severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering on an individual would not violate the torture 
statute if he acted with the goal or purpose of obtaining information’,150 and 
stated that ‘The availability of good faith as a defence to torture is not a 
foregone conclusion’.151 The OPR also noted that the author of the memo, John 
Yoo,152 did not fully understand the law in relation to specific intent.153 
 
The Bybee Memo also stated that the defences of necessity and self-defence 
may be raised by a defendant who is accused of torture.154 Clark questions the 
invocation of these defences on the basis that a detainee in custody would not 
be in a position to harm their interrogator.155 Additionally, Alvarez questions how 
necessity can be raised as a defence on the basis that no such defence is 
available for torture under international law and that even if such a defence did 
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exist, it would be almost impossible to prove that torture was the only course of 
action available to an interrogator.156 
 
As a matter of United States policy, good faith reliance on legal advice does 
appear to act as a barrier to prosecutions, as President Obama said in 2009 
that CIA members relying on legal advice in relation to authorized operations 
would not be prosecuted,157 stating ‘nothing will be gained by spending our time 
and energy laying blame for the past’.158 Additionally, as part of the Detainee 
Treatment Act, it is stated that in the context of detention and interrogation 
programmes involving foreign nationals, a defence exists to persons who did 
not know that the practices that they were involved in were unlawful. 
Additionally, good faith reliance on legal advice is a factor to be taken into 
account when determining whether this knowledge existed or not.159 This 
defence applies to acts that took place between 11 September 2001 and 30 
December 2005.160 The policies of the United States in relation to criminal 
investigations and prosecutions will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
 
Even though Luban and Shue state that the existence of this defence was part 
of an effort to ensure that US personnel would not be held accountable for their 
actions,161 the existence of the defence and the Obama Administration’s 
position that prosecutions would not be carried out in relation to authorised 
investigations may be a recognition of the belief that torture became a tolerated 
aspect of the war on terror. A 2004 report from the American Bar Association, 
for example, states, ‘what does seem clear is that the memoranda and the 
decisions of high U.S. officials at the very least contributed to a culture in which 
prisoner abuse became widespread’.162 Additionally, a 2007 survey found that 
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soldiers in Iraq still believed that torture was legal in some circumstances.163 
This position does not, however, explain why high ranking policy makers have 
not been held accountable for their actions. In the OTP’s request to open an 
investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, it is stated that to date, no 
prosecutions have been brought against those that the OTP considers are most 
responsible for the alleged crimes under investigation.164 In fact, those 
responsible for the creation of the OLC memos also sought to express their 
view that international law did not apply in the context of the US war on 
terror.165 
 
It is also the case, however, that the individuals involved in the creation of 
policies which ultimately led to the allegations under investigation by the ICC do 
not reflect the universal position of the entirety of the United States legal 
community. For example, Scharf highlights how the Legal War Council lacked 
the involvement of the State Department Legal Advisor, William H Taft IV, who 
had raised concerns about the policy course of the Bush Administration.166 
Additionally, Dickinson suggests that, in the context of the military, the fact that 
legal rules and personnel were so engrained into military culture actually helped 
to ensure compliance with international law.167 Scharf argues that the State 
Department Legal Advisor and the military acting in concert may have been 
able to ensure that the US always acted in a manner compatible with 
international law.168 
 
Also, the 2002 Bybee memo was ultimately revoked by Jack Goldsmith who 
stated: 
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“on an issue that demanded the greatest of care, OLC’s analysis of the 
law of torture in the August 1, 2002, opinion and the March 2003 opinion 
was legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone, and overbroad 
and thus largely unnecessary. My main concern upon reading the 
opinions was that someone might rely on their green light to justify 
interrogations much more aggressive than ones specifically approved 
and then maintain, not without justification, that they were acting on the 
basis of the OLC’s view of the law.”169  
 
This suggests that the torture policies did not come about as a result of 
systemic flaws, rather it was the case that a group of people attempted to justify 
what were previously unjustifiable individuals and it would therefore be possible 
to hold them to account. This will be discussed further in the next chapter on the 




In conclusion, it appears that whilst it may be possible for the United States to 
be able to satisfy the principle of complementarity in relation to some alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes in a manner which reflects both the nature 
and significance of the crime, it is by no means certain that this is the case for 
all the alleged offences. For example, the crime of rape under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice required penetration of either a genital opening or for that 
penetration to be done by a penis but the wrongdoing alleged by the OTP 
involves anal penetration, including by the use of objects. Additionally, the 
threshold for pain or suffering for the crimes of torture and cruel or inhuman 
treatment appears to be so high that its severely restricts the potential 
application of the offences. The most problematic aspect in relation to United 
States law may however be that laws exist to provide individuals with defences 
for crimes within the War Crimes Act, an action that may be seen by the OTP as 
 
169 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgement inside the Bush Administration 




contributing towards a situation whereby those most responsible for 
international crimes cannot be held to account. To determine whether the 
United States has complied with the principle of complementarity, it will be 
necessary to examine the range of criminal investigations that have been 
conducted in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as other 





Chapter Three: United States Senate Reports 
 
This Chapter will discuss two reports published by select committees of the 
United States Senate in relation to allegations of detainee abuse – the Report of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Treatment of Detainees in US 
Custody (Armed Services Committee Report),1 and the Executive Summary of 
the Report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program (Intelligence Committee Report).2 These reports will be 
discussed because they have been relied upon as a source of evidence by the 
Office of the Prosecutor in their request to open an investigation in relation to 
alleged War Crimes in Afghanistan,3 and by Pre-Trial Chamber Two in their 
judgment on the OTP’s investigation request.4 Whilst these reports were cited 
as evidence of war crimes in the ICC context, it has to be asked whether they 
demonstrate that the United States is willing to conduct an investigation into 
alleged war crimes since under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is only 
able to act where a State is unwilling or unable to investigate such offences.5 
 
These factors must be considered in light of the limited impact of the reports in 
relation to the current practice of the United States. By the time the Armed 
Services Committee Report was published in November 2008, the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 had been implemented.6 This Act limited the range of 
interrogation techniques available in the context of the Department of Defense’s 
 
1 United States Senate Select Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of 
Detainees in U.S. Custody (Senate Printout 110-54, 20 November 2008) 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT48761/pdf/CPRT-110SPRT48761.pdf> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
2 United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program together with Foreword by Chairman Feinstein and Additional and 
Minority Views (Senate Report 113-288, 9 December 2014) 
<https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt288/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021). 
3 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15”) ICC-02/17-7-Red (20 November 2017), 
para 36 
4 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan) ICC-02/17-33 (12 April 2019), paras 46-48 
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 17 




(DoD) Detention and Interrogation Program, stating ‘No person in the custody or 
under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a 
Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of 
interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Field Manual on 
Intelligence Interrogation.’7 Furthermore, by the time the Intelligence Committee 
Report was published in December 2014, the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program had already been ended as a result of a January 2009 Executive 
Order from the Obama Administration.8 
 
The impact of these reports as a potential means of satisfying the principle of 
complementarity also have to be considered in light of the apparent lack of 
willingness on the part of the United States in pursuing criminal prosecutions for 
those responsible for the alleged abuses conducted as a result of authorised 
detention and interrogation operations. For example, in August 2009, when 
announcing ‘a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in 
connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations’,9 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder stated, ‘the Department of Justice 
will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the 
legal advice given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of 
detainees.’10 
 
Additionally, President Obama made similar statements, at the release of Office 
of Legal Counsel memos from the Bush Administration, stated, ‘This is a time 
for reflection, not retribution… at a time of great challenges and disturbing 
disunity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy laying blame 
 
7 ibid s.1002(a) 
8 Executive Order 13491 ‘Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’ (22 January 2009) 
9 United States Department of Justice, ‘Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary 
Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees’ (United States Department of Justice, 24 
August 2009) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-
preliminary-review-interrogation-certain-detainees> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
10 Ibid. This preliminary review was ultimately closed without any prosecutions, despite two 
criminal investigations being launched: see United States Department of Justice, ‘Statement of 
Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain 
Detainees’ (United States Department of Justice, 30 August 2012) 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigation-




for the past.’11 Furthermore, despite President Obama stating that the 
Intelligence Committee Report ‘reinforces my long-held view that these harsh 
methods were not only inconsistent with our values as a nation, they did not 
serve our broader counterterrorism efforts or our national security interests’,12 
the Department of Justice decided not to pursue any prosecutions.13 
 
These factors necessitate the need for consideration of whether the pursuit of 
widespread prosecutions of those responsible for the perpetration of alleged 
war crimes is the only means by which the United States can satisfy the 
principle of complementarity, or whether the two Senate Reports may constitute 
an effective investigation for the purposes of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.14 
This is especially the case when it is considered that the Intelligence Committee 
Report examined ‘more than six million pages of CIA materials, to include 
operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and emails, 
briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts, and other records’,15 and the 
Armed Services Committee Report considered ‘more than 200,000 pages of 
classified and unclassified documents, including detention and interrogation 
policies, memoranda, electronic communications, training manuals, and the 
results of previous investigations into detainee abuse’.16 
 
In order to consider the impact of these US Senate Reports and their potential 
impact in relation to the applicability of the principle of complementarity, this 
Chapter will examine the findings of the reports regarding the development of 
the DoD and CIA Detention and Interrogation policies, whether the reports 
highlight an effective means of ensuring accountability for alleged wrongdoing 
 
11 White House, ‘Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos’ (White 
House, 16 April 2009) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-
president-barack-obama-release-olc-memos> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
12 White House, ‘Statement by the President Report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence’ (White House, 9 December 2014) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2014/12/09/statement-president-report-senate-select-committee-intelligence> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021) 
13 Julian Hattem, ‘DOJ won’t reopen torture probe after CIA report’ (The Hill, 10 December 
2014) <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/226603-justice-department-wont-reopen-torture-
probes> (Last accessed 15 May 2021). The policies of the United States in relation to criminal 
investigations and prosecutions will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
14 Rome Statute (n 5), Article 17 
15 Intelligence Committee Report (n 2) viii 




(or are in of themselves), and the response to the release of these reports 
including whether this led to action which would prevent the recurrence of 
abuses. 
 
1. The Development of the DoD and CIA Detention and Interrogation 
Policies 
 
This section will discuss the development of detention and interrogation policies 
by the DoD and the CIA. This will be broken down into two sections, one 
focusing on each of the detention and interrogation policies. Whilst the OTP’s 
Afghanistan investigation request states that the crimes alleged to have been 
committed in the context of the DoD detention and interrogation program have 
taken place since 1 May 2003,17 the section discussing the DoD detention and 
interrogation policy will include discussions regarding the development of 
policies designed for use at Guantanamo Bay prior to 2003,18 since as will be 
shown, this had a significant impact on the development of interrogation policy 
in Afghanistan. Additionally, whilst the OTP request to open an investigation in 
relation to Afghanistan states that alleged war crimes perpetrated by members 
of the CIA have occurred ‘in the period since 1 July 2002’,19 though 
predominately in 2003 and 2004,20 the section discussing the CIA’s detention 
and interrogation program will discuss events which occurred throughout the 
program’s history. The purpose of this section is to discuss whether the two 
Senate Reports demonstrate that evidence exists to suggest that there is a 





17 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 3) para 187. However, as stated in para 189, the 
OTP believes that the majority of the alleged crimes were committed in 2003 or 2004. 
18 It should, however, be noted that the OTP’s investigation request states that ‘the Prosecution 
has excluded persons who were originally detained in the context of the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan but subject to alleged crimes on the territory of States that are not party to the 
Statute, such as on the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.’: ibid para 250 
19 ibid para 187 




a. The Development of the Department of Defense’s Detention and 
Interrogation Policy 
 
The Armed Services Committee Report highlights the overwhelming role played 
by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, Escape (SERE) School tactics with seven of the report’s nineteen 
conclusions focusing on the role played by JPRA and SERE tactics.21 In relation 
to SERE tactics, the Report states that ‘The use of techniques in interrogations 
derived from SERE resistance training created a serious risk of physical and 
psychological harm to detainees’,22 and that the controls that are in place to 
prevent harm to SERE students do not exist in live interrogations.23 This section 
will discuss the development of policy before discussing how the policy 
manifested itself in Afghanistan. 
 
i. The Role of Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape 
Techniques and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency in 
the Development of Interrogation Policy 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to explain the purpose of JPRA and 
SERE training. As the Armed Services Committee Report states, JPRA is a 
DoD agency under the United States Joint Force Command,24 and is 
‘responsible for coordinating joint personnel recovery capabilities. Personnel 
recovery is the term used to describe efforts to obtain the release or recovery of 
captured, missing, or isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile environments 
and denied areas’,25 which includes oversight of SERE training.26 In relation to 
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“The techniques used in SERE school, based in part, on Chinese 
Communist techniques used during the Korean War to elicit false 
confessions, include stripping students of their clothing, placing them in 
stress positions, putting hoods over their heads, disrupting their sleep, 
treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud music and flashing 
lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures.”27 
 
Furthermore, the Report cites a memo by Joseph Witsch, a JPRA instructor 
who provided training on SERE techniques to Guantanamo Bay personnel, 
which states the following: 
 
“We base our role-play laboratories on what we know our former 
enemies have done to our personnel in captivity. It is based on illegal 
exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 
50 years.”28 
 
These points regarding the use of unorthodox techniques are highlighted in 
Army Regulation 350-30, the army regulation governing SERE training between 
1985 and 2010, which states that SERE training includes ‘Communist prisoner 
of war management techniques to include – (1) Interrogation and indoctrination 
methods, techniques, and goals. (2) Physical and psychological stresses. (3) 
Pavlovian and respondent conditioning.’29 
 
The report also shows that those who act as interrogators at SERE Schools are 
not qualified interrogators,30 and in some cases provide training in techniques 
 
27 ibid xiii 
28 ibid 48 citing Joseph Witsch, ‘Memorandum: U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC), Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction’ (24 September 2002); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 
29 United States Army, Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) 
Training (Army Regulation 350-30, 10 December 1985) <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar350-
30.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), Chapter 2-10. Army Regulation 350-30 was replaced on 
5 March 2010 by United States Army, Personnel Recovery (Army Regulation 525-28, 5 March 
2010) <https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r525_28.pdf> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021) 




for which they do not know the full procedure. For example, the Report 
highlights that Joseph Witsch had told Committee Staff that ‘he was not aware 
that students at the U.S. Navy’s SERE school could not be subjected to 
waterboarding for more than 20 seconds, if a cloth is placed over the students 
face’,31 despite this point being emphasised in the Navy SERE school’s 
manual.32 This may help to demonstrate why the following statement from 
Lieutenant Colonel Banks is the case: ‘Because of the danger involved, very 
few SERE instructors are allowed to actually use physical pressures. It is 
extremely easy for U.S. Army instructors, training U.S. Army soldiers, to get out 
of hand, and to injure students.’33 
 
The Armed Services Committee Report shows that in December 2001, the DoD 
General Counsel’s Office contacted the JPRA to find out information regarding 
techniques that could be used to exploit detainees,34 something which the 
Armed Services Committee state they were unaware of happening before.35 
The report goes on to highlight a further request in July 2002 with the Deputy 
General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin requesting information from 
JPRA Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner about ‘techniques 
that had been effective against Americans’,36 which itself was followed up by a 
request for further information.37 Shiffrin testified to the Armed Services 
Committee that one of the purposes of these requests for information was to 
‘reverse-engineer’ the techniques used in SERE School to teach students how 
to resist interrogations.38 However, when asked why JPRA was contacted, 
Shiffrin stated that the General Counsel’s Office was trying to find out about 
how to conduct interrogations for purposes other than law enforcement,39 as the 
DoD had not been involved in interrogations for this purpose since the Vietnam 
 
31 ibid 93 
32 ibid 93-94 
33 ibid 5 
34 ibid 3-4 
35 ibid xiii 
36 ibid 24 
37 ibid 26 
38 ibid 26; United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, ‘The Treatment of Detainees in 
U.S. Custody – Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate’ 
(Senate Hearing 110-720, 17 June and 25 September 2008) 
<https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/treatment.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 61-62 




War.40 In response to the follow-up request for information, Lieutenant Colonel 
Baumgartner sent three memos to the DoD’s General Counsel’s Office. These 
included a list of tactics used to train students at SERE school,41 a memo 
entitled ‘Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use of Physical/Psychological 
Coercion in Interrogation’,42 and a memo entitled ‘Psychological Effects of 
Resistance Training’.43 
 
The Armed Services Committee Report discusses three risks associated with 
the use of aggressive interrogations highlighted in the second memo: that the 
use of such techniques may result in detainees not cooperating with 
interrogators,44 that any intelligence obtained may not be reliable,45 and that the 
use of such techniques may have the effect of increasing the likelihood of them 
being used against US personnel in the future.46 However, whilst the report 
does quote all but the first sentence of the first paragraph of a section entitled 
‘Operational Concerns’, it fails to note the point made in the first sentence: 
JPRA had already noted that ‘upwards of 90 percent of interrogations have 
been successful through the exclusive use of a direct approach, where a degree 
of rapport is established with the prisoner’.47 If it is to be accepted that the DoD 
General Counsel’s Office was to try and find out how to conduct effective 
interrogations, as Shiffrin said was the case, it is difficult to see how the DoD 
would end up pursuing a policy which runs contrary to JPRA’s accumulated 
knowledge that interrogations based on rapport-building are more effective than 
those where aggressive techniques are used. 
 
The third memo provided to the DoD General Counsel’s Office by JPRA, makes 
comments in relation to two areas – the general psychological effects of SERE 
 
40 ibid 
41 Armed Services Committee Report (n 1) 27-28 
42 ibid 28 
43 ibid 29 
44 ibid 28 
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46 Ibid 29 
47 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, ‘Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use of 
Physical/Psychological Coercion in Interrogation’ (25 July 2002) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/JPRA-Memo_042409.pdf> (Last accessed 




training on students at the US Air Force’s SERE School and the impact of the 
waterboard. In relation to the general impact of SERE training, Ogrisseg states, 
‘historically, a small minority of students in USAF Resistance Training (RT) have 
had temporary adverse reactions’,48 and that between 1992 and 2001, ‘Out of 
the entire student population, only 0.14% were psychologically pulled from 
training’.49 Ogrisseg additionally stated that even though there had not been any 
long-term studies of the effects of RT during his tenure, he did not believe that 
the training caused long-term harm because of post-training briefings, open 
group discussion and a lack of official complaints.50 In a written response to a 
question from Senator Carl Levin regarding his conclusions on the point of long-
term harm, Ogrisseg clarified his comments, stating: 
 
“The conclusion in my July 24, 2002, memo to Lieutenant Colonel 
Baumgartner was very specific to medically and psychologically 
screened personnel with medical and psychological staff monitoring the 
training and immediately able to intervene if necessary. There are a 
number of important differences between SERE school and real world 
interrogations that would limit my conclusions to the SERE school 
training populations.”51 
 
Over the course of three pages, Ogrisseg provides several reasons why his 
conclusions would not apply to real world interrogations. These include: (1) the 
lack of extensive psychological and physical screening of detainees compared 
to the thorough screening of SERE School students;52 (2) the difference in 
nature between the learning experience of SERE school and intelligence 
gathering interrogations;53 (3) differences between oversight functions in 
schools and interrogation facilities;54 (4) the risk for the dehumanisation of 
 
48 Jerald F Ogrisseg, ‘Psychological Effects of Resistance Training’ (24 July 2002) 
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020724.pdf> (Last accessed 15 
May 2021), para 2 
49 ibid 
50 ibid para 4 
51 United States Armed Services Committee Hearing (n 38) 148 
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detainees;55 (5) the lack of an opportunity for detainees to have debriefings;56 
(6) the fact that real world interrogations are not voluntary;57 and (7) the 
difference between SERE school being a short experience versus a potentially 
indefinite interrogation experience.58 
 
Ogrisseg’s clarification of this advice is important because the statistics included 
in the memo are cited in a 1 August 2002 Memo from Jay Bybee to the CIA’s 
Acting General Counsel John Rizzo as part of the case to justify the use of a 
number of techniques, including walling, stress positions, and sleep 
deprivation,59 in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.60  The SERE influence on 
the CIA’s proposed interrogation in this case is clear with Bybee stating, ‘these 
same techniques, with the exception of the insect in the cramped confined 
space, have been used and continue to be used on some members of our 
military personnel during their SERE training.’61 This highlights that the failures 
exhibited as a result of the DoD’s reliance on SERE tactics in the interrogation 
policy formulation process were also evident in the CIA’s development of 
policy.62 
 
With reference to the second point in Ogrisseg’s memo, regarding the use of 
the waterboard, Ogrisseg stated: 
 
 
55 ibid 149-50 
56 ibid 150 
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59 Jay S Bybee, ‘Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence 
Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: 
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative’ (Office of Legal Counsel, 1 August 2002) 
<https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886076/download> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 5. The full list 
of proposed interrogation techniques can be found at 2-4. This memo was not subject to 
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the public in April 2009: United States Department of Justice, ‘Department of Justice Releases 
Four Office of Legal Counsel Memos’ (United States Department of Justice, 16 April 2009) 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-four-office-legal-counsel-opinions> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
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“I observed the watering board being utilized approximately 10-12 times 
when I was conducting a Staff Assistance Visit to the Navy North Island 
SERE School in September of 2001. The effects of the pressure were 
highly predictable. Use of the watering board resulted in student 
capitulation and compliance 100% of the time. I do not believe the 
watering board posed a real and serious physical danger to the students 
when I observed… Psychologically, however, the watering board broke 
the students’ will to resist providing information and induced 
helplessness”.63 
 
In respect of the information provided by Ogrisseg, it seems that the assertions 
made regarding its effectiveness did not match up with the real world use of the 
waterboard. In the context of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program 
where the use of the waterboard was approved in the Bybee memo referred to 
above,64 the Office of Medical Services stated the following in relation to the 
effectiveness of the waterboard in their September 2003 Draft Guidelines: 
 
“While SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain 
psychological resistance to the waterboard, our experience was 
otherwise. Subjects unquestionably can withstand a large number of 
applications, with no seeming cumulative impact beyond their strong 
aversion to the experience. Whether the waterboard offers a more 
effective alternative to sleep deprivation and/or stress positions or is an 
effective supplement to these techniques is not yet known.”65 
 
 
63 Ogrisseg (n 48) para 5b 
64 Bybee (n 59). This was in part because the techniques proposed were determined, at 11, not 
to cause ‘severe physical pain or suffering’, and, at 15, were determined not to result in ‘severe 
mental pain or suffering’ as required for the offence of torture under 18 US Code s.2340. 
65 Office of Medical Services, ‘Draft OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to 
Detainee Operations’ (4 September 2003) in Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector 
General, ‘Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 
2001 – October 2003), Report No. 2003-7123-IG (7 May 2004) 
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Additionally, with reference to physical harm, the OMS stated that risks included 
‘respiratory arrest associated with laryngospasm’,66 possible pneumonia in 
cases of aspiration,67 or in cases of extended use of the waterboard, it is 
possible that ‘for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the 
subject may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of 
consciousness.’68 In relation to mental harm, the guidelines state there is a 
possibility of conditions such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder developing.69 
O’Mara further notes that: 
 
“At a minimum, waterboarding deliberately interrupts the voluntary 
control of breathing and imposes a life-threatening stress by directly 
interrupting the breathing cycle. It will invoke and induce reflexes that are 
beyond voluntary control. It changes oxygen and carbon dioxide 
concentrations, including hypoxia (decreases in blood oxygen levels) and 
hypercapnia (increases in blood concentration of carbon dioxide).”70 
 
The waterboard as a technique is not specifically relevant to the discussion of 
the approved techniques in the DoD’s detention and interrogation program 
since it was never specifically authorised in either the December 2002 approval 
of techniques approved for use at Guantanamo Bay (to be discussed below in 
the context of Afghanistan) or in the April 2003 endorsement of interrogation 
techniques following the conclusion of the work of a DoD Working Group.71 This 
is the case even though the OTP alleges that the waterboard was used by 
members of the US armed forces.72 The discussion of whether the waterboard 
 
66 ibid Appendix F, page 9 
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68 ibid  
69 ibid Appendix F, 10 
70 Shane O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation (Harvard 
University Press 2015), 178 
71 William J Haynes II, ‘Counter-Resistance Techniques’ (27 November 2002) 
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20021127-1.pdf> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021); Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism’ (16 
April 2003) <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20030416.pdf> (Last 
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72 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 3) para 193. The Armed Services Committee 
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is effective and safe does, however, provide an insight about the development 
of detention and interrogation policy. 
 
It is clear that the results of reliance on SERE techniques is that it is impossible 
to gain a full picture of whether the use of proposed techniques are either 
effective or harmful. It appears that the reason for this is limited experience of 
the use of the techniques in live interrogations. The OMS draft guidelines for 
example highlight that at most, a SERE student will be subjected to the 
waterboard on at most two occasions,73 and that a SERE trainee is likely to be 
fitter than a detainee, though the guidelines state ‘the procedure nonetheless 
carries some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of times or when 
applied to an individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee’.74 This seeming 
disconnect between the effects of techniques applied in live interrogations 
versus the application of techniques designed to build resistance against 
interrogations in a training environment raises questions about the extent to 
which the United States ever wanted to conform with long-standing legal norms, 
or whether the US wanted to justify an aggressive interrogation program no 
matter what.  
 
However, beyond stating that a reason behind the request for information from 
JPRA was the potential to modify SERE school techniques for use in real life 
interrogations, the Armed Services Report does not elaborate on why it was 
deemed to be acceptable to contact an organisation, in JPRA, which is oriented 
on the protection of US personnel for the purposes of developing an 
interrogation policy. This is a prudent factor to consider when JPRA personnel 
admit that the use of SERE techniques would constitute a breach of the Geneva 
Conventions, especially when the program was developed at a time when 
President Bush had declared that the Geneva Conventions did not apply in the 
conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.75 
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It seems difficult, therefore, to establish how the present Report can be used as 
a means of holding people accountable for alleged wrongdoing if it is not able to 
answer the question of why the DoD’s detention and interrogation policy 
developed in the way that it did; the Report merely presents the development of 
policy as a matter of fact. 
 
ii. The Transfer of Policy from Guantanamo Bay to 
Afghanistan 
  
JPRA had already begun the process of trying to develop their role in the 
interrogation of detainees prior to the DoD’s July 2002 request for information 
on SERE techniques. In February 2002, following the completion of a paper on 
how to defeat Al Qaeda resistance measures written by James Mitchell and 
Bruce Jessen, JPRA Commander Colonel Randy Moulton had already written 
an email to commanders across the US military stating that JPRA was able to 
provide courses on interrogation resistance.76 Additionally, Jessen had been 
asked by Moulton to prepare a plan for how JPRA should integrate itself into the 
interrogation process,77 though the Armed Services Committee states that it is 
unclear to what extent this plan was ever utilised.78 Furthermore, JPRA began 
providing training to bodies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency,79 the 
CIA,80 and personnel deployed at Guantanamo Bay.81 
 
Those attending training conducted in September 2002 included members of 
the Behavioral Science Consultation Team at Guantanamo Bay,82 who would 
go on to produce a memo proposing an interrogation policy for Guantanamo 
Bay.83 The Armed Services Committee state that the 11 October 2002 memo 
which requested permission for the use of 18 different interrogation techniques 
at Guantanamo Bay ‘was largely drawn from the October 2, 2002 memorandum 
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that the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) had written upon 
their return from the JPRA training at Fort Bragg’.84 The 18 proposed 
interrogation techniques included within the memo are broken down into three 
categories.85 
 
In relation to Category I, for which it is stated ‘the detainee should be provided a 
chair and the environment should be generally comfortable’,86 2 types of 
technique were proposed: the detainee could be shouted at,87 and the 
interrogator could use ‘techniques of deception’.88 In relation to Category II 
techniques, which the Armed Services Committee state bear a strong 
resemblance to SERE techniques,89 12 techniques were proposed which 
include stress positions, exploitation of phobias and hooding.90 Four Category III 
tactics, which required approval by the Commanding General of United States 
Southern Command, were proposed: tactics to convince the detainee that they 
or their family were facing the threat of death,91 ‘exposure to cold weather or 
water’,92 ‘use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of 
suffocation’,93 and ‘use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, 
poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing’.94 A number of the 
techniques listed within Categories II and III are amongst those listed by the 
OTP as being alleged to have been committed by US military personnel in the 
perpetration of both torture and outrages upon personal dignity as war crimes 
under Articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute respectively.95 
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The use of all Category I and II techniques listed in Lieutenant Colonel Phifer’s 
request for approval, as well as the Category III technique of ‘mild non-injurious 
physical contact’ were subsequently approved exclusively for use at 
Guantanamo Bay by United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 2 
December 2002.96 This approval was subsequently withdrawn on 15 January 
2003 following concerns surrounding the legality of the approved techniques 
being raised by the Office of the Navy General Counsel.97 
 
However, despite the fact that Donald Rumsfeld’s approval of the interrogation 
techniques applied exclusively to Guantanamo, the initial approval of these 
interrogation techniques did have an impact on the development of interrogation 
policy in Afghanistan. On 10 January 2003, the Special Mission Unit Task Force 
(SMU TF), who had begun conducting interrogations in Afghanistan in October 
2002 (previously serving as support to Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-
180) in this role), introduced a new Standard Operating Practice (SOP).98  The 
Armed Services Committee Report highlights similarities with the techniques 
which Rumsfeld had approved: 
 
“Three of the four techniques approved by the SMU TF – isolation, stress 
positions, and multiple interrogators – were among those authorized by 
the Secretary of Defence for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. The 
fourth technique – sleep deprivation (defined by the SMU TF as “no less 
than 4 hours sleep in a 24-hour period”) was, in effect, authorized by the 
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Secretary on December 2, 2002, when he authorized the use of 20 hour 
interrogations.”99 
 
In the process of creating the SMU TF SOP, two SMU TF legal advisors who 
worked on the SOP stated that Rumsfeld’s approval of interrogation techniques 
in December 2002 had impacted their determination of the legality of the 
techniques proposed.100 Prior to the implementation of SOPs by the SMU TF on 
10 January 2003 (and 24 January 2004 in the case of CJTF-180), interrogation 
policy in Afghanistan was regulated only by Army Field Manual 34-52.101 The 
Armed Services Committee Report highlights that redacted memos written by 
the SMU TF Staff Judge Advocate General noted that the techniques approved 
‘could rise to the level of torture if applied in such a way and for such a period of 
time that it rises to the level of severe physical pain and suffering’.102 The 
Report further notes that the redacted memos state ‘we are at risk as we get 
more ‘creative and stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures 
taught at DoD and DA schools and detailed in official interrogation manuals.’103 
Furthermore, the United States Army, prior to Donald Rumsfeld’s initial approval 
of interrogation techniques at Guantanamo in December 2002, stated that the 
proposal of stress positions ‘crosses the line of “humane” treatment, would likely 
be considered maltreatment under Article 93 of the UCMJ, and may violate the 
Federal torture statute if it results in severe physical pain or suffering.’104 This 
means that techniques permitted by the SMU TF SOP appear to run contrary to 
previously accepted military interrogation practices, and again raises significant 
questions about the willingness of the United States to comply with legal norms. 
 
Furthermore, the Armed Services Committee Report makes it clear that the Air 
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Criminal Investigative Task Force all 
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raised significant doubts in relation to the legality of the interrogation 
techniques, citing both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Torture 
Statute.105 The DoD’s Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, Eliana 
Davidson, is also alleged to have told DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes that 
the request required further examination.106 Additionally, the Legal Counsel for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Captain Jane Dalton, was allegedly stopped from 
carrying out a legal review into the request for approval of interrogation 
techniques at Guantanamo by DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes because of 
concerns he had regarding knowledge of the review becoming widespread.107 
Scharf also highlighted that State Department Legal Advisor William H Taft IV 
was not involved in the policy formulation process.108 When asked if there was 
an appearance that they had ignored legal criticisms of proposed interrogation 
plans, Haynes stated: 
 
“It is erroneous to say that I dismissed the reservations of others. I 
understand that people have differences of opinion. I understand how 
those who have the benefit of hindsight and who disagree with policy 
judgments that were made by the administration can be “troubled” by and 
continue to disagree with some decisions. There are thousands of 
lawyers within the DOD. The views of these lawyers are not uniform. 
They also have differences of opinion. It was my practice, given the 
constraints of time, resources, and the need-to-know, to listen and 
appropriately take into consideration the views of civilian and military 
lawyers within DOD as well as take the views of commanders.”109 
 
This does not provide an entirely convincing explanation of why Jim Haynes 
chose to recommend pursuit of a policy which he was warned ran contrary to 
established United States law. Whilst it is possible that Haynes did not 
recognise that the policy would have ramifications beyond operations at 
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Guantanamo Bay at the time he recommended the policy in November 2002,110 
the extent of the policy should have become clear during the work of the 
Working Group established by Donald Rumsfeld in January 2003 ‘to assess the 
legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees 
held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism’.111 This is the case 
because, as will be discussed below, it was clear from the work of the Working 
Group that the effects of the policy did not apply only to Guantanamo. 
 
The final point to discuss in relation to this section is the development of 
interrogation policy in Afghanistan by Combined Joint Task Force 180. As has 
already been stated, until they introduced their own SOP, they were relying 
solely upon Army Field Manual 34-52 as their source of authority for 
interrogation policy. The circumstances by which they introduced their SOP 
present further questions about the extent to which United States authorities 
maintained oversight of their interrogation policy in the early years of its 
operation. On 24 January 2003, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cotell, sent a memo to the Working Group 
established by Donald Rumsfeld which outlined a range of interrogation 
techniques that had been used by CJTF-180 in Afghanistan, including the 
exploitation of phobias, sensory deprivation and hooding.112 Additionally, the 
Armed Services Committee Report states that Cotell: 
 
“also recommended use of five additional techniques, including 
“deprivation of clothing” to put detainees in a “shameful, uncomfortable 
situation;” “food deprivation;” “sensory overload – loud music or 
temperature regulation;” “controlled fear through the use of muzzled, 
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Cotell stated that he whilst he was aware that Rumsfeld’s approval for the use 
of aggressive interrogation techniques had been revoked, the lack of alternative 
guidance meant that CJTF-180 considered their policy to be valid.114 The 
Church Report states that following a lack of response to their memo, ‘in the 
absence of any negative feedback, the CJTF legal staff concluded that the 
techniques described as being currently employed in the January 24, 2003 
memorandum were unobjectionable to higher headquarters and that the 
memorandum could be considered an approved policy’.115 
 
The Church Report also states that ‘in developing techniques, interrogators in 
Afghanistan took so literally FM 34-52’s suggestion to be creative that they 
strayed significantly from a plain-language reading of FM-34-52’.116 
Furthermore, it took until June 2004 for interrogation policy to conform with Field 
Manual 34-52 once again.117 In this situation, it has to be asked how an 
interrogation policy based on an approval for techniques which had been 
rescinded, prior to the policy ever being written, was allowed to remain in force 
for over a year. 
 
The Armed Services Committee Report does not provide any answers in this 
respect, which raises further questions as to whether it can be a means by 
which to say the US has complied with the principle of complementarity since 
there is no way to ensure accountability for a situation that is not fully 
understood. However, the findings of the Report do serve to suggest that the 
Department of Defense failed to effectively maintain oversight of their own 
detention and interrogation program. This raises the potential for liability under 
the principle of command responsibility as found in Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute.118 This is because the continued existence of the policy, in the 
circumstances described above, suggest that senior officials ‘failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent’ alleged 
 
114 ibid 156 
115 Church Report (n 101) 201 
116 ibid 196 
117 ibid 7 




international crimes from being committed by those under their ‘effective 




Whilst this section has shown that the Armed Services Committee Report does 
highlight important facts in relation to the development of the DoD’s 
interrogation policy, particularly in relation to the role played by JPRA/SERE 
personnel, and the transfer of interrogation policy from Guantanamo Bay to 
Afghanistan, it does not effectively show that the Report can be a means by 
which the US can comply with the principle of complementarity in and of itself. A 
primary reason for that is because the Report does not carry out a thorough 
examination of why the policy developed and manifested itself in the way that it 
did in order to try and ensure steps are taken to prevent recurrence. This seems 
to be especially important in the absence of prosecutions for those determined 
to be the most responsible for the perpetration of international crimes. In 
relation to such prosecutions, the OTP states: 
 
“The Prosecution has been unable to obtain specific information with a 
sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates that 
proceedings were undertaken with respect to cases of alleged detainee 
abuse by members of the US armed forces in Afghanistan within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court.”120 
 
Additionally, the main conclusions of the Armed Services Committee Report in 
relation to interrogation policy transfer can be seen in the Church Report, as 
was shown above, and the role of SERE can be seen through the examination 
of publicly released documents in the context of both the DoD and the CIA. This 
further demonstrates the limited impact of the Report, and therefore its utility in 
demonstrating that the US has complied with the principle of complementarity. 
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b. The Development of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program 
 
The Report of the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism 
Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003), 
highlights that prior to the commencement of the War on Terror, the CIA’s 
previous involvement in interrogations during the 1980s had to be brought to an 
end as a result of ‘allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America’.121 
Additionally, the CIA handbook states that ‘it is CIA policy to neither participate 
directly in nor encourage interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or 
physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane 
treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation’.122 
 
This suggests that the CIA should have taken special care to ensure that any 
pursuit of detention and interrogation operations should have been conducted in 
such a way that it both conformed with the CIA’s own policy but also ensured 
that the mistakes of the past were not repeated (goals which hardly appear to 
be mutually exclusive). Instead, the CIA operated a detention and interrogation 
program which resulted in the Senate Intelligence Committee Report concluding 
that ‘the interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA 
represented to policymakers’,123 impeded the operation of accountability 
mechanisms,124 and that ‘CIA detainees were subjected to coercive 
interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of 
Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters’.125 This section will 
discuss the findings of the Report and highlight significant weaknesses with the 
report’s ability to be a useful means of ensuring accountability. 
 
It should also be noted that prior to this analysis taking place that the European 
Court of Human Rights, when adjudicating on cases relating to the CIA’s 
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detention and interrogation program, found that detainees who had been 
subject to enhanced interrogation techniques had been victims of torture.126 
 
i. Quality of Staff 
 
The first point which needs to be highlighted is that the Report makes it clear 
that the management of Detention Site Cobalt (located in Afghanistan and in 
operation between September 2002 and April 2004)127 raises significant 
questions about how the CIA managed their detention and operation 
operations. For example, it is stated that there were concerns surrounding the 
extent to which the officer placed in charge of Detention Site Cobalt between 
September 2002 and July 2003,128 referred to in the Intelligence Committee 
Report as ‘[CIA OFFICER 1]’,129 could be trusted to carry out his duties. 
Colleagues stated that [CIA OFFICER 1] had ‘issues with judgment and 
maturity’,130 and that he had a ‘lack of honesty, judgment and maturity’.131  
 
Additionally, the Report makes it clear that this officer ‘was a junior officer on his 
first overseas assignment with no previous experience or training in handling 
prisoners or conducting interrogations’.132 The Office of the Inspector General 
Report into the death of Gul Rahman, a detainee who died of hypothermia at 
Cobalt in November 2002, states that at that time, [CIA OFFICER 1] ‘had not 
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received interrogation training and was operating the facility with a modicum of 
Headquarters guidance’.133 The Intelligence Committee Report states that he 
only became a certified interrogator, in April 2003 after having his practical 
training requirement waived because of his work at Cobalt.134 Furthermore, the 
Intelligence Committee Report states that in March 2003, [CIA OFFICER 1] was 
given a bonus for ‘consistently superior work’,135 and the CIA took the decision 
to not take disciplinary action against [CIA OFFICER 1] because of ‘the 
operational context that existed at the time of Rahman’s detention’.136 
 
The doubts raised in relation to [CIA OFFICER 1]’s appropriateness to be 
placed in charge of Detention Site Cobalt were not the only issues raised in 
relation to officers employed as part of the CIA’s detention and interrogation 
program. The Intelligence Committee Report states in relation to officers 
employed in 2002 and 2003: 
 
“The Committee identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds 
include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility 
for employment, their access to classified information, and their 
participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the 
derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of 
the CIA officers to the Detention and Interrogation Program. This group 
of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in 
inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management 
issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.”137 
 
The CIA acknowledged in their response to the Intelligence Committee Report 
that some of the officers referred to in the Report should not have been allowed 
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to be involved in the CIA’s detention and interrogation operations but stated that 
‘much of the derogatory information was not in fact available to senior 
managers making assignments’.138 The CIA further stated that in some 
instances individuals were appointed as a result of an ‘on-the-scene 
decision’.139 
 
Staffing problems were something that dogged the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program through its history. For example, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee Report highlights that in April 2005, the Base Chief at Detention Site 
Black (located in Romania and in operation between September 2003 and 
November 2005)140 sent an email to the CIA in which they stated the following: 
 
“With regards to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are 
exceptional and more than a few are basically incompetent. From what 
we can determine there is no established methodology as to the 
selection of debriefers. Rather than look for their best, managers seem 
be selecting either problem, underperforming officers or whomever 
seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no 
evidence that thought is being given to deploying an ‘A-Team’.”141 
 
This is a problem which also existed at other detention sites. For example, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee Report states that there were no debriefers 
present at Detention Site Orange (located in Afghanistan and in operation 
between April 2004 and September 2006)142 at times in 2005. Furthermore, 
multiple requests were made by the Station Chief for more debriefers to be 
made available.143 An Office of the Inspector General Audit from June 2006  
stated that ‘CIA detention facilities have experienced a shortage of qualified 
debriefers, which may have negatively impacted intelligence exploitation of 
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detainees’,144 and that ‘a shortage of qualified debriefers at detention facilities is 
an on-going problem’.145 
 
The fact that the CIA allowed a situation where they had a lack of (capable) staff 
to carry out roles in their detention and interrogation program to exist nearly four 
years after the program began operation presents doubts about the extent to 
which they were committed to operating a program which resembled an 
effective intelligence gathering operation, as opposed to a situation where 
chaos reigned. This is especially the case when it is considered that a Base 
Chief of one of the CIA’s detention sites stated that ‘problem, underperforming 
officers’ were being sent to work as debriefers.146 Additionally, the fact that such 
staffing problems continued for years makes it difficult to give any credence to 
one of the CIA’s major critiques of the Intelligence Committee Report, that:  
 
“it tars the Agency’s entire RDI effort with the mistakes of the first few 
months… the Study as a whole leads the reader to believe that 
management shortcomings that marked those initial months persisted 
throughout the program, which is historically inaccurate”147 
 
The creation of a program whereby an individual with no interrogation 
experience is placed in charge of a detention and interrogation facility on their 
first overseas assignment, where individuals for whom there are serious 
character doubts are allowed to assume roles within that interrogation program 
(including the aforementioned detention facility manager), and allowing facilities 
to operate without sufficient qualified and/or competent staff for years 
afterwards makes it appear that the CIA at the very least tolerated a situation 
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ii. CIA Management Problems 
 
A key factor in why this was the case may rest in the notion there were 
significant failings in the CIA’s management of their detention and interrogation 
program. One aspect in relation to this can be found in the seeming disconnect 
between what CIA Headquarters knew about their detention and interrogation 
program and what was actually taking place at detention and interrogation 
facilities. For example, in the case of Gul Rahman, who died of hypothermia at 
Detention Site Cobalt in November 2002.148 The CIA Office of the Inspector 
General was critical of false statements made in the official cable sent in 
relation to Rahman’s death, which ‘obscured or minimized the circumstances of 
the death’,149 and ‘the absence of adequate supervision’.150 This meant that 
when Congress were initially notified of the circumstances of Rahman’s death, 
they were provided incorrect information which subsequently had to be 
corrected.151 
 
Furthermore, at Detention Site Blue,152 between 28 December 2002 and 1 
January 2003, ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri, who ‘is associated with the planning 
of the attack on the USS Cole, the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, 
and a 1997 attempt to smuggle Sagger anti-tank missiles into Saudi Arabia to 
attack U.S. forces based there’,153 had an empty handgun pointed at his head 
and the effect of the gun firing was simulated whilst shackled.154 Additionally, Al-
Nashiri, when naked and hooded, had a revving power drill placed near him.155 
Use of these techniques was not reported to Headquarters because it was 
believed that these techniques did not meet the reporting threshold,156 because 
 
148 For more information, see Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General (n 133) 
generally 
149 ibid para 178 
150 ibid 
151 ibid 
152 Intelligence Committee Report (n 2) 68 
153 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General, ‘Report of Investigation: 
Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [Redacted]’ (29 October 2003) Report No. 2003-
7123-IG <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/0006541525.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021), para 19 
154 ibid para 7 
155 ibid para 54 




staff at Detention Site Blue stated that they were aware of similar events taking 
place at other detention facilities,157 and because one of the CIA officers 
involved said they had been told to reduce the number of reports made.158 In 
this case, the CIA Office of Inspector General concluded that the techniques 
used went beyond anything the CIA had previously approved,159 and that the 
staff members involved had acted independently of CIA Headquarters.160 
 
Additionally, the Intelligence Committee Report suggests that the CIA used 
enhanced interrogation techniques on a number of individuals without the 
required authorisation, stating: 
 
“Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were 
subjected to one or more of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. 
CIA records indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were 
subjected to one or more CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without 
CIA Headquarters approval. This count included detainees who were 
approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to 
unapproved techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had 
no approvals to use any of the techniques categorized as “enhanced” or 
“standard” by the CIA at the time they were applied.”161 
 
The Intelligence Committee Report shows that CIA cables indicated that the 17 
individuals subjected to unapproved enhanced interrogation techniques were 
subject to these practices between 2002 and 2004.162 Of these 17, it appears 
that at least 10 were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques after 
interrogation guidelines were issued by CIA Director George Tenet in January 
2003 which specified when interrogation techniques required approval in order 
to be used.163 
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These interrogation guidelines stated that ‘the use of each specific Enhanced 
Technique must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and may be 
employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee’.164 
In the case of standard techniques, it is stated that ‘whenever feasible, advance 
approval is required for the use of Standard Techniques by an interrogation 
team.’165 
 
For their part, the CIA deny that enhanced techniques were used without 
approval on 17 individuals, stating, ‘no more than seven detainees received 
enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval’.166 Whilst the 
Intelligence Committee provided an explanation as to why they believe that the 
explanation provided by the CIA is inaccurate,167 the distinction between 
whether the techniques were used without approval on seven or seventeen 
individuals seems hardly relevant when it is considered that the use of 
enhanced interrogation techniques were specifically approved as a result of 
guidance from the Office of Legal Counsel in August 2002 (guidance which as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter has been subject to much criticism).168  
Additionally, Article 11 of the Torture Convention requires that: 
 
“Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, 
instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the 
custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, 
detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a 
view to preventing any cases of torture”.169 
 
This duty also applies in relation to ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ 
under Article 16 of the Torture Convention.170 Furthermore. Article 2(2) of the 
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Torture Convention states that ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever… 
may be invoked as a justification for torture.’171 
 
The fact that there is confusion surrounding the extent to which interrogation 
techniques were used without required approval highlights concerns 
surrounding the management of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, 
as does the fact that the Intelligence Committee’s findings that individuals were 
subjected to unauthorized interrogation techniques were based on 
documentation from within the CIA. This suggests that CIA personnel were 
aware of the use of the techniques and chose to allow them to be used 
regardless; and suggests that, as was the case with the DoD interrogation 
program, the CIA failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent abuses from 
taking place and thus open themselves up to potential criminal liability under the 
principle of command responsibility.172 
 
The Intelligence Committee Report highlights a number of instances which raise 
significant doubts as to whether the instances discussed above illustrate that 
abuse of detainees was the result of isolated acts by problematic personnel 
within the CIA or whether these instances were symptomatic of the CIA’s 
general ignorance of their own detention and interrogation program. For 
example, in relation to Detention Site Cobalt, the Report highlights that in 
September 2003, the CIA Director George Tenet stated that he was ‘not very 
familiar’ with the operations at the detention site;173 the CIA’s Associate Deputy 
Director of Operations was ‘unaware that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation 
techniques were being used there’;174 and, in August 2003, both the CIA’s 
General Counsel and Deputy Counsel stated that they were unaware of 
operations at Cobalt.175 
 
The lack of knowledge of the CIA’s senior management of their own detention 
and interrogation operations in the second half of 2003 came over 6 months 
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after the CIA’s introduction of formal interrogation guidelines.176 The CIA stated 
in their response to the Intelligence Committee Report that the Counterterrorism 
Center’s (CTC) Renditions Group, who had been placed in charge of the CIA’s 
detention and interrogation program in December 2002 following Rahman’s 
death,177 ‘developed standards and guidelines for operating all CIA-controlled 
detention and interrogation facilities and monitored adherence to those 
guidelines’.178 However, the Head of the CTC Chief Jose Rodriguez stated that 
Cobalt was not of as much importance as his other responsibilities.179 In any 
event, Rodriguez has defended the use of CIA enhanced interrogation 
techniques on the basis of their relationship with SERE techniques: 
 
“we put AZ in isolation at the black site where he was being held while a 
set of interrogation techniques based on a U.S. military course called 
“Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape” (SERE) was developed. 
Over the years tens of thousands of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force 
personnel have endured the enhanced interrogation techniques of 
SERE, which include waterboarding. I am convinced that when years 
later President Obama and his Attorney General said that waterboarding 
is torture they were referring to the waterboarding method used by the 
Spanish Inquisition, or by the Japanese during World War II, or the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia – not the waterboarding technique used in 
SERE. Otherwise hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. military trainers 
would be guilty of torture.”180 
 
This raises significant doubts as to the extent that the CIA’s assertion that their 
detention and interrogation program was ‘much better developed and managed 
after the initial months of RDI activities’ since the CIA was unaware of what was 
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going on at its own detention sites.181 The extent to which there was a lack of 
awareness of CIA activities on the part of senior management is highlighted by 
the fact that in their response to the Intelligence Committee Report, with the 
benefit of hindsight, the CIA stated that they were unable to bring Cobalt up to 
the standards of their other detention facilities (which have already been shown 
to have their own problems).182 
 
The instances highlighted above only serve to support one of the conclusions of 
the Intelligence Committee Report, that ‘the CIA’s management and operation 
of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the 
program’s duration, particularly so in 2002 and 2003.’183 This, however, may be 
the tip of the iceberg, as the Intelligence Committee Report shows that the CIA 
attempted to avoid accountability for the operation of their detention and 
interrogation program. 
 
The Intelligence Committee Report states that in 2004, following the circulation 
of a draft review of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program by the Office 
of the Inspector General, several members of the CIA’s senior management 
were ‘highly critical’ of the draft.184 In particular, the Intelligence Committee 
Report quotes a memo from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, which stated 
that the review provided ‘an imbalanced and inaccurate picture of the 
Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’.185 Additionally, the CIA 
Deputy Director James Pavitt stated that the Draft Review had not focused on 
the effectiveness of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program,186 though 
the Intelligence Committee Report states that ‘a review of CIA records found 
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Additionally, the Intelligence Committee Report highlights that in July 2005, a 
memo was sent from CIA Director Porter Goss to the Office of the Inspector 
General raising concerns about the Office of the Inspector General’s work on 
the operations of the Counterterrorism Center and requesting to delay some 
aspects of new investigations.188 The memo states in relation to this point: 
 
“Given its mission, CTC unquestionably must be subjected to rigorous 
independent oversight. This, in fact, has been the case, as evidenced by 
the 20 or so ongoing, incomplete OIG reviews directed at the Center. I 
am increasingly concerned about the cumulative impact of the OIG’s 
work on CTC’s performance. As I have said in previous correspondence 
to you, I believe it makes sense to complete existing reviews, particularly 
resource-intensive investigations such as those now impacting CTC, 
before opening new ones. As CIA continues to wage battle in the Global 
War on Terrorism, I ask that you reschedule these aspects of the new 
CTC review until a mutually agreeable time in the future.”189 
 
In their response to the Intelligence Committee Report, the CIA attempt to justify 
Goss’s comments, stating that they came at a time when the Counterterrorism 
Center’s resources were limited,190 and that ‘The DCIA’s request thus sought to 
strike a balance between the critical missions both OIG and CTC had to 
perform.’191 Both the CIA and Republican Minority responses to the Intelligence 
Report seek to downplay the significance of the CIA Director’s actions by stating 
that they ultimately had no impact on the activities of the Office of the Inspector 
General.192 The fact that the work of the Office of the Inspector General was not 
undermined does not justify why the CIA Director sought to delay the Office of 
the Inspector General. On the one hand it can be argued that the CIA Director 
did not act in a manner which was not inconsistent with his powers under US 
law. The Central Intelligence Agency Act 1949, as amended, for example, 
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states that the CIA Director has the power to prevent Office of the Inspector 
General Investigations: 
 
“The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying 
out, or completing any audit, inspection or investigation… if the Director 
determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect the vital national 
security interests of the United States.”193 
 
On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency Act states that one of the 
duties of the Inspector General is: 
 
“To provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and 
coordinate independently, the inspections, investigations, and audits 
relating to the programs and operations of the Agency to ensure that they 
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law.”194 
 
Additionally, the Act states that the Inspector General has to ‘report to the 
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received by the 
Inspector General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involve a 
program or operation of the Agency’.195 Whilst the CIA Director did not actually 
impact the work of the Inspector General, and regardless the powers held by 
them, in light of the concerns raised over the course of this Chapter, it should 
still be a matter of concern that such a request was ever made. This is 
especially the case since the job of the CIA Office of Inspector General is to 
ensure that CIA activities conform to US law. This raises questions about the 
extent to which individuals within the CIA were willing to be held accountable for 
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In a 27 November 2007 document regarding the use of contractors as 
interrogators in the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, it is stated that 
‘the unique skill sets necessary for a successful interrogation program did not 
make it feasible for CIA to create a cadre of long-term experienced staff 
interrogators’.196 The document states that the subsequent reliance on 
contractors occurred because: 
 
“long-term contract interrogators are able to apply a history of program-
specific experiences and lessons-learned to maximise interrogation and 
exploitation efforts. CIA would be unable to replicate this level of 
experience from a temporary cadre of staff interrogators.”197 
 
Two such contract psychologists, referred to in the Intelligence Committee 
Report as ‘Grayson SWIGERT’ and ‘Hammond DUNBAR,198 but actually called 
James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen played a key part in the development of the 
CIA’s detention and interrogation program from the beginning.199 The CIA 
stated in relation to their role: 
 
“Ph.D psychologists, Drs. Mitchell and Jessen played a significant and 
formative role in the development of CTC’s detention and interrogation 
program and continue to lead in the development of additional 
psychologically-based strategies to collect threat and actionable 
intelligence from HVDs in a manner that does not violate any federal law, 
the US constitution, or any US treaty obligation. They have been 
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instrumental in training and mentoring other CIA interrogators and 
debriefers, and many of the current successes in obtaining information 
from detainees who are actively trying to withhold or distort it, are due to 
the interrogations conducted by Drs Mitchell and Jessen.”200 
 
Jessen and Mitchell’s involvement in the CIA’s detention and interrogation 
program meant that in they were awarded an exclusive contract to provide staff 
at the CIA’s detention facilities worth $180 million.201 Whilst this contract was 
cancelled in 2008, their company Jessen, Mitchell, and Associates had been 
paid over $75 million by the CIA for services rendered.202 The CIA stated that 
under their contract, Mitchell, Jessen, and Associates provided ‘100 percent of 
the security exploitation personnel operating at CIA’s Blacksites, and 
approximately 80 percent of CIA’s interrogators’.203 
 
The role of Jessen and Mitchell in the CIA’s detention and interrogation program 
is clearly illustrated in the Intelligence Committee Report, which confirms that 
the two psychologists were involved in the CIA’s first interrogation of Abu 
Zubaydah at Detention Site Green (which falls outside the scope of the OTP’s 
proposed investigation);204 Jessen was present at Detention Site Cobalt prior to 
the death of Gul Rahman in November 2002,205 even preparing a psychological 
assessment of Rahman;206 both Jessen and Mitchell were sent to Detention 
Site Blue in June 2003 and conducted interrogations there;207 and in June 2007, 
Jessen and Mitchell were asked to brief Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program in order to alleviate her 
conditions in relation to the program.208 
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In the Salim v Mitchell civil complaint, it was alleged that Mitchell and Jessen 
are responsible for the war crime of torture and cruel treatment because: 
 
“Defendants entered into an agreement with agents of the United States 
to design and implement a program for the CIA intended to inflict 
physical and mental suffering on Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were tortured and 
cruelly treated within that program. Defendants participated in or 
committed wrongful acts in furtherance of said conspiracy and/or joint 
criminal enterprise, resulting in injury to Plaintiffs.”209 
 
The involvement of Jessen and Mitchell led the President of the American 
Psychological Association, Nadine Kaslow, to state that ‘if the allegations are 
true, what this pair did was pervert psychological science to break down and 
dehumanize detainees in a misguided effort to extract information. It is clear to 
me that their actions constituted torture.’210 Additionally, one of Kaslow’s 
successors as President of the American Psychological Association, Antonio 
Puente, stated that Jessen and Mitchell’s involvement in the detention and 
interrogation operation resulted in them ‘violating the ethics of their profession 
and leaving a stain on the discipline of psychology.’211 It should, however, be 
noted that the role of the American Psychological Association in the US 
detention and interrogation operations has been subject to criticism, with the 
Hoffman Report stating: 
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“The evidence supports the conclusion that APA officials colluded with 
DoD officials to, at the least, adopt and maintain APA ethics policies that 
were not more restrictive than the guidelines that key DoD officials 
wanted, and that were as closely aligned as possible with DoD policies, 
guidelines, practices, or preferences, as articulated to APA by these DoD 
officials… APA simply took the word of DoD officials with whom it was 
trying to curry favor that no such abuse was occurring, and that future 
DoD policies and training would ensure that no such abuse would occur. 
APA officials did so even in the face of clear and strong indications that 
such abuse had in fact occurred.”212 
 
The CIA, in their response to the Intelligence Committee Report, defended the 
involvement of Jessen and Mitchell on the basis that between them, they had 
been involved in SERE training,213 had conducted academic research on 
resistance techniques,214 and they had expertise in ‘non-standard means of 
interrogation’ which the CIA was lacking in.215 The fact that Mitchell and Jessen 
were allowed to take on such a crucial role based on their knowledge of 
unconventional interrogation techniques again serves to raise questions about 
the extent to which the CIA intended to operate a detention and interrogation 
program which conformed with legal norms. This is especially the case since a 
CIA review acknowledged, in response to a request from the CIA Inspector 
General for information regarding the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation: 
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“There is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy. Because of 
classification, it is not possible to compare this program with other 
programs (e.g. law enforcement procedures) which derive information 
through interrogations. As such, there are no external standards for 
comparison. And there is the epistemological problem of internal 
measure of effectiveness.”216 
 
In their response to the Intelligence Committee Report, the CIA further state that 
they ‘should have attempted to develop a more sustained, systematic, and 
independent means by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the approaches 
used with detainees’,217 but state that such a study would have been difficult to 
conduct because of a number of factors including variations in detainees and 
the way in which interrogation methods were applied,218 ‘the need for 
secrecy’,219 and ‘the need to devote to mission execution the analytic resources 
that might have been used in an evaluation program, especially during the 
years just after 9/11 when CIA was recovering from a depletion of its personnel 
resources during the 1990s’.220 The fact that the CIA acknowledge the 
weaknesses of their detention and interrogation program with the benefit of 
hindsight but still provide excuses as to why they did not take action only 
demonstrates further the chaotic nature of the CIA’s detention and interrogation 
operation. The CIA allowed a program to operate which had incompetent staff, 
which the leadership of the CIA knew very little about, and which the CIA did not 
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in the development of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. However, 
as will be shown in the next section, the Report only had a limited impact on the 
debate within the United States surrounding the War on Terror. Therefore, as 
with the Armed Services Committee Report, it is difficult to see how the 
Intelligence Committee Report can be used as a means of demonstrating that 
the United States has complied with the principle of complementarity. This is 
especially the case when the Senate Intelligence Committee themselves could 
not agree on the validity of the findings of the Intelligence Committee Report – a 
number of Republican members of the Intelligence Committee issued a minority 
response to the Intelligence Committee Report which stated that the Report 
‘appears to be more of an exercise of partisan politics than effective 
congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community’,221 and that the Report 
contains ‘numerous analytical shortfalls, which ultimately led to an unacceptable 
number of incorrect claims and invalid conclusions’.222 
 
The disagreements on the rationale underpinning the report can also be 
demonstrated in relation to the discussion of effectiveness. The Senate 
Intelligence Committee Report states that ‘The CIA’s justification for the use of 
its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their 
effectiveness.’223 The Minority Report, however disputes those findings,224 as do 
the CIA, who stated that ‘the actual impact of the information acquired from 
interrogations was significant and still supported CIA’s judgments about the 
overall value of the information acquired from detainees’.225 
 
The focus on effectiveness has been subject to criticism. For example, Amnesty 
International stated that this disagreement meant that ‘The question of 
accountability for crimes under international law does not get a look in.’226 
Additionally, Johnson, Mora and Schmidt raise an important critique of the 
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Report stating that ‘Despite their disagreements, all these perspectives share 
one key assumption: that whether torture was good or bad depends on whether 
or not it “worked”’.227 Cole was also critical of the focus of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, stating that ‘The report should not have focused so 
much attention on whether the CIA’s tactics worked, and instead should have 
addressed the more important – and answerable question, namely, whether 
they were illegal’.228 Cole additionally states that the Senate Intelligence 
Committee’s Report focus ‘effectively gave a pass’ to those who devised the 
policies underlying the US detention and interrogation programs.229 Jervis 
concluded that because of the Report’s failings ‘a less political report might 
have had more influence’,230 and Zegart argues that ‘the report is likely to 
remain more a Rorschach test than smoking gun, reinforcing existing views of 
the past rather than informing them.’231 
 
It is therefore difficult to establish how the principle of complementarity could 
ever be satisfied by this Report due to the fundamental disagreements which 
exist regarding the factual basis of the Report. This can be established by the 
fact that the Istanbul Protocol states that an effective investigation of torture 
requires ‘clarification of the facts and establishment and acknowledgement of 
individual and State responsibility for victims and their families’,232 which cannot 
be said to have occurred here. Consequently, it would be difficult to determine 
 
227 Douglas A Johnson, Alberto Mora and Averell Schmidt, ‘The Strategic Costs of Torture: How 
Enhanced Interrogation Hurt America’ (2016) 95 Foreign Affairs 121, 122 
228 David Cole, ‘On Rereading the Torture Report – SSCI Focus Gave Too Many Perpetrators a 
Pass’ (Just Security, 22 February 2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/20267/rereading-torture-
report-ssci-focus-gave-perpetrators-pass/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
229 ibid 
230 Robert Jervis, ‘The Torture Blame Game’ (2015) 94 Foreign Affairs 120, 127 
231 Amy Zegart, ‘SSCI Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: A Flawed 
Report’ (Lawfare, 10 December 2015) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/ssci-study-cias-detention-
and-interrogation-program-flawed-report> (Last accessed 15 May 2021). Zegart’s conclusions 
on the Senate Intelligence Committee Report were subject to critique from the Chair of the 
Committee, Dianne Feinstein, ‘A Reply to Amy Zegart on the SSCI Study of the CIA’s Detention 
and Interrogation Program’ (Lawfare, 21 December 2015) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/reply-
amy-zegart-ssci-study-cias-detention-and-interrogation-program> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
This, itself led to a further response from Zegart, who criticised the partisan nature of Feinstein’s 
rebuttal: Amy Zegart, ‘A Response to Senator Feinstein’ (Lawfare, 21 December 2015) 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/response-senator-feinstein> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
232 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Istanbul Protocol Manual 
on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 




how an investigation which does not meet the standards for an effective 
investigation of torture could demonstrate a State’s willingness to conduct an 
investigation for the purposes of Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute.233 
 
2. The Domestic Response to the Senate Reports 
 
Despite the two reports of the United Senate which have formed the basis of 
discussion in this Chapter being valuable sources of information, as can be 
shown by the Office of the Prosecutor citing each of the reports on multiple 
occasions in their request to open an investigation in relation to Afghanistan,234 
it is unclear what impact they actually had on criminal investigation and agency 
reform processes in the United States. This section will discuss the limited 
nature of the impact made by the United States Senate Reports in turn, 
beginning with the Armed Services Committee Report. 
 
a. Armed Services Committee Report 
 
Whilst the Armed Services Committee Report highlighted that SERE techniques 
played a major role in the development of the Department of Defense’s 
interrogation policy in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the Armed Services 
Committee Report made no impact on the development of policy removing the 
possibility of SERE techniques being used in the United States military. The 
reason for this is that the action to remove the influence of SERE primarily took 
place prior to the publication of the Armed Services Committee Report in 
November 2008. An August 2006 report by the Office of the Inspector General 
for the Department of Defense stated that ‘We recommend that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Army, expedite the issuance of Army Field Manual 2-22.3, “Human Intelligence 
Collector Operations.”’235 Army Field Manual 2-22.3 was introduced in 
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September 2006.236 In Chapter 8 of the Field Manual, it is stated that ‘the only 
authorized interrogation approaches and techniques are those authorized by 
and listed in this manual, in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005.’237 
 
Additionally, as highlighted in an Office of the Inspector General Field 
Verification Report, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had stated 
in October 2006 that it was their intention to issue a revised version of the 
Department of Defence Directive relating to interrogations.238 The resulting 
Directive, issued in October 2008, stated that the use of SERE techniques was 
banned.239 Finally, in June 2009, a memo written by General James Mattis in 
response to the August 2006 Office of the Inspector General Report stated that 
‘SERE techniques for interrogation of personnel in DoD Custody or control is 
prohibited.’240 
 
The Office for Professional Responsibility’s Report on their investigation into the 
Office of Legal Counsel’s memos (discussed earlier in this Chapter and in 
Chapter Two), states that ‘during the course of our investigation significant 
pieces of information were brought to light by the news media and, more 
recently, congressional investigations’.241 In relation to these memos, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that: 
 
“Legal opinions… issued by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) interpreted legal obligations under U.S. anti-torture laws 
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and determined the legality of CIA interrogation techniques. Those OLC 
opinions distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture laws, 
rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced 
Department of Defense determinations as to what interrogation 
techniques were legal for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. 
military personnel.”242 
 
The Office of Professional Responsibility concluded that ‘the Bybee Memo had 
the effect of authorizing a program of CIA interrogation that many would argue 
violated the torture statute, the War Crimes Act, the Geneva Convention, and 
the Convention Against Torture’;243 that John Yoo ‘knowingly failed to provide a 
thorough, objective, and candid interpretation of the law’;244 and that Jay Bybee 
‘at a minimum, should have known that the memoranda were not thorough, 
objective, or candid in terms of the legal advice they were providing… and that 
thus he acted in reckless disregard of his professional obligations’.245 
 
However, despite these findings, Associate Deputy Attorney General David 
Margolis stated in January 2010, ‘I cannot adopt OPR’s findings of misconduct, 
and I will not authorize OPR to refer its findings to the state bar disciplinary 
authorities in the jurisdictions where Yoo and Bybee are licensed’.246 This was 
the case even though Margolis states that his ‘decision should not be viewed as 
an endorsement of the legal work that underlies those memoranda’.247 
Consequently, despite being considered a valuable source of information and 
concluding that the OLC memos changed the meaning of torture under United 
States law, the Armed Services Committee Report does not appear to have 
been a significant factor in ensuring that those responsible for the creation of 
those memos should be held to account. 
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Finally, it is unclear in the context of Afghanistan whether the Armed Services 
Committee Report led to any new prosecutions being launched in respect of 
members of the United States military. The Office of the Prosecutor states in 
their Afghanistan investigation request: 
 
“Despite a number of efforts undertaken, the Prosecution has been 
unable to obtain specific information with a sufficient degree of specificity 
and probative value that demonstrates that proceedings were undertaken 
with respect to cases of alleged detainee abuse by members of the US 
armed forces in Afghanistan within the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Court.”248 
 
This is the case even though the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Carl Levin, stated in April 2009: 
 
“I have recommended to Attorney General Holder that he select a 
distinguished individual or individuals – either inside or outside the 
Justice Department, such as retired federal judges – to look at the 
volumes of evidence relating to treatment of detainees, including 
evidence in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report, and to 
recommend what steps, if any, should be taken to establish 
accountability of high-level officials – including lawyers.”249 
 
The statements of the OTP, made in November 2017, appear to indicate that 
Senator Levin’s request for accountability measures be pursued against high-
ranking officials ultimately resulted in no action being taken. Additionally, 
Senator Levin’s request came nearly nine months prior to the Associate Deputy 
Attorney General’s determination that John Yoo and Jay Bybee would not face 
any action in relation to the Office of Professional Responsibility’s finding of 
 
248 OTP Afghanistan Investigation Request (n 3) para 296 
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professional misconduct. This also serves to highlight that the most useful 
aspect of the Senate Armed Services Committee report is that it is a source of 
information, rather than a method of ensuring accountability in and of itself. The 
Report undoubtedly provides information about the practices of US personnel 
during the War on Terror but it is difficult to determine whether any action was 
taken to ensure that individuals were held responsible for alleged wrongdoing 
as a direct result of the Report. 
 
b. Intelligence Committee Report 
 
As was the case with the Armed Services Committee Report, it does not appear 
to be the case that the Intelligence Committee Report contributed to the process 
of criminal prosecutions. In fact, as was stated previously, the Department of 
Justice took the decision after the publication of the Report to not pursue any 
further prosecutions in relation to the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, 
stating to the UN Human Rights Committee that: 
 
“before the SSCI report was released, Mr Durham’s team reviewed the 
Senate Select Committee’s report as it existed in 2012 to determine if it 
contained any new information that would change his previous analysis, 
and determined that it did not.”250 
 
This was the case even though the CIA acknowledged that they had failed to 
hold individuals responsible for the of unauthorised interrogation techniques, 
stating in their response to the Intelligence Committee Report: 
 
“The Study focuses on the inadequate consequences meted out for line 
officers who acted contrary to policy in conducting interrogations in the 
field or in providing the rationale for captures from CTC. To us, an even 
more compelling concern is that the Agency did not sufficiently broaden 
and elevate the focus of its accountability efforts to include the more 
 
250 Human Rights Committee, ‘Information received from the United States of America on follow-
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senior officers who were responsible for organizing, guiding, staffing, and 
supervising RDI activities, especially in the beginning.”251 
 
Despite this acknowledgement that there was a lack of accountability within the 
CIA for past mistakes, the CIA state later on in their response that they did not 
consider it ‘practical or productive to revisit any RDI-related case so long after 
the events unfolded’.252 The CIA stated that they instead preferred to examine 
how future accountability mechanisms should ‘look more broadly at 
management responsibility and look more consistently at any systemic 
issues’.253 
 
Following the publication of the Intelligence Committee Report, Amnesty 
International stated that ‘Failure to end the impunity and ensure redress not only 
leaves the USA in serious violation of its international legal obligations, it 
increases the risk that history will repeat itself’.254 Additionally, the Executive 
Director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth stated days prior to the end of 
Barack Obama’s presidency that the Obama Administration’s failure to 
prosecute those responsible for alleged torture meant that ‘Instead of 
reaffirming the criminality of torture enshrined in international law, Obama 
leaves office having sent the lingering message that, should future officials 
resort to torture, there is little chance they will be held to account’.255 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor stated in their Afghanistan investigation request 
state in relation to the CIA that: 
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“The limited inquiries and/or criminal proceedings that were initiated 
appear to have been focussed on the conduct of direct perpetrators and 
to persons who did not act in good faith or within the scope of the legal 
guidance given by the OLC regarding the interrogation of detainees. The 
conduct of those who purportedly acted in good faith and within the 
boundaries of the legal guidance was excluded from the scope of 
possible prosecution from the outset, regardless of the nature and gravity 
of that conduct. In addition, no proceedings appear to have been 
conducted to examine the criminal responsibility of those who developed, 
authorised or bore oversight responsibility for the implementation by 
members of the CIA of the interrogation techniques set out in this 
request.”256 
 
A failure to hold individuals to account, regardless of where they are in the CIA 
hierarchy or what crimes they are alleged to have committed, based on good 
faith reliance on legally flawed advice means that it is difficult to determine that 
the United States has complied with the principle of complementarity. The 





This Chapter has raised significant doubts about the ability to consider that the 
Reports of the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees can be 
considered a mechanism through which the United States can demonstrate that 
it has complied with the principle of complementarity. The simplest reason for 
this is that, despite highlighting the involvement of senior officials in the 
development of policy which led to the alleged perpetration of acts of torture or 
inhuman treatment, the Reports do not appear to have been a significant 
contributor to the criminal investigation process or have a major impact on the 
process of institutional reform. In the case of the Intelligence Committee Report, 
it is not clear how the Report has served to contribute to the debate around 
 




torture and cruel treatment in the United States since there appears to have 
been little agreement between the two political parties about the factual basis of 
the Report. This means that the most valuable aspect of the United States 
Senate Reports is the information that they provide for an investigation, such as 
that being carried out by the OTP, about the development of detention and 
interrogation operations during the War on Terror. This sentiment appears to be 





Chapter Four: Criminal Investigations in the United States 
 
Under Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
is unable to assert jurisdiction ‘unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.1 In the Burundi admissibility 
judgment, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that ‘national investigations that are not 
designed to result in criminal prosecutions do not meet the admissibility 
requirements under article 17(1) of the Statute.’2 Because the last chapter 
discussing reports of the United States Senate raised questions in relation to 
potential liability of those involved in the military and CIA detention and 
interrogation programs, whilst also raising doubts about how these reports 
contributed to the process of holding individuals accountable, this chapter will 
discuss criminal investigative processes in the United States. The discussion 
will focus on three aspects: criminal investigations themselves, US policies 
which may serve to limit the potential for people to be held accountable for 
potential crimes, and the use of executive clemency. 
 
1. Criminal Investigations 
 
In order to satisfy the principle of complementarity, it was held in Lubanga that  
‘it is a conditio sine qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a 
situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both the 
person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the court’.3 
Exactly what this duty requires has been clarified in subsequent cases before 
the ICC with the Court stating in Gbagbo that ‘If a State is unable to clearly 
indicate the contours of its national investigation, the State cannot assert that 
there exists a conflict of jurisdictions with the Court.’4 Additionally, in the al-
Senussi Appeals Chambers judgment, it was stated that: 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 17(1)(a) 
2 Situation in the Republic of Burundi (Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi”) ICC-01/17-9-Red (9 November 2017), para 152 
3 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of 
arrest, Article 58) ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red (10 February 2006), para 31 
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“If there is a large overlap between the incidents under investigation, it 
may be clear that the State is investigating substantially the same 
conduct; if the overlap is smaller, depending on the precise facts, it may 
be that the State is still investigating substantially the same conduct or 
that it is only investigating a very small part of the Prosecutor’s case.”5 
 
However, despite calls for prosecutions from UN treaty bodies,6 special 
rapporteurs,7 and NGOs,8 it is unclear to what extent the US have satisfied the 
requirements of the principle of complementarity. For example, in their 
investigation request, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) state that: 
 
“the Prosecution has been unable to obtain specific information with a 
sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates that 
proceedings were undertaken with respect to cases of alleged detainee 
 
5 Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the admissibility of the case 
against Abdullah Al-Senussi”) ICC-01/11-01/11-565 (24 July 2014), para 72 
6 See, for example, United Nations Committee against Torture, ‘Concluding observations on the 
combined third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America’ (19 December 2014) UN 
Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5, para 12; and Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on 
the fourth periodic report of the United States of America’ (23 April 2014) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para 5 
7 For example, see the comments of Ben Emmerson: Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ‘Feinstein report: UN expert calls for prosecution of CIA officers and other 
Government officials’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 December 2014) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15397&LangID=E> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021); and Nils Melzer: Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, ‘“US must stop policy of impunity for the crime of torture”- UN rights expert’ (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 December 2017) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22532&LangID=E> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
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slams-cia-torture-lies> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Amnesty International, ‘USA: Senate 
summary report on CIA detention programme must not be end of story’ (Amnesty International, 
9 December 2014) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/usa-senate-summary-
report-cia-detention-programme-must-not-be-end-story/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); and 
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2014) <https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/those-who-approved-torture-shouldnt-be-above-the-law-




abuse by members of the US armed forces in Afghanistan within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court.”9 
 
The OTP make a similar statement in relation to alleged crimes committed in 
the context of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program.10 
 
a. The United States Military 
 
In the context of investigations conducted by the US military, the OTP state that 
‘the information available typically categorises domestic activity in clusters of 
statistics.’11 Among the examples of statistics cited by the OTP,12 is a statement 
made by the United States to the Human Rights Committee in which it was 
stated: 
 
“The Department of Defense (DoD) has conducted thousands of 
investigations since 2001 and it has prosecuted or disciplined hundreds 
of service members for misconduct, including mistreatment of detainees. 
For example, more than 70 investigations concerning allegations of 
detainee abuse by military personnel in Afghanistan conducted by DoD 
resulted in trial by courts-martial, close to 200 investigations of detainee 
abuse resulted in either non-judicial punishment or adverse 
administrative action, and many more were investigated and resulted in 
action at a lower level. The remainder were determined to be 
unsubstantiated, lacking in sufficient inculpatory evidence, or were 
included as multiple counts against one individual.”13 
 
 
9 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15”) ICC-02/17-7-Red (20 November 2017), 
para 296 
10 ibid para 297 
11 ibid para 301 
12 ibid paras 302-07 
13 Permanent Mission of the United States of America, ‘One-Year Follow-up Response of the 
United States of America to Priority Recommendations of the Human Rights Committee on its 
Fourth Periodic Report on Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 April 2015) 
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In this regard, the OTP state that ‘Specific public information on the incidents 
and persons forming the subject of those proceedings is, however, scant’,14 and 
that they were ‘unable to identify any individual in the armed forces prosecuted 
by courts martial for the ill-treatment of detainees within the Court’s temporal 
and territorial jurisdiction.’15 This is the case even though the United States told 
the United Nations Committee against Torture that ‘the U.S. Armed Forces 
conduct prompt and independent investigations into all credible allegations 
concerning mistreatment of detainees.’,16 and a 2013 Defense Legal Policy 
Board Report stated that ‘Since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
2001, the Services have demonstrated increasing proficiency in the 
administration of military justice in the deployed environment’.17 It should, 
however, be noted that Rosenblatt shows that only 7 courts-martial took place 
in Afghanistan in 2003-04 when the OTP states that offences committed by the 
military ‘primarily’ took place.18 
 
Whilst Rosenblatt does highlight logistical reasons why courts-martial did not 
take place early in the armed conflict in Afghanistan,19 it is not clear to what 
extent US prosecutorial efforts could be considered to have satisfied the 
principle of complementarity. This is especially the case since the US have 
admitted to reliance on the use of non-judicial punishment. Under Article 15 of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, non-judicial punishments can be imposed 
 
14 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 9) para 306. See also Marshall L Wilde, ‘Incomplete 
Justice: Unintended Consequences of Military Nonjudicial Punishment’ (2007) 60 Air Force Law 
Review 115, 120 for a discussion of how public records related to non-judicial punishment are 
not publicly disclosed. 
15 OTP Afghanistan investigation request (n 9) para 306 
16 United Nations Committee against Torture, ‘Third to fifth periodic reports of States parties due 
in 2011: United States of America’ (4 December 2013) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/3-5, para 129. See 
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17 Defense Legal Policy Board, ‘Report of the Subcommittee on Military Justice in Combat 
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injury or abuse of non-combatants in Iraq or Afghanistan’ Defense Legal Policy Board, 30 May 
2013) <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=743021> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 91 
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for ‘minor offences without the intervention of a court-martial’.20 The 2002 
Manual for Courts-Martial states that ‘Ordinarily, a minor offence is an offense 
which the maximum sentence imposable would not include a dishonorable 
discharge or confinement for longer than 1 year if tried by general court-
martial.’21 The 2002 Manual further states that ‘Nonjudicial punishment is a 
disciplinary measure more serious than the administrative corrective 
measures… but less serious than trial by court-martial.’22 
 
However, in a 2006 Report, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
Human Rights First and Human Rights Watch state that: 
 
“Even though non-judicial hearings are meant to adjudicate minor 
offenses and can result only in relatively weak penalties like reprimands, 
in practice, commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at Guantánamo Bay 
have used these hearings in numerous cases that warranted criminal 
prosecution. DAA Project researchers found that in over seventy 
instances, commanders who were faced with evidence that supported 
criminal prosecution chose instead to impose non-judicial punishments or 
to use non-punitive administrative actions… Many of the personnel 
punished were implicated in serious abuses, including over ten personnel 
implicated in homicide cases, and approximately twenty personnel 
implicated in assault cases. Little is known about the results of non-
judicial proceedings and other administrative processes, because the 
military refuses to release information about them.”23 
 
 
20 10 US Code s.815(b). 
21 Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2002 
Edition) (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2002) 
<https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-2002.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 
Part V, page 1 
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There are further issues in relation to the use of non-judicial punishments and 
the nature of punishment imposed. For example, Wilde highlights that 
‘nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 does not result in a conviction for the 
accused’;24 and that the rights of victims in relation to non-judicial punishment 
are limited.25 Additionally, the 2013 Defense Legal Policy Board Report notes 
that ‘the Services currently have different standards of proof for non-judicial 
punishment’,26 which Reeves argues ‘is contrary to the intent of the drafters of 
the UCMJ and specifically Article 15’.27 Reeves additionally states that: 
 
“The use of different burdens of proof by the separate military branches 
raises serious concerns about Article 15 proceedings. These concerns 
are most evident in joint operations where servicemembers under the 
same command who commit the same misconduct may receive different 
dispositions.”28 
 
The Defense Legal Policy Board Report, however, states that ‘it was unable to 
reach a consensus as to whether increased uniformity was appropriate and if 
so, what the proper standard should be’,29 though the matter was deemed to be 
worthy of ‘further study’.30 
 
Whilst the Department of Defense Law of War Manual states that ‘In some 
cases, it may be appropriate to administer non-judicial punishment in order to 
punish and repress violations of the law of war’,31 the use of non-judicial 
punishments combined with the OTP’s inability to determine whether the US 
has conducted prosecutions in relation to members of the armed forces 
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allegedly responsible for war crimes raises questions about the extent to which 
the US has complied with the principle of complementarity. This is especially 
the case in light of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s comments in the Burundi 
admissibility decision regarding the type of investigations which do satisfy 
complementarity. Furthermore, in relation to the use of such measures by the 
United States, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated in their Afghanistan decision that 
‘national proceedings designed to result in non-judicial and administrative 
measures rather than criminal prosecutions do not result in inadmissibility under 
article 17’.32 
 
b. The CIA 
 
In their investigation request, the OTP cited just one prosecution and a limited 
number of investigations not resulting in prosecution as examples of actions 
that had been taken by the United States to investigate crimes allegedly 
committed in the context of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program.33 
This is the case even though the CIA stated in their response to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee Report that ‘we acknowledge that, particularly in the 
cases cited in the Study’s Conclusion, the narrow scope of CIA’s accountability 
efforts yielded outcomes that are, in retrospect, unsatisfying in view of the 
serious nature of the events.’34 In relation to the internal accountability 
processes deployed, the CIA state: 
 
“In the RDI-related reviews, some of the officers assessed as 
accountable received disciplinary actions including one and two year 
prohibitions on promotion or any form of monetary recognition. 
Disciplinary actions at the level of Letters of Reprimand or above are 
permanently maintained in the security files of the disciplined officers. 
Other officers received oral admonitions and letters of warning; these 
 
32 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan) ICC-02/17-33 (12 April 2019), para 79 
33 OTP Afghanistan Investigation Request (n 9) paras 316-23 
34 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
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individuals were those with a lesser degree of involvement in the matters 
under review. Some of the officers assessed as accountable were either 
not recommended for disciplinary action or recommended for lesser 
disciplinary actions, due to mitigating factors that included whether these 
officers had been provided appropriate guidance from CIA Headquarters; 
had sought, but not received, adequate guidance; or were found not to 
have acted with malice.”35 
 
The CIA also stated that a contractor was placed on a ‘contractor watchlist’,36 
and cite the conviction noted by the OTP.37 The prosecution cited by both the 
OTP and the CIA is that of David Passaro, who was sentenced to eighty months 
in prison for his role in the death of an Afghan detainee.38 
 
However, despite acknowledging that accountability was lacking, the CIA 
appear reticent about the prospects of further attempts to hold people 
accountable, stating that ‘we do not believe it would be practical or productive to 
revisit any RDI-related case so long after the events unfolded’.39 This reticence 
appears to have been shared by the United States government, as when 
announcing ‘a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in 
connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations’,40 
Attorney General Eric Holder stated: 
 
“I have made it clear in the past that the Department of Justice will not 
prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the 
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legal advice given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the 
interrogation of detainees. I want to reiterate that point today, and to 
underscore the fact that this preliminary review will not focus on those 
individuals.”41 
 
This review ultimately resulted in no prosecutions being pursued.42  This is the 
case even though President Obama would later admit in 2014, ‘we tortured 
some folks. We did some things that were contrary to our values.’43 In a 2015 
Report, Amnesty International were critical of the scope of the review 
announced by Holder, stating that it ‘amounts to a de facto amnesty for crimes 
under international law.’44 Human Rights Watch also raised criticism of the 
scope of review, stating: 
 
“The Durham investigation was primarily focused only on CIA abuse that 
went beyond what was authorized. This limitation was always too narrow 
in scope because the authorization not only permitted interrogation 
methods in violation of US and international law, but also appear to have 
been designed specifically to create a legal escape hatch for what would 
otherwise be the illegal use of torture.”45 
 
Human Rights Watch were also critical of the failure of the investigative team to 
conduct interviews of alleged torture victims.46 This criticism was shared by the 
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United Nations Committee Against Torture.47 Additionally, Sanders states of the 
lack of action resulting from the Holder review that ‘While reflecting a failure of 
political will, the cover of plausible legality helped facilitate this limited scope of 
recrimination.’48 
 
The move not to conduct prosecutions was, however, welcomed by some. For 
example, after the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report on the 
CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, Posner argued that ‘Obama has 
acted rightly by refusing to authorize prosecutions…Criminal punishment of a 
partisan opponent who engages in illegal behavior for policy rather than 
personal reasons can pose a risk to democracy.’49 A more nuanced approach 
as to why prosecutions should not occur is put forward by Vladeck, who argues 
that: 
 
“The problem isn’t that laws weren’t broken, or prosecutions might not 
succeed. The problem is that our real goal, as a polity, should be in hard-
wiring into our historical and legal consciousness the conclusion that 
these actions must never be given legal sanction again. And the more 
that prosecutions are perceived across large swaths of American society 
as the “criminalization of politics”, whether rightly or wrongly, the less I 
suspect that historical narrative will be able to develop.”50 
 
Any position which does not indicate that criminal investigations or prosecutions 
have taken place is unlikely to be acceptable to the OTP, as otherwise it would 
seem unlikely that the conduct of US forces would have been included within 
the scope of any investigation into Afghanistan in the first place. This is even 
more prudent when it is considered that one of the objectives of the ICC, as 
stated in the preamble to the Rome Statute is to ‘guarantee lasting respect for 
 
47 United Nations Committee against Torture (n 6) para 12 
48 Rebecca Sanders, Plausible Legality: Legal Culture and Political Imperative in the Global War 
on Terror (Oxford University Press 2018), 69-70 
49 Eric Posner, ‘Why Obama Won’t Prosecute Torturers’ (Slate, 9 December 2014) 
<https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/12/senate-torture-report-why-obama-wont-prosecute-
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and the enforcement of international justice’,51 and the importance of the 
prohibition of war crimes. The importance of this prohibition is recognised, for 
example, in the foreword to the Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
which states that: 
 
“The law of war is a part of our military heritage, and obeying it is the 
right thing to do. But we also know that the law of war poses no obstacle 
to fighting well and prevailing. Nations have developed the law of war to 
be fundamentally consistent with the military doctrines that are the basis 
for effective combat operations. For example, the self-control needed to 
refrain from violations of the law of war under the stresses of combat is 
the same good order and discipline necessary to operate cohesively and 
victoriously in battle. Similarly, the law of war’s prohibitions on torture and 
unnecessary destruction are consistent with the practical insight that 
such actions ultimately frustrate rather than accomplish the mission.”52 
 
Additionally, in relation to torture, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated in Delalić that 
‘There can be no doubt that torture is prohibited by both conventional and 
customary international law.’53 However, commentary suggests that a lack of 
action taken by the United States to address torture has caused damage to this 
prohibition. For example, Hajjar argued that ‘because of the power and 
influence of the United States… unaccountability undermines the strength of the 
anti-torture norm globally’;54 Schmidt and Sikkink state that ‘US actions have 
damaged the torture norm’s robustness by injecting a greater degree of legal 
and cultural acceptance for the situational use of torture and by disregarding the 
obligation of accountability’;55 and Sanders said that ‘considering ongoing 
impunity for torture, the anti-torture norm certainly has not been strengthened. 
 
51 Rome Statute (n 1), Preamble 
52 Department of Defense Law of War Manual (n 31) ii 
53 Prosecutor v Delalić (Judgement) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), para 452. See also: 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Rule 90. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment’ (International Humanitarian Law Database) <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule90> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
54 Lisa Hajjar, ‘The afterlives of Torture: The Global Implications of Reactionary US Politics’, 
(2019) 8(2) State Crime 164, 172 
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Rather it barely survived and remains vulnerable to assault.’56 There is therefore 
a justifiable need for the OTP to investigate crimes allegedly committed by US 
personnel since their alleged actions serve to undermine important rules of 
international law. 
 
2. Good Faith Reliance on Legal Advice – 42 US Code s.2000dd-1 
 
As was highlighted above, when launching a preliminary review into the conduct 
of US personnel, in August 2009, US Attorney General Eric Holder specifically 
stated that ‘the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in 
good faith and within the scope of the legal advice given by the Office of Legal 
Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees’.57 However, four years earlier 
as part of the Detainee Treatment Act 2005, a defence was enacted which may 
also serve to prevent prosecutions: 
 
“In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, 
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States 
Government who is a United States person, arising out of the officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent’s engaging in 
specific operational practices, that involve detention and interrogation of 
aliens who the President or his designees have determined are believed 
to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that 
poses a serious, continuing threat to the United States, its interests, or its 
allies, and that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at 
the time that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know 
that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and 
understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. Good faith 
reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among 
others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and 
understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful.”58 
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Section 8(b) of the Military Commissions Act 2006 clarifies the scope of this 
defence, stating: 
 
“Section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000dd-
1) shall apply with respect to any criminal prosecution that- 
(1) relates to the detention and interrogation of aliens described in 
such section; 
(2) is grounded in section 2441(c)(3) of title 18, United States 
Code; and 
(3) relates to actions occurring between September 11, 2001, and 
December 30, 2005.”59 
 
Carson is critical of this defence, stating that ‘The message is undeniably clear: 
the machinery of the judiciary is not geared up to deter abusive interrogations’,60 
and that it ‘signals that the Administration will pound incidents of abuse with a 
velvet-tipped hammer’.61 Furthermore, Hobel is critical of the relationship 
between the defence found within the Detainee Treatment Act and the defence 
of superior orders, stating that ‘Interpreted broadly… the DTA defense echoes 
discredited versions of the superior orders defense that insufficiently deterred 
violations of international humanitarian law.’62 
 
Human rights groups have stated that the defence should have a limited effect. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, have stated that the 
defence ‘is not a golden shield’.63 Additionally, Human Rights Watch have 
 
59 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109-366 (17 October 2006), s.8(b). The 
statutory provision referred to in s.8(b)(2) refers to the offences of grave breaches of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions found within the War Crimes Act, which was discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
60 Carlissa R Carson, ‘The Military Commissions Act of 2006: How Its Inability to Curb Abusive 
Interrogations Threatens the Future Treatment of Detainees and the United States’ Reputation’ 
(2008) 57 Emory Law Journal 695, 711 
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stated that ‘it was not reasonable to believe that these practices were lawful’,64 
that ‘reliance on counsel was not “in good faith”’,65 and that there should be no 
defence for ‘those involved in authorizing the program. It also should not be 
available to those who engaged in practices that went beyond what where 
authorised’.66 Sifton argues that ‘the defense may… be viewed skeptically in 
cases of outright torture’,67 though it ‘could meet greater success in cases 
where the applicable law is unclear’.68 
 
3. The Use of Executive Clemency 
 
The final issue to be discussed in this chapter is the potential use of executive 
clemency by the United States in order to address alleged crimes committed by 
US personnel. This was suggested by ACLU Executive Director Anthony 
Romero in December 2014 in the run-up to the release of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee’s Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation 
Program.69 Romero stated that: 
 
“Mr. Obama is not inclined to pursue prosecutions – no matter how great 
the outrage, at home or abroad, over the disclosures – because of the 
political fallout. He should therefore take ownership of this decision. He 
should acknowledge that the country’s most senior officials authorized 
conduct that violated fundamental laws, and compromised our standing 
in the world as well as our security. If the choice is between a tacit 
pardon and a formal one, a formal one is better. An explicit pardon would 
lay down a marker, signalling to those considering torture in the future 
that they could be prosecuted.”70 
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This proposal was criticised by Heller on the basis that: 
 
“there is a significant difference between lacking the political will to 
prosecute the Bush administration’s torturers and having the political will 
to offer them a blanket amnesty… Some states in the world can at least 
plausibly argue that amnestying the previous regime’s crimes is 
necessary to avoid political destabilisation and future conflict. But the US 
is not one of them.”71 
 
Additionally, the Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, Baher 
Azmy, criticized the proposal of pardoning those responsible for torture, arguing 
that ‘The notion that torturers should be shielded from any consequences for 
their actions only makes sense in a society in which human rights and 
constitutional protections have been demoted’.72 
 
However, the rationale behind this criticism is only one reason why such a 
policy should not be seen in the interests of either the United States or the OTP, 
another can be seen in the critical response to the recent exercise of executive 
clemency for crimes committed in the context of an armed conflict. The recent 
use of clemency is not directly related to the offences the OTP is planning to 
investigate – some offences subject to clemency took place in Iraq, and those in 
Afghanistan do not appear to correspond to the conduct forming the basis of the 
OTP’s ongoing investigation.73 It does, however, raise further questions about 
the extent to which the United States is committed to holding those who commit 
serious crimes accountable.  
 
In May 2019, President Trump pardoned Michael Behenna, who had been 
convicted for the murder of an Iraqi detainee during the course of an 
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interrogation.74 In November 2019, Trump took further action in relation to three 
individuals who had been charged with, or convicted of, crimes in the context of 
an armed conflict.75 Matthew Golsteyn, who was awaiting trial for killing a 
suspected bomb maker in 2010,76 was pardoned.77 Edward Gallagher, who had 
been found not guilty of the murder of a captured teenage ISIS fighter but 
convicted of being photographed next to the ISIS member’s body,78 had a 
demotion reversed.79 Additionally, Clint Lorance, who had been convicted of 
numerous offences including murder for incidents that occurred in Kandahar 
Province in Afghanistan in June-July 2012,80 was also pardoned.81 Finally in 
December 2020, Trump pardoned four former Blackwater personnel who were 
responsible for the deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians in 2007.82 
 
Former senior security officials within the US have been critical of the actions of 
Trump, and the consequences that they could have on the military. Former 
National Security Member Jeff McCausland after the exercise of clemency in 
2019 stated that: 
 
“First, military commanders at all levels may be concerned about being 
second guessed for decisions they make about holding their troops 
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accountable for potential war crimes. In the future, they may even 
hesitate to do so. Second, some service members may be encouraged to 
believe that in all cases the ends justify the means. This may result in 
future violations of international law and further alienate those we are 
supposed to be supporting.”83 
 
Additionally, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles Krulak, 
stated that: 
 
“Disregard for the law undermines our national security by reducing 
combat effectiveness, increasing the risks to our troops, hindering 
cooperation with allies, alienating populations whose support the United 
States needs in the struggle against terrorism, and providing a 
propaganda tool for extremists who wish to do us harm.”84 
 
The academic response to the Trump Administration’s use of clemency has 
also been critical. Solis, for example, stated that the Trump Administration’s 
actions had ‘subverted military justice’,85 and ‘made it easier for those who have 
committed crimes to escape justice in the workings of the military justice 
system’.86 Bell and Gift also argue that ‘Pardons, particularly for egregious 
crimes committed on the battlefield signal that norm enforcement within the 
military isn’t a priority’.87 Additionally, it has been argued that the Trump 
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Administration’s use of executive clemency could lead to the imposition of 
criminal liability under the principle of command responsibility.88 
 
Finally, it should also be noted that the use of clemency has been the subject of 
criticism by the Chair-Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries, Jelena Apparac, who said of the pardons of the former 
Blackwater personnel that: 
 
“The Geneva Conventions oblige States to hold war criminals 
accountable for their crimes, even when they act as private security 
contractors. These pardons violate US obligations under international law 
and human rights at a global level.”89 
 
In light of this extensive criticism, it appears doubtful that the OTP or ICC would 
ever accept that the use of executive clemency would discharge US obligations 
under the principle of complementarity, when not only academics and the 
United Nations have been critical of the impact of such actions, but senior 
figures from the military have admitted that such actions undermine the notion 




In their decision on whether to authorise an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
stated that ‘the potential cases arising from the incidents presented by the 
Prosecution appear to be admissible.’90 The analysis conducted in this Chapter 
does not serve to rebut this conclusion. Rather, it raises questions about 
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whether the United States could ever satisfy the principle of complementarity, 
and indeed raises questions about the extent to which the US is committed to 
compliance with international humanitarian law. The analysis conducted shows 
that accountability processes within the United States are either inadequate or 
lacking entirely. There are multiple policies which prevent individuals 
responsible for serious crimes from being held criminally accountable. Even in 
relation to the use of executive clemency of US military personnel by the Trump 
Administration, military figures were against it, citing the fact that it runs contrary 
to international law. This is problematic, since, as has also been shown in this 
chapter, the United States acknowledges the importance of international 






Chapter Five: Criminal Law in the United Kingdom 
 
This Chapter, the first of four discussing the United Kingdom’s handling of 
allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq, will assess crimes under English law 
which deal with conduct relating to the war crimes which the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) has determined there is a ‘reasonable basis to believe’ were 
committed by members of the United Kingdom military.1 The OTP stated: 
 
“on the basis of the information available, there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that, at a minimum, the following war crimes have been 
committed by members of UK armed forces: wilful killing/murder under 
article 8(2)(a)(i)) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); torture and inhuman/cruel treatment 
under article 8(2)(a)(ii) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); outrages upon personal 
dignity under article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or article 8(2)(c)(ii)); rape and/or other 
forms of sexual violence under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or article 8(2)(e)(vi)).”2 
 
In their 2019 Preliminary Examination Report, the OTP stated that their focus in 
their preliminary examination of UK conduct in Iraq has been on assessing the 
genuineness of UK investigation efforts, rather than on inability to conduct an 
investigation.3 This means that this Chapter’s discussion of UK criminal law will 
not focus on every single potential offence which could have been committed by 
UK personnel in relation to the allegations currently subject to examination by 
the OTP. 
 
Instead, this Chapter will discuss only offences related to the ‘strategic priorities’ 
of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, as stated in their quarterly updates.4 
 
1 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (Office of the Prosecutor, 9 
December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 71 
2 ibid 
3 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019’ (International 
Criminal Court, 5 December 2019) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-
PE.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), paras 167-68 
4 Iraq Historic Allegations Team, ‘IHAT Quarterly Update – April to June 2017’ (Iraq Historic 




These priorities state that the focus of IHAT’s investigatory efforts surrounded 
‘allegations of unlawful killing’,5 ‘allegations of serious ill treatment including 
rape, sexual assaults and Grievous Bodily Harm’,6 and ‘allegations of ill 
treatment where the war-crime threshold has been met’.7 This Chapter will 
therefore discuss crimes under the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and 
the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, torture under s.134 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988, grievous bodily harm (GBH) under the sections 18 and 20 of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861, and the homicide offences of murder 
and manslaughter found under common law. 
 
In the time period in which UK personnel are alleged to have committed the 
offences which form the basis of the OTP’s preliminary examination, 20 March 
2003 – 28 July 2009,8 the primary means by which the offences outlined above 
could be prosecuted in the military context would be as a ‘civil offence’ under 
s.70 of the Army Act 1955 in the case of army personnel,9 s.70 of the Air Force 
Act 1955 in the case of air force personnel,10 or s.42 of the Naval Discipline Act 
1957 in the case of navy personnel.11 This is the case because alleged conduct 
 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
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2021), 2. IHAT Quarterly Updates covering the period up until December 2015 included a 
further ‘strategic priority’, ‘allegations of ill-treatment not meeting war crimes threshold’ though it 
is not stated what this means: Iraq Historic Allegations Team, ‘Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
(IHAT) Quarterly Update – October to December 2015’ (Iraq Historic Allegations Team, 19 
February 2016) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/504671/20160222-Quarterly_Update_website.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 2. 
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not stated why the priority was no longer included: Iraq Historic Allegations Team, ‘IHAT 
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occurred prior to the Armed Forces Act 2006, which resulted in significant 
reform to the military justice system, coming into force on 31 October 2009.12 
 
s.70(2) of the Army Act 1955 states that ‘the expression “civil offence” means 
any act or omission punishable by the law of England or which, if committed in 
England, would be punishable by that law’.13 In Cox v Army Council, it was 
confirmed that this would be the case to the extent that it is possible to commit 
offences under English law overseas.14 
 
1. International Criminal Court Act 2001 
 
As is stated in the explanatory notes to the International Criminal Court Act 
2001 (ICC Act 2001), prepared by the Foreign Office, one of the ‘principal aims’ 
of the Act is ‘to incorporate the offences in the Statute into domestic law so that 
domestic authorities will always be in a position to investigate and prosecute 
any ICC crimes committed in this country, or committed overseas by a UK 
national, a UK resident or a person subject to UK Service jurisdiction’.15 To this 
end, s.50(1) of the Act confirms that the definitions of the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes have the same definition under the Act 
as they do in the Rome Statute,16 and s.51 of the Act makes it an offence to 
commit these crimes under English and Welsh law.17 Whilst this may appear to 
ensure that the UK could easily comply with the principle of complementarity if it 
chose to do so, by charging individuals suspected of international crimes with 
such crimes, there are a number of issues which may potentially make the 
application of the Rome Statute in a domestic setting more difficult. 
 
 
12 For an explanation, see Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law (JSP 830 Version 2.0), 1-
8-2 
13 Army Act 1955, s 70(2). s.70(2) of the Air Force Act 1955 contains the same definition of a 
civil offence; and s.42(1) of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 contains a definition which carries the 
same effect, though is slightly differently worded, stating that a civil offence is ‘any act or 
omission which is punishable by the law of England or would be so punishable if committed in 
England’. 
14 Cox v Army Council [1963] AC 48 
15 Explanatory Notes to the International Criminal Court Act 2001, para 6 
16 International Criminal Court Act 2001, s.50(1); Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Articles 6-8. 




When making decisions in relation to offences under the ICC Act 2001, courts 
are required to ‘take into account’ the ICC’s Elements of Crimes,18 as well as 
the jurisprudence of the ICC,19 and that ‘account may also be taken of any other 
relevant international jurisprudence’.20 In relation to this final category, the 
explanatory notes to the Act state that the term ‘relevant international 
jurisprudence’ refers to ‘any relevant jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals and the International Court of Justice’.21 These requirements are 
criticised by Grady based on a number of factors including the potential for 
judges in UK courts not having a full understanding of international criminal 
law,22 the differences in structure between domestic court judgments and 
international tribunal judgments,23 and because of the potential for conflict 
between the position of the UK and the ICC regarding the interpretation of 
crimes under the Rome Statute.24 
 
The ICC Act 2001 also incorporates the principle of command responsibility into 
English law in s.65 of the Act. The explanatory notes to the Act state that 
‘inclusion of command responsibility… is intended to permit the investigation 
and prosecution of cases before domestic courts in all the circumstances where 
the ICC might found a case on that basis’.25 May and Powles state that the 
inclusion of ‘indirect command responsibility and the liability of superiors 
pursuant to section 65 of the ICC Act 2001 does represent a new basis of 
criminal liability and goes well beyond existing forms of liability in English law.’26  
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Review 693, 701 
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English law?’ [2002] Criminal Law Review 363, 377. Shackle states that ‘the last person in 
Britain to be prosecuted for crimes committed by forces under their command was in 1651 
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crimes in Iraq’ (The Guardian, 7 June 2018) 
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The principle of command responsibility is undoubtedly important in relation to 
the Preliminary Examination into the conduct of UK personnel in Iraq, since the 
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Public 
Interest Lawyers (PIL) alleged in their joint communication to the OTP that 
criminal liability for abuses in Iraq potentially stretched as far as senior military 
personnel, the Minister for Service Personnel and the Secretary of State for 
Defence.27 Additionally, in their Final Report on the UK Preliminary 
Examination, the OTP noted that command responsibility had been a focus for 
UK investigators.28 However, the application of the principle has yet to be fully 
tested in UK courts. For example, Rasiah states in connection to the 
prosecution of Major Peebles, Staff Sergeant Davies and Colonel Mendonca in 
relation to the death of Baha Mousa that: 
 
“The prosecution did not deploy enterprise liability or superior 
responsibility… opting rather to characterise the alleged conduct as 
negligently performing a duty – a general, less serious offence centring on 
the failure to adhere to the standards of a reasonable person in performing 
any military duty.”29 
 
This is the case even though Rasiah went on to state that Payne’s court-martial 
highlighted that it would have been easier to secure the conviction of Payne’s 
superiors on the basis of command responsibility than it was to prove the 
charges that were actually pursued.30 This is problematic since the case of 
Donald Payne remains the only instance in which there has been a conviction 
 
27 European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and Public Interest Lawyers, 
‘Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: The 
Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee 
Abuse in Iraq from 2003-2008’ (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 10 
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under the ICC Act 2001.31 Information disclosed by the Ministry of Defence also 
confirms that there has only been 1 prosecution under the ICC Act 2001 in 
relation to the armed conflict in Iraq.32 If the ECCHR’s assertions were correct, 
and liability for alleged war crimes did stretch as far as senior military personnel 
and government ministers, the application of command responsibility is a 
subject which would receive much scrutiny should the UK decide to pursue 
further prosecutions under this legislation. 
 
The final point to discuss in this section is the potential application of defences 
in cases involving crimes under the Rome Statute which may either not exist in 
UK law or are not compatible with the reasoning behind the current application 
of defences in UK law. As Cryer and Bekou state, s.56 of the ICC Act 2001 
enables defences found within English law to apply to offences under the Rome 
Statute.33 However, they also point out that under Article 31(d) of the Rome 
Statute, duress is a defence to crimes under the Rome Statute, even though in 
UK law, the defence would not be available in cases involving murder.34 Cryer 
states that the defence of duress would not apply to ICC Act 2001 crimes 
involving murder because of the decision of the House of Lords in Howe.35 It is, 
however, unclear whether the defence of duress should apply to any crimes 
under the Rome Statute in UK law in any event. For example, in Howe, Lord 
Griffiths stated: 
 
“We face a rising tide of violence and terrorism against which the law 
must stand firm recognising that its highest duty is to protect the freedom 
and lives of those that live under it. The sanctity of human life lies at the 
 
31 Carla Ferstman, Thomas Obel Hansen and Noora Arajärvi, ‘The UK Military in Iraq: Efforts 
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32 Ministry of Defence, ‘Letter, dated 3 November 2020, to Roseanne Burke, CEASEFIRE’, 
available at <https://www.ceasefire.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FOI2020_06821-
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root of this ideal and I would do nothing to undermine it, be it ever so 
slight.”36 
 
If the protection of human life and freedom really is a major factor in deciding 
whether a defence such as duress should apply under UK law, it is questionable 
whether crimes under the Rome Statute should ever be included within the 
defence since the preamble to the Rome Statute states that the crimes included 
within the statute are ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’,37 and ‘shock the conscience of humanity’.38 
Additionally, in relation to some of the offences which constitute a war crime 
under Article 8 of the Rome Statute,39 it is clear that there is no justification for 
these acts being committed. For example, in relation to torture, Article 2(2) of 
the Torture Convention states, ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture’.40 
 
Whilst Cryer and Bekou state that the majority of the defences available under 
UK law are similar to those found within the Rome Statute,41 there is the 
potential for defences other than duress to apply differently in UK law than 
would be the case at the ICC. For example, Grady states that the version of 
self-defence available under the Rome Statute is ‘wider’ than would be the case 
under English law.42 Additionally, both Grady and Cryer and Bekou raise the 
fact that UK courts have not yet addressed the potential availability of a defence 
of superior orders, even though such a defence exists in the Rome Statute.43 
Ultimately, whether there are any problems regarding the application of 
defences to crimes under the Rome Statute in UK courts is a matter which will 
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be determined as case law on the point develops. However, as was mentioned 
in relation to the potential application of the principle of command responsibility, 
the number of prosecutions under the ICC Act 2001 have to this point been 
limited. 
 
2. Geneva Conventions Act 1957 
 
The Geneva Conventions Act 1957, as implemented during the time period 
when the offences which are the focus of the OTP’s Preliminary Examination 
are alleged to have taken place, criminalises grave breaches of the Four 
Geneva Conventions,44 and grave breaches of Additional Protocol I.45 The Act 
does not, however, criminalise breaches of Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions which governs non-international armed conflicts.46 This means that 
the Act would only apply during the time when the conflict in Iraq was classified 
as an international armed conflict, which the OTP state was the case between 
‘20 March 2003 and 28 June 2004’.47 Additionally, as revealed by the Ministry of 
Defence, no prosecutions have been brought under this act for crimes related to 
the armed conflict in Iraq.48 It is therefore impracticable to discuss the Act any 
further, since it is not clear how the UK courts would interpret the Geneva 
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3. Torture as Found under s.134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
 
Under s.134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, torture is defined as the following: 
 
“(1)  A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever 
his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or 
suffering on another in the performance or purported performance 
of his official duties. 
(2)  A person not falling within subsection (1) above commits the 
offence of torture, whatever his nationality, if – 
(a)  in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally 
inflicts severe pain or suffering on another at the 
instigation or with the consent or acquiescence – 
(i)  of a public official; or 
(ii) of a person acting in an official capacity; and 
(b)  the official or other person is performing or 
purporting to perform his official duties when he 
instigates the commission of the offence or consents 
to or acquiesces in it.”49 
 
The term ‘person acting in an official capacity’ was defined by the UK Supreme 
Court in R v Reeves Taylor as:  
 
“a person who purports to act, otherwise than in a private and individual 
capacity, for or on behalf of an organisation or body which exercises, in 
the territory controlled by that organisation or body and in which the 
relevant conduct occurs, functions normally exercised by governments 
over their civilian populations. Furthermore, it covers any such person 
whether acting in peace time or in a situation of armed conflict.”50 
 
 
49 Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss.134(1)-(2) 




A defence to torture exists under s.134(4) of the Act where the defendant can 
‘prove that he had lawful authority, justification or excuse for that conduct’.51 
The term ‘lawful authority, justification or excuse’ is then defined in s.134(5) of 
the Act.52 This defence has been subject to criticism by the United Nations 
Committee against Torture who state that such a defence ‘is inconsistent with 
the absolute prohibition of torture’.53 The extent to which the offence of torture 
under s.134 of the Criminal Justice Act is relevant to any prosecution of 
offences in relation to the armed conflict in Iraq has so far been non-existent, as 
the MoD state that no prosecutions have been brought under this legislation.54 
Additionally, the Supreme Court stated in Reeves Taylor that only 3 
prosecutions had been brought for torture under this provision since it came into 
force.55 
 
4. Homicide Offences 
 
This section will discuss the law related to the offences of murder and unlawful 
and dangerous act manslaughter as they apply to allegations of misconduct by 
UK military personnel in Iraq. As referred to previously, the investigation of 
unlawful killings was a priority for IHAT. Before this discussion begins, however, 
it is worth noting that in the course of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team’s 
investigation into allegations alleged misconduct by UK personnel in Iraq, 325 
cases involving ‘unlawful killing/manslaughter’ were referred, of which 20 were 
still under investigation at the time that IHAT was closed down in June 2017.56 
The amount of allegations which were ultimately dismissed may serve to 
demonstrate the difficulties of proving that a criminal offence has been 
committed in the context of an ongoing armed conflict, even where deaths have 
occurred. For example, IHAT’s Table of work highlights a number of cases 
which were closed without prosecutions being brought as a result of there being 
 
51 Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.134(4) 
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insufficient evidence.57 Additionally, of the prosecutions brought about so far in 





The definition of murder in English law was articulated in 1644 by Sir Edward 
Coke, who stated: 
 
“Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, 
unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature 
in rerum natura under the king’s peace, with malice aforethought, either 
expressed by the party or implied by law, so as the party wounded, or 
hurt, etc die of the wound or hurt, etc within a year and a day after the 
same.”59 
 
This definition of murder, despite being over three hundred years old, still 
applies to this day, subject to one major amendment – there is no longer a 
requirement that the victim die within a year and a day of whatever conduct it is 
that caused their death, due to the implementation of the Law Reform (Year and 
a Day Rule) Act 1996. In relation to the principle of the Queen’s Peace, it is 
clear that this does not serve to prevent a soldier from being held responsible 
for a prosecution that took place overseas. This can be demonstrated by the 
case of Page where a British soldier was found guilty of the murder as a result 
of a killing which occurred in an Egyptian village.60 Additionally, Rowe illustrates 
that whilst a soldier would not be charged with murder in the context of military 
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operations which take place during an armed conflict or when defending 
themselves from attack, this does not serve to prevent a soldier from being 
charged with murder in instances involving detainee abuse.61  
 
In Moloney, it was held that the term malice aforethought refers to an intention 
to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm.62 In DPP v Smith, it was held that the 
term grievous bodily harm refers to harm ‘no more and no less than “really 
serious”’.63 It seems unlikely, in all but the most extreme of cases, that any 
member of the British military would directly intend to cause serious harm to 
Iraqi nationals.64 As an alternative to finding that there is a direct intent to kill or 
cause GBH, it may be possible for board members or a jury to find that 
individuals involved in the deaths of detainees were aware that death or GBH to 
victims was virtually certain, a situation in which intention can be found, as held 
in Woollin.65 
 
It may be possible to find intent on the basis that some of the deaths which 
occurred in situations where there was potential wrongdoing occurred in 
situations that are similar. For example, a November 2019 joint report by The 
Sunday Times and the BBC’s Panorama program highlights that in May 2003 
Radhi Nama died within two hours of being transported to Camp Stephen after 
he was punched in the face when being arrested and being placed in an area at 
Camp Stephen where he was subjected to stress positions.66 The British 
military claimed that Nama had died as a result of a heart attack,67 though an 
IHAT investigator stated: 
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“There are injuries all over his face, his face was filthy, full of dirt. He had 
marks on his forehead, he had marks around his eyes, down the side of 
his face. If a guy’s just fallen over and died of a heart attack, how would 
you have facial injuries?”68 
 
Five days later, another detainee, Abdul Jabar Mousa Ali, was wrongly captured 
by the British military, a process which allegedly involved being hit with 
weapons and kicked by British soldiers, before then being placed in stress 
positions at Camp Stephen and died hours after arriving at Camp Stephen.69 
 
However, even acknowledging these similarities, it appears unlikely that this 
could be used to find the required intent for murder, as the individuals involved 
in the deaths would have to either be the same or would have to be aware of 
the exact circumstances in which an individual died in order to be aware that the 
consequences of their actions were virtually certain. There is no evidence that 
either was the case. The SPLI ultimately decided not to prosecute in either case 
due to ‘insufficient evidence’.70 
 
Additionally, it may be difficult to prove that the conduct of an individual was 
actually responsible for causing the death of the victim. For example, in relation 
to the attempted prosecution of Donald Payne for manslaughter for the death of 
Baha Mousa, Rasiah states that the Judge Advocate held that the prosecution 
failed to discharge their burden to prove that Payne was responsible for the 
injuries that ultimately caused Baha Mousa’s death, and that in any event, the 
chain of causation was broken when Payne had to use force to restrain Baha 
Mousa during an escape attempt.71 The Baha Mousa Report does, however, 
cast doubt on these findings by expressing that Baha Mousa removing his 
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was ‘hardly surprising’ that Baha Mousa would remove his restraints in order to 
defend himself.73 
 
Furthermore, in the Baha Mousa Inquiry, it was stated that it was not possible to 
prove who all the individuals involved in violence towards detainees during the 
course of an incident referred to as a ‘Free for All’ prior to the death of Baha 
Mousa, in which the detainees captured in Operation Salerno were subjected to 
excessive force by members of 1 Queen’s Lancashire Regiment:74 
 
“I do not accept that those who have admitted some violence during this 
incident, namely Payne, Pte Cooper, MacKenzie and Aspinall, were the 
only perpetrators of violence against the Detainees at this time. It is 
nevertheless not possible to determine with certainty the identity of those 
others who punched or kicked the Detainees.”75 
 
From this perspective, it is unclear whether it would be possible to secure any 
conviction in the context of a situation in which those responsible for an alleged 
offence cannot be identified. This is also highlighted by the finding of Judge 
Advocate General Blackett in Evans that there was not enough evidence on 
which to determine whether any of the defendants involved in the case were 
involved in the death of Nadhem Abdullah and it could not be proven that one of 
the defendants was even at the scene of the alleged crime.76 
 
b. Unlawful Act Manslaughter 
 
Whilst the previous paragraphs show that it would be difficult to establish that a 
defendant had the prerequisite level of intent required in order to be convicted 
of murder, that does not mean they cannot be held responsible for an incident 
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which results in death since they could be prosecuted for manslaughter. The 
following paragraphs will discuss one form of manslaughter, that resulting from 
an unlawful act. 
 
As demonstrated by Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994), in order to 
prove the offence of manslaughter, it must be shown that the defendant 
committed an unlawful act, deliberately, in a manner which was dangerous, and 
which resulted in the death of another human being.77 The first element, the 
requirement of an unlawful act simply requires that the defendant has 
committed an act which would be a crime even in circumstances where it did 
not result in death. For example, in Lamb - a case involving children playing 
with a revolver which they did not believe would fire a bullet, but when fired, 
resulted in the death of the victim - it was held that unlawful and dangerous act 
manslaughter could not have occurred because the actus reus and mens rea 
for the underlying offence of assault did not exist.78 
 
The second element, that the act committed must be deliberate means that the 
underlying criminal act, in order to be unlawful act manslaughter, must not be 
one which can only be committed through the negligence of the defendant, as 
held in  Andrews v DPP.79 The third element, that the act must be dangerous, 
which, as held in Church, requires that ‘the unlawful act must be such as all 
sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other 
person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious 
harm’.80 The final element, requires that the death be a result of the unlawful 
and dangerous act, meaning that it must be proven that there is no break in the 
chain of causation, as demonstrated in Lewis.81 
 
In relation to alleged conduct which took place in the context of the armed 
conflict in Iraq, it may be possible to obtain convictions in cases similar to those 
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of Radhi Nama and Abdul Jabar Mousa Ali discussed during the discussion of 
murder where the defendants were allegedly beaten by British soldiers, since a 
conviction for unlawful act manslaughter can be established in cases where a 
battery is the underlying criminal act.82 However, as was the case with murder, 
this requires that it is possible to prove that there is an unbroken chain of 
causation between the actions of individual defendants and the death of the 
victim, something which was held not to exist in the prosecution of Donald 
Payne.83 
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that not all deaths which occur in the context of 
an armed conflict are the result of criminal conduct. The OTP, for example state 
in their final report that: 
 
“With respect to the alleged crime of wilful killing/murder under articles 
8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(c)(i), concerning escalation-of-force and cross-fire 
incidents, the newly available information does not indicate that civilian 
deaths or injuries caused in these incidents resulted in intentional or 
reckless killing. Instead, the available information suggests that the 
deaths were caused by combat operations carried out in compliance with 
the law of armed conflict.”84 
 
It should be also noted that it has been alleged that situations which have 
involved the deaths of Iraqi civilians which should result in prosecutions being 
pursued have not been subject to such action. The Sunday Times and 
Panorama reported that an Iraqi police officer was allegedly shot dead by a 
British soldier without a warning being shouted out,85 and no prosecution was 
brought forward despite IHAT investigators recommending that a prosecution 
should occur.86 This raises concerns about the extent to which it is possible to 
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state that the UK is conducting a genuine investigation into war crimes. 
However, it is stated in the OTP’s final report into the UK Preliminary 
Examination that SPLI chose not to prosecute in this case because of an 
inability to reconcile conflicting evidence from witnesses and a lack of any 
further evidence.87 The OTP stated that they ‘treated the allegations of cover-up 
from former personnel of IHAT with the utmost seriousness’,88 though conclude 
that ‘the Office has not been able to substantiate the allegations to the required 
level of proof before the Court to demonstrate an intent to shield perpetrators 
from criminal justice.’89 
 
5. Grievous Bodily Harm 
 
Under English law, there are two versions of the offence of grievous bodily harm 
(GBH). Both offences are found within the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861, maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm under section s.20, and 
grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm under s.18.90 A 
focus on GBH by IHAT has been criticised by Bates who states: 
 
“Setting a threshold of grievous bodily harm as the minimum injury that 
might warrant investigation risks a failure to investigate an indeterminate 
number of torture cases; of grave breaches of the Four Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I, and could have the effect (but not 
yet the proven purpose) of shielding those responsible from prosecution 
for war crimes.”91 
 
 
87 Office of the Prosecutor (n 1) para 395 
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continuity of the whole skin, but the skin may include not merely the outer skin of the body but 
the skin of an internal cavity of the body where the skin of the cavity is continuous with the outer 
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If this is the case, the UK’s investigative policies raise questions about the 
extent to which the UK is willing to investigate accusations of war crimes, as 
required under Article 17 of the Rome Statute,92 as well as the extent to which 
the UK is examining the same person/conduct as the ICC, which is also, as 
demonstrated in Lubanga, a requirement for a State to comply with the principle 
of complementarity, and therefore render a case inadmissible at the ICC.93 
 
As was referred to earlier in this chapter, the term in grievous bodily harm, as 
held in DPP v Smith, refers to causing ‘really serious’ harm.94 As stated by 
Treacy LJ in Golding, ‘Ultimately, the assessment of harm done in an individual 
case in a contested trial will be a matter for the jury, applying contemporary 
social standards.’95 Additionally, in Bollom, it was stated that when ‘deciding 
whether injuries are grievous, an assessment has to be made of, amongst other 
things, the effect of the harm on the particular individual.’96 
 
In relation to physical harm caused, it is clear that the required level for an 
offence to constitute GBH is higher than the standard required for the offence of 
Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) found within s.47 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. For example, in Savage and Parmenter, 
Mustill LJ stated: 
 
“Although the maximum sentences for offences under section 20 and 47 
are the same, and although the sentences imposed in practice for the 
worst section 47 offences will overlap those imposed at the lower end of 
section 20, nobody could doubt that the two offences are seen in quite 
different terms”97 
 
In Chan-Fook, it was stated that level of harm required for the offence of ABH is 
such that ‘the injury (although there is no need for it to be permanent) should 
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94 DPP v Smith (n 63) 334 
95 R v Golding [2014] EWCA Crim 889, para 64 
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not be so trivial as to be wholly insignificant’.98 The UK Manual of Service Law 
states in relation to the level of harm related for ABH: 
 
“It is appropriate to charge this offence in cases where there is: loss of or 
breaking of a tooth; temporary loss of sensory function (e.g. loss of 
consciousness); extensive or multiple bruising; minor fractures; minor but 
more than superficial, cuts requiring medical treatment.”99 
 
In relation to psychiatric harm, it was held in Ireland that ‘“bodily harm” in 
sections 18, 20 and 47 must be interpreted so as to include recognisable 
psychiatric illness’.100 In order to state that bodily harm was caused as a result 
of psychiatric harm, it was held in Chan-Fook that this requires expert evidence: 
 
“In any case where psychiatric injury is relied upon as the basis for an 
allegation of bodily harm, and the matter has not been admitted by the 
defence, expert evidence should be called by the prosecution. It should 
not be left to be inferred by the jury from the general facts of the case. In 
the absence of appropriate expert advice a question whether or not the 
assault occasioned psychiatric injury should not be left to the jury.”101 
 
In relation to the required level of mens rea for GBH under s.20, in Mowatt, 
Diplock LJ stated that: 
 
“It is quite unnecessary that the accused should have foreseen that his 
unlawful act might cause physical harm of the gravity described in the 
section… It is enough that he should have foreseen that some physical 
harm to some person, albeit of a minor character might result.”102 
 
 
98 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689, 694 
99 Ministry of Defence (n 12) 1-8-12 
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In relation to s.18, which has the same actus reus as s.20, the mens rea 
required as held in Taylor is that ‘there must be an intent to cause really serious 
bodily injury’.103 
 
As has already been stated, one of IHAT’s investigatory priorities was 
‘allegations of serious ill treatment including rape, sexual assaults and Grievous 
Bodily Harm’.104 This is potentially problematic as, in relation to potentially 
analogous conduct, the investigative focus of the OTP has centred around 
allegations relating to torture and inhuman treatment, as well as outrages upon 
personal dignity.105 It is not always clear that the offences falling within the 
OTP’s focus are necessarily the same as GBH. 
 
For example, the ICC Elements of Crimes states that the war crime of torture 
under Articles 8(2)(a)(ii) and 8(2)(c)(i) requires that ‘the perpetrator inflicted 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons’.106 
However, as shown by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in 
Brđanin, this is does not necessarily require the same type of harm as GBH, as 
it is stated, ‘Acts inflicting physical pain may amount to torture even when they 
do not cause pain of the type accompanying serious injury. An act may give rise 
to a conviction when it inflicts severe pain and suffering.’107 
 
Additionally, in the civil case of Alseran, where the Court of Appeal held that 
British military personnel were responsible for a number of violations of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is not clear that in all instances 
the harm suffered would reach the level of harm required to constitute grievous 
bodily harm.108 For example, Alseran, who, along with other detainees was 
 
103 R v Taylor [2009] EWCA Crim 544, para 3. See also the wording in the Statute, Offences 
against the Person Act 1861, s.18 
104 ‘IHAT Quarterly Update April-June 2017’ (n 4) 2 
105 Office of the Prosecutor (n 1) para 71 
106 International Criminal Court, Elements of Crime (International Criminal Court 2013) 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021), 10 and 22 
107 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgement) IT-99-36-A (3 April 2007), para 251 
108 Alseran v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB); Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights states ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 




forced to lay down on their stomachs before soldiers walked on their backs,109 
‘has suffered from anxiety and depression, as well as outbursts of anger and 
other symptoms of trauma’ as a result,110 though psychiatrists who assessed 
Alseran’s psychiatric condition described his ‘current psychiatric symptoms as 
mild or moderate in their severity’.111 It appears that had action been brought 
about in relation to Alseran earlier, his symptoms may have reached the 
threshold required for GBH since it is stated that ‘there appeared to be some 
recent improvement in his trauma symptoms, probably due to psychological 
treatment that he has recently commenced’.112 It should, however, be noted that 
the conduct suffered by Alseran has had a profound impact, as Leggatt J 
stated: 
 
“the incident at Al-Seeba in which soldiers deliberately ran over the 
backs of prisoners clearly crossed the threshold level of severity to 
amount to a breach of article 3. Those assaults involved the gratuitous 
infliction of pain and humiliation for the amusement of those who 
perpetrated them. They have caused Mr Alseran deep and long-lasting 
feelings of anger and mental anguish and were an affront to his dignity 
as a human being. I find that they constituted both inhuman and 
degrading treatment.”113 
 
Another of the claimants, MRE suffered from a coroneal laceration when 
subjected to hooding due to ‘an unidentified sharp object (such as a shard of 
glass) that was in the bag.114 It is unclear whether there was either the 
prerequisite mental element to support any charge for offences under sections 
18 or 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, including for wounding, if 
the object in the bag wasn’t known about, and since hooding was ‘used for 
reasons of operational security’.115 Whilst this does not serve to justify hooding, 
which has been held to constitute inhuman treatment by the European Court of 
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Human Rights,116 it does provide another example of the fact that inhuman 
treatment and GBH are not necessarily the same. 
 
A final incident to be discussed in connection with Alseran which does not 
appear to meet the required threshold for GBH is that one of the claimants, Al-
Waheed, was held to have suffered a cut above his left eye and a pattern of 
bruising to his upper body caused by British soldiers when being transported to 
Basra Airport.117 This is conduct which was held to constitute inhuman 
treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.118 The injuries in this case, however, 
appear to be more consistent with the level of harm required for the offence of 
ABH, discussed above, than they do with the level of harm required for GBH. To 
this end, Bates argues that this case ‘raises questions about the MOD’s closure 
of hundreds of potentially similar cases’,119 and that the breadth of European 
Court of Human Rights case law addressing Article 3 of the ECHR ‘expresses 
the qualitative breadth and depth of conduct prohibited by Article 3; concepts 
missing from the Service Police’s wrong-headed choice to continue 
investigations only where the ill-treatment alleged reached the threshold of 
grievous bodily harm’.120 
 
Injuries suffered in Alseran that may reach the threshold required for GBH 
include an incident in which ‘MRE was hit on the head with what must have 
been a rifle butt, an assault which has caused him some permanent 
disability’.121 CPS Charging guidelines for the offence of GBH state that ‘Life-
changing injuries should be charged as GBH’.122 An injury which results in a 
disability would appear to fall within this category. As MRE was hit by the rifle 
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butt whilst hooded, this was held to be inhuman treatment for the purposes of 




It is clear that the UK has a judicial system capable of trying cases involving 
alleged war crimes – the UK scored full marks on judicial independence and 
due process, for instance, in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2020 
report,124 and the OTP has acknowledged that the UK has taken action to 
address accusations of alleged wrongdoing.125 Whether the UK’s investigative 
focus is centred around ensuring accountability for war crimes is unclear. Whilst 
this chapter has highlighted that there are numerous ways through which the 
UK can prosecute the conduct underlying war crimes, there have been a total of 
five prosecutions for offences against Iraqi civilians.126 However, even when 
onerous evidential thresholds and differences in definitions between offences in 
domestic law and international law are taken into account, the UK should still be 
able to effectively investigate alleged war crimes. The following chapters will 
therefore assess the UK’s use of a non-criminal investigation process in the 
form of the Baha Mousa Report, and the IHAT criminal investigation process, 
before examining the potential impact of the Overseas Operations (Service 
Personnel and Veterans) Bill on investigations.
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Chapter Six: The Baha Mousa Inquiry 
 
This Chapter will discuss the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report and its potential 
impact on the UK’s ability to demonstrate that it has complied with the principle 
of complementarity. This Report has been cited by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as having been a source of 
information used by the OTP in order to determine whether a request should be 
made to launch an investigation in relation to the conduct of United Kingdom 
military personnel in Iraq.1  
 
The inquiry which forms the focus of this Chapter was set up under the Inquiries 
Act 2005,2 s.2(1) of which states ‘An inquiry panel is not to rule on, and has no 
power to determine, any person’s civil or criminal liability’.3 The explanatory 
notes to this section of the act explain that this is the case because ‘the aim of 
inquiries is to help to restore public confidence in systems or services by 
investigating the facts and making recommendations to prevent recurrence, not 
to establish liability or to punish anyone.’4 However, s.2(2) of the Act states that 
‘an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by any 
likelihood of liability being inferred from facts that it determines or 
recommendations that it makes.’5 To further emphasise the non-criminal nature 
of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, the Report notes that it ‘obtained from the Attorney 
General and undertaking that evidence given by an individual witness could not 
be used against that same witness in any subsequent prosecution.’6 
 
Additionally, as shown by Chapter 1 of Part XV of the Baha Mousa Inquiry 
Report, it is clear that inquiries are allowed to pursue an examination of events 
which are not explicitly included within the terms of reference originally 
 
1 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (Office of the Prosecutor, 9 
December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 20-28, for example. 
2 HC Deb 14 May 2008 vol 475 cols 60WS-61WS 
3 Inquiries Act 2005, s.2(1) 
4 Explanatory Notes to the Inquiries Act 2005, para 8 
5 Inquiries Act 2005, s.2(2). 





provided.7 In this instance, the inquiry determined that it could investigate steps 
that had been taken by the UK military in relation to the use of, and policy 
surrounding, hooding, tactical questioning and interrogation following the death 
of Baha Mousa.8 This means that whilst the Inquiry to be discussed in this 
Chapter is not a not criminal investigation, it does potentially satisfy the criteria 
of the principle of complementarity, articulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
which only allows the ICC to assert jurisdiction in situations where ‘the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’,9 by 
providing for an investigation of the facts and by contributing to the process to 
prevent the recurrence of potentially criminal acts. However, as will be noted 
throughout the chapter, the Baha Mousa Report does feature some notable 
weaknesses which may undermine its ability to effectively contribute to the 
complementarity process. 
 
This means that the objective of this Chapter, in common with the focus of 
Chapter Three which examined the United States Senate Reports in relation to 
alleged wrongdoing connected to the conflict in Afghanistan,10 is to determine 
whether it is possible for a non-criminal process to contribute towards a State’s 
ability to argue that it has satisfied the principle of complementarity. 
 
On 21 July 2008, the United Kingdom Defence Secretary, Des Browne, 
announced that the terms of reference for the Baha Mousa Inquiry would be: 
 
“To investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding the death of 
Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him, taking 
account of the investigations which have already taken place, in 
particular where responsibility lay for approving the practice of 
conditioning detainees by any members of the 1st Battalion The Queen’s 
Lancashire Regiment in Iraq in 2003, and to make recommendations.”11 
 
7 Sir William Gage, The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry: Volume III (2011-2012, HC 1452-III), 
Part XV ch 1 
8 ibid para 15.3 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 17(1)(a) 
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As is made clear in the Inquiry Report, a major focus was on five interrogation 
techniques, ‘wall postures, hooding, noise deprivation of sleep, and deprivation 
of food and water’,12 which were prohibited by Prime Minister Edward Heath in 
March 1972.13 In 1978, these techniques were deemed by the European Court 
of Human Rights in Ireland v UK to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment 
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).14 In the 
case of Selmouni v France, it was however noted that ‘certain acts which were 
classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to 
“torture” could be classified differently in future.’15 
 
This inquiry is of value from the international criminal law perspective not only 
because, as identified by the OTP in Preliminary Examination Reports, it 
identifies the practices of the personnel involved in the military operations in 
Iraq,16 but also because the Report identifies reasons why the United Kingdom 
may have chosen not to pursue extensive prosecutions in relation to the crimes 
alleged by the OTP. This is because of systemic issues in relation to prisoner 
handling, interrogation and tactical questioning doctrine and policy which may 
not necessarily be the fault of any one individual. 
 
It is these systemic issues, rather than the death of Baha Mousa itself, which 
will be the focus of this Chapter’s discussion of the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report. 
The main reason for this exclusion is that court martials have already taken 
place in relation to the death of Baha Mousa,17 and the SPLI examination into 
the death of Baha Mousa ended without any further prosecutions.18 The focus 
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13 HC Deb 2 March 1972 vol 832 cols 743-44 
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15 Selmouni v France 1999-V, para 101 
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will primarily be on three strands: the lack of developed and widely 
communicated policy on prisoner handling, tactical questioning and 
interrogation which allowed the five techniques to be used in Iraq, attempts to 
ban the use of the technique of hooding during Operation Telic 1, and the 
response of the Ministry of Defence and the UK military to recommendations 
made by the Inquiry to address the systemic issues raised. 
 
1. The Development of Doctrine Regarding the Five Techniques 
 
This section addressing the development of doctrine will summarise the findings 
of the Baha Mousa Report in relation to the development of doctrine – this will 
be done in three sections, the first two mirroring the construction of the Baha 
Mousa Report. The first section will address policy implemented up until the 
1990s, and the second will discuss the policies implemented between 1997 and 
the beginning of the conflict in Iraq. Following this summary, the potential 
impact of the findings on UK prosecutorial policy will be discussed. 
 
a. The Early Development of Doctrine 
 
i. The Heath Declaration and the Directive on Interrogation by 
the Armed Forces in Internal Security Operations 
 
The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry made it clear that the development of 
policy in relation to prisoner handling, interrogation and tactical questioning has 
been problematic since the 1970s. On 2 March 1972, the Prime Minister 
Edward Heath announced that ‘the government, having reviewed the whole 
matter with great care and with particular reference to any future operations, 
have decided that the techniques… will not be used in future as an aid to 
interrogation’,19 and that a Directive had been issued to this effect.20 The Inquiry 
Report states that the effect of this ban was unambiguous – it was intended to 
 
19 HC Deb 2 March 1972 vol 832 col 744; Sir William Gage, The Report of the Baha Mousa 
Inquiry: Volume II (2011-2012, HC 1452-II), para 4.71 





have a global effect and it was designed not to have any temporal limitations.21 
The Directive issued, entitled Directive on Interrogation by the Armed Forces in 
Internal Security Operations, states: 
 
“When British forces are operating in aid of the civil power, the conduct of 
interrogation is a matter for the civil authorities. If, in exceptional 
circumstances, the civil authority is unable to carry out interrogation, the 
principles and procedures set out in this directive shall apply to Service 
personnel who may be employed for this purpose. Before Service 
personnel are used for interrogation, the approval of United Kingdom 
Ministers will be sought.”22 
 
The directive then states that the UK is under a number of obligations in 
international law to ensure that individuals ‘are at all times to be treated 
humanely and not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’.23 The directive also confirms that in the context of an interrogation: 
 
“no form of coercion is to be inflicted on persons being interrogated. 
Persons who refuse to answer questions are not to be threatened, 
insulted, or exposed to other forms of ill treatment. Techniques such as 
the following are prohibited: 
a. any form of blindfold or hood; 
b. the forcing of a subject to stand or to adopt any position of 
stress for long periods to induce physical exhaustion; 
c. the use of noise producing equipment; 
d. deliberate deprivation of sleep; 
e. the use of a restricted diet to weaken a subject’s resistance.”24 
 
 
21 Baha Mousa Inquiry Report Volume II (n 19) paras 4.85-4.87 
22 Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Directive on Interrogation by the Armed Forces in Internal 
Security Operations’ (Cabinet Office, 29 June 1972) para 2 
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Sir William Gage expressed criticism of the limitations of the Directive, stating 
that ‘this can be seen now to have contributed over time to the loss of MoD 
corporate knowledge about the prohibition and its extent’.25  
 
This loss of knowledge manifested itself in such a manner that the Report found 
that:  
 
“by 2002/2003, none of the pre-prepared handouts or PowerPoint 
presentations for the PH&TQ and Interrogation courses included a 
reference to the Heath Statement, 1972 Directive  or specifically to the 
prohibition on the five techniques as a distinct part of the applicable 
doctrine.”26  
 
Additionally, officers throughout the chain of command were unaware of the 
events leading to the prohibition of the five techniques including the Chief of 
Joint Operations at the Permanent Joint Headquarters, Lieutenant General Sir 
John Reith who was not aware of the 1972 Directive; 27 the most senior Human 
Intelligence officer in 1 (UK) Division during Operation Telic, Lieutenant Colonel 
S002 who was also unaware of the Directive;28 and within the Battlegroup 
responsible for the death of Baha Mousa, the commanding officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jorge Mendonça stated that he didn’t remember reading Heath’s 
declaration.29 This was also the case with the Adjutant, Captain Mark 
Moutarde,30 and the Battlegroup Internment Review Officer, Major Michael 
Peebles.31 
 
Furthermore, in relation to a set of emails sent by the officer commanding F 
Branch (who were responsible for Prisoner Handling and Tactical Questioning 
training) which stated that training had to rigidly conform to previously set 
 
25 Baha Mousa Inquiry Report Volume II (n 19) para 4.115(4) 
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guidelines due to the risk of increased scrutiny,32 the Report stated that they 
‘suggest that knowledge of the 1972 prohibition of the techniques was not all 
that it might have been even amongst the instructors’.33 
 
The lack of knowledge of the Heath Declaration, and the Directive implementing 
it is of significance because the techniques prohibited were subject to scrutiny 
by the European Court of Human Rights in the years following Heath’s 
announcement to the House of Commons. The European Commission on 
Human Rights stated in Ireland v United Kingdom that whilst the individual 
techniques of sleep deprivation or dietary restrictions may not in of themselves 
always constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR,34 but: 
 
“It is this character of the combined use of the five techniques which, in 
the opinion of the Commission, renders them in breach of Art. 3 of the 
Convention in the form not only of inhuman and degrading treatment, but 
also of torture within the meaning of that provision.”35 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, disagreed on Commission’s 
finding of torture, stating that the use of the techniques ‘did not occasion 
suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture’.36 The 
Court instead found that the techniques constituted inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.37 Whether a similar finding would be 
made today is unclear, as in Selmouni v France, the European Court of Human 
Rights suggested that acts previously classified as inhuman treatment may now 
be classified as torture, stating: 
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“the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as 
“inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be 
classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly high 
standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and 
fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater 
firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic 
societies.”38 
 
In the context of UK courts, it is also possible that the use of the five techniques 
may no longer be classified as inhuman treatment, since after quoting the 
Selmouni judgment, Lord Bingham stated obiter in A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department that ‘It may well be that the conduct complained of in Ireland 
v United Kingdom… would now be held to fall within the definition in article 1 of 
the Torture Convention’.39 Whilst this case took place in 2005, and therefore 
after the conduct discussed in the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report took place, it 
does emphasise the unacceptable nature of the alleged conduct of some UK 
personnel in Iraq. 
 
The prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights is just one of a number of 
provisions in international law under which the United Kingdom has obligations 
to ensure that torture and inhuman treatment do not take place including, but 
not limited to, the Torture Convention,40 the Geneva Conventions,41 and the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).42 Additionally, 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are also prohibited as a 
matter of customary international law.43 Furthermore, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, there are multiple mechanisms through which a prosecution 
can be brought for offences involving mistreatment of detainees. 
 
In relation to the application of the Torture Convention, the UK government 
stated that it did apply to the conduct of UK personnel overseas with Roger 
Hutton, the Joint Commitments Policy Director at the Ministry of Defence, 
testifying before the Joint Committee on Human Rights that ‘we accept that 
UNCAT does apply to our troops overseas because it has been enshrined in 
British law in section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and therefore British 
soldiers carry it with them.’44 However, in a 2006 Report on the Torture 
Convention, the Joint Committee on Human Rights were critical of UK military 
training documents for not including references to the Torture Convention,45 and 
stated that: 
 
IV prohibits ‘cruel treatment and torture’ – a standard which applies in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts, as the International Court of Justice stated in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua that ‘in the event of international armed 
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“Irrespective of the Government position on the legal application of 
UNCAT obligations to territories outside the UK which are under its 
control, we consider that, as a matter of good practice, training and 
guidance should contain information on the Convention and the 
obligations it imposes.”46 
 
The UK, even after the Iraq War had concluded adopted the following position, 
as stated in Al-Saadoon: 
 
“There is a question as to the territorial scope of UNCAT which turns on 
what is meant by the words “in any territory under its jurisdiction” used in 
(among other provisions) articles 2, 11, 12 and 13. The Secretary of 
State takes a narrow view of his phrase and does not accept that it 
applies to any part of Iraq at any time when British forces were present in 
Iraq. It is therefore his position that UNCAT did not require the UK to take 
any measures to prevent acts of torture (or other forms of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment) by its soldiers in Iraq.”47 
 
This is the case even though the UK’s position has been subject to criticism 
from the Joint Committee on Human Rights,48 and the Torture Committee.49 
 
Regardless of the UK’s position on the application of international instruments 
to operations overseas, it does appear perplexing that UK troops were not 
made aware of a prohibition on specific forms of conduct that had in the past 
been held to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, especially when the 
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Service Discipline Acts meant that English law applied to UK military personnel 
wherever they were in the world.50 This is especially the case since, in June 
2007, Attorney General Lord Goldsmith stated the following in relation to the 
standards required by UK personnel: 
 
“I do not believe, so far as the substantive standards of treatment are 
concerned, there is any difference between what the Geneva 
Convention, the Convention Against Torture require in relation to 
detention and the ECHR. I do not think there is any difference at all… 
and I am not aware that anyone ever thought there was something that 
was permitted under the Geneva Conventions that it not permitted under 
the ECHR.”51 
 
Goldsmith also stated in relation to the use of the five techniques, ‘there is a 
matter of grave concern as to how these techniques came to be used, who 
authorised them and on what basis’,52 that he was not asked to advise on the 
legality of the use of the five techniques before the start of the armed conflict in 
Iraq,53 and that he only became aware of the use of the techniques following the 
death of Baha Mousa.54 In relation to his specific views on the application of the 
ECHR, Goldsmith argued that ‘So far as the substantive standards of treatment 
are concerned, it has always been my view that Articles 2 and 3 apply overseas 
to the actions of British soldiers who are holding civilians in UK-run detention 
facilities.’55 The exact nature of legal advice provided by Goldsmith to the MoD, 
however, is unclear since Sir William Gage held that ‘the documents which form 
the Advice remain confidential and I cannot direct that any of them be produced 
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by the MoD’.56 In any event, the High Court,57 Court of Appeal,58 and House of 
Lords in Al-Skeini that the ECHR did apply in the case of Baha Mousa.59 
Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the ECHR did 
apply to in relation to UK military operations in Iraq.60  
 
ii. Subsequent Policy Developments 
 
Following the implementation of the 1972 Directive, attempts were made to 
raise the issue of interrogation and prisoner treatment policy in the context of an 
international armed conflict. In September 1973, the Brigadier General Staff 
(Intelligence) for the Defence Intelligence Staff contacted the Vice Chief of the 
General Staff to state that existing policy was obsolete and that there was no 
policy on interrogating prisoners of war.61 This led to a response from the Vice 
Chief of the General Staff recommending that a new policy incorporating the 
1972 Directive be implemented.62 The Joint Service Publication – JSP 120(6) - 
which carried out this instruction was not published until almost six years had 
passed after the initial request was made,63 did not include any reference to the 
five techniques.64 It did, however, state that Prisoners of War must be treated in 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions,65 and set out guidance on when sight 
deprivation could be used for security purposes.66  
 
The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report found that there were seven reasons why the 
failure to include references to the five techniques was ‘not a failure that could 
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only have been appreciated with hindsight’.67 These included the initial request 
to create a policy which incorporated the 1972 Directive,68 that ‘the prohibited 
techniques had previously been taught to those UK personnel attending training 
courses at Ashford. Clear guidance ought to have been provided to make the 
illegality of their use in warfare abundantly clear’,69 and that the Attorney 
General as part of the Ireland v United Kingdom proceedings had given an 
assurance that the five techniques would not be used in the context of 
interrogations.70 
 
The Report was additionally critical of the guidance provided, stating that ‘the 
MoD failed to ensure that the updated guidance on interrogation of prisoners 
included a reference to the prohibition on the five techniques’,71 and that ‘this 
historical failure contributed to the entirely unacceptable situation that no Op 
Telic Order, nor any readily accessible MoD doctrine at the time of Baha 
Mousa’s death referred to the prohibition on the five techniques’.72 This 
publication was replaced in 1999 by Joint Warfare Publication 2-00,73 about 
which the Report stated ‘In contrast to JSP 120(6), there was no guidance at all 
on sight deprivation. Nothing was said about questioning prisoners of war. 
References to interrogators in JWP 2-00 were limited and incidental’.74 
 
The Report is also critical of the failure in 1990 to incorporate the prohibition of 
the five techniques into Joint Service Publication 391 on the basis that it was ‘a 
missed opportunity to ensure that the prohibition became properly entrenched in 
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b. Development of Policy: 1997-2003 
 
A policy review was carried out by the Joint Services Intelligence Organisation 
over the course of 1996 and 1997, which the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report states 
‘arose initially out of consideration of which non-UK nationals should be 
permitted to attend Joint Service Intelligence Organisation (JSIO) interrogation 
courses.’76 In the period when the policy review was conducted, Defence 
Intelligence Commitments distributed papers which referred to the 1972 
Directive,77 as well as the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Ireland v United Kingdom.78 The papers also acknowledged that interrogation 
policy differed depending on the type of armed conflict,79 and that the use of the 
five techniques would be inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s legal 
obligations regardless of the type of armed conflict taking place.80 
 
The policy circulated as a result of the review stated that ‘Interrogation methods 
employed during all operations should comply with the Geneva Conventions 
and international and domestic law’,81 and further stated that ‘Procedures used 
by UK interrogators in an operational theatre should be governed by a detailed 
directive that incorporates current legal advice and is issued on behalf of the UK 
Joint Commander’.82 The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report stated that the 1997 
Policy itself did not affect the prohibition of the five interrogation techniques 
introduced by the 1972 Directive,83 and sought to ensure that all operations 
were conducted in a manner which satisfied the United Kingdom’s legal 
obligations.84 However, the inquiry did criticise the policy’s failure to take the 
opportunity to end policy differentiation between interrogations conducted in 
international armed conflicts and those conducted in non-international armed 
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conflicts,85 even though those who were responsible for the drafting of the policy 
understood that the five techniques were banned regardless of the type of 
conflict.86 
 
The 1997 policy was however completely ignored in a subsequent review of 
policy conducted by the Joint Service Intelligence Organisation in 1999-2000,87 
with the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report stating that the officer responsible for the 
review, S040, only ‘saw the policy for the first time on this inquiry’s website’.88 
The covering minute for the report produced by the Joint Service Intelligence 
Organisation did, however, state that ‘It is evident that the interrogation function 
has not been properly addressed for several years… Direction and firm policy 
need to be the start point for any re-examination’.89 The Baha Mousa Inquiry 
Report however states ‘Despite this clear identification of a need for “direction 
and firm policy” no further policy or doctrine on tactical questioning or 
interrogation was drafted between 2 May 2000 and Baha Mousa’s death in 
September 2003’.90  
 
Instead, the Report highlights that in the lead up to the armed conflict in Iraq, 
the focus was on the development of intelligence capability rather than on the 
development of interrogation doctrine.91 Whilst a Joint Warfare Publication was 
published in 2001, JWP 1-10, entitled ‘Prisoners of War Handling’,92 the Report 
states ‘while JWP 1-10 made clear the need to treat prisoners humanely, it did 
not contain any reference to the prohibition on the five techniques’.93 It was 
further noted in the Report that if there had been definitive guidance on the five 
techniques contained within JWP 1.10, there would have been no doubts over 
the legality of the techniques.94 It was then shown that at the start of the Iraq 
War, the only policy guidelines which actually addressed prohibited 
 
85 ibid paras 5.18 and 5.139 
86 ibid para 5.18 
87 ibid paras 5.28-5.46 
88 ibid para 5.33 
89 ibid para 5.44 
90 ibid para 5.46 
91 ibid paras 5.145-5.146 
92 ibid para 5.85 
93 ibid para 5.101 




interrogation techniques were contained within a draft of the Manual of the Law 
of Armed Conflict.95 This was seen to be problematic as the manual ‘was not, 
and did not purport to be, operational guidance for commanders on the 
ground.’96 The lack of knowledge of the 1997 Policy also affected a Human 
Intelligence Directive issued in the lead up to the Iraq War as the Inquiry found 
that one of the individuals responsible for drafting the Directive, Major S062, 
would have drafted the Directive differently had they been aware of the 1997 
policy.97 
 
c. Responsibility for the Failure to Implement Adequate Doctrine 
 
In the conclusions to Part V of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, which addressed the 
development of doctrine from the 1997 policy review to the beginning of the 
armed conflict in Iraq, it was stated that:98 
 
“In this Part of the Report… I have made some limited comments on the 
part played by some individuals in the lost doctrine saga. Save for those 
comments, in my view, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to blame or 
apportion blame to any individuals. It would also, in my opinion, be unfair 
to do so. The MoD has conceded that there were corporate failures… As 
I have endeavoured to explain, the failings arose over a lengthy period of 
time and involved a combination of failings and missed opportunities, 
some more serious than others. In the circumstances, in my judgment, 
the only fair conclusion is that the position reached at the outset of Op 
Telic… resulted from a series of corporate failings and missed 
opportunities.”99 
 
These findings appear to be reasonable, since the doctrine which failed to 
highlight the fact that prohibited techniques were banned was developed over 
the course of 30 years and involved numerous people who were not necessarily 
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aware of the work which was done in the past (and any potential shortcomings 
in that work). Additionally, the passage of time would seemingly make it 
impossible to establish any chain of causation between a failure to properly 
establish doctrine banning the use of the five techniques with actions committed 
in Iraq. 
 
However, the failure to attribute responsibility to individuals may raise questions 
about whether the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report can be a means through which 
the United Kingdom can argue that it has conducted an investigation which 
satisfies the principle of complementarity, since it is stated in the Istanbul 
Protocol that one of the purposes of a torture investigation is the ‘establishment 
and acknowledgement of individual and State responsibility’.100 
 
The findings of the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report in relation to the loss of doctrine 
were criticised by the academic Andrew Williams who stated that ‘it provided a 
blanket defence to any government or military official involved in the use of such 
illegal practices – all could point to the “lost doctrine” that Gage held was 
unattributable.’101 However, in their final Report on the Preliminary Examination 
into the UK, the OTP noted that there ‘is a reasonable basis to believe’ that war 
crimes were committed in the events leading up to the death of Baha Mousa,102 
and that:  
 
“even if doctrinal shortcomings may have contributed to the process of 
unlawful ‘conditioning’ of detainees, as the Baha Mousa Inquiry stressed, 
nothing could have excused or mitigated the serious and gratuitous 
violence inflicted on detainees such as Baha Mousa, who was kicked, 
punched and beaten to death.”103 
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The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report found that there were numerous failings in 
training that may have served to increase such risks. For example, in relation to 
teaching on the Law of Armed Conflict, training materials ‘did not specifically 
mention the prohibition on the five techniques and did not provide any detailed 
guidance on prisoner handling and the treatment of civilian detainees’.104 
Additionally, teaching was found to largely rely on showing a video produced in 
1986,105 which did not address themes relevant to modern conflicts.106 Whilst 
the Report highlights that the training did emphasise the requirement that 
people had to be treated ‘humanely’,107 some soldiers nonetheless were under 
the impression that the use of hooding and stress positions could be justified.108 
Furthermore, the inquiry stated that failings in pre-deployment training 
‘demonstrate the fault lines in policy and doctrine’,109 which ‘stem from, and are 
examples of, the consequences of the loss of corporate memory of the Heath 
Statement and the 1972 Directive’.110 
 
In relation to this, the House of Commons Defence Sub-Committee stated that: 
 
“The admission that training material for interrogations contained 
information which could have placed service personnel outside of 
domestic or international law represents a failing of the highest order. We 
expect the MoD to confirm that no cases under consideration by IHAT 
are based on the actions of individuals who were following that flawed 
guidance. If there are, we ask the MoD to set out how it will support 
individuals who are subject to claims arising from actions which their 
training advised was lawful.”111 
 
Whether the findings of the Baha Mousa Report did serve to provide such a 
blanket defence, as suggested by Williams, is unclear, however. For example, 
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in his statement following the publication of the Baha Mousa Report, the 
Defence Secretary stated the following: 
 
“There is no place in our armed forces for the mistreatment of detainees, 
and there is no place for the mistreatment of detainees, and there is no 
place for a perverted sense of loyalty that turns a blind eye to 
wrongdoing or erects a wall of silence to cover it up. If any serviceman or 
woman, no matter the colour of uniform that they wear is found to have 
betrayed the values this country stands for and the standards that we 
hold dear, they will be held to account.”112 
 
This statement does not appear to be consistent with the notion that UK 
personnel would escape liability in situations where they were responsible for 
potentially unlawful conduct. Calls for prosecutions of individuals for war crimes, 
based on the findings of the Baha Mousa Report, were also made by the non-
governmental organisations Human Rights Watch,113 and Amnesty 
International.114 The OTP, in their Final Report on the UK Preliminary 
Examination stated that systemic issues identified in the Baha Mousa Report 
were ‘an aggravating factor’ in their assessment of alleged crimes committed by 
UK forces.115 
 
However, it appears unlikely that a substantial number of prosecutions will take 
place in relation to alleged criminal conduct which has formed the basis of 
investigations conducted by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), as the 
OTP noted ‘one IHAT referral resulting in a guilty plea at a summary hearing for 
the beating of an Iraqi civilian in a UK armed forces vehicle’.116 In relation to 
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IHAT’s successor organisation, the Service Police Legacy Investigations (SPLI), 
Director of Service Prosecutions Andrew Cayley admitted in June 2020 that it 
was ‘quite possible’ that no prosecutions may be brought.117  
 
Additionally, the UK government have introduced a Bill, the Overseas 
Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, which if passed, will 
introduce a presumption against prosecutions taking place more than five years 
after the alleged conduct took place.118 This Bill may therefore reduce the 
chances of further prosecutions being pursued by the UK in relation to conduct 
which took place during the Iraq War. Whilst several offences are excluded from 
this presumption within the draft Bill, these are offences of a sexual nature, and 
therefore do not cover the full range of war being examined by the OTP.119 This 
Bill, and its potential effects on the UK’s compliance with the principle of 
complementarity, will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
The matter of whether the Baha Mousa inquiry has actually inhibited the UK 
government’s ability to pursue investigations and prosecutions is particularly 
important since the focus of the OTP’s Preliminary Examination into the UK has 
been about the extent to which they have launched genuine investigations into 
instances of alleged abuse.120 The potential lack of genuine investigations is a 
concern that has been drawn into recent focus as UK personnel are alleged to 
have taken steps to prevent individuals being held to account for potential war 
crimes,121 an allegation which has led to calls for an inquiry to be conducted into 
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the conduct of UK personnel.122 Furthermore, the analysis to be conducted 
below will demonstrate some of the shortcomings of the Baha Mousa Report. 
 
2. Operation Telic 1 Practices 
 
This section will discuss two attempts made to ban the use of hooding during 
Operation Telic 1. These are the ban on hooding imposed by the General 
Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Division during Operation Telic 1, Major General 
Robin Brims, in April 2003 and attempts to reinforce and extend the ban on 
hooding made by 1 (UK) Division Legal Advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas 
Mercer in May 2003. Whilst these bans on the use of hooding do not directly 
touch on the subject of the inquiry, the death of Baha Mousa, they do serve to 
highlight the operational difficulties which existed in trying to ban the practice of 
hooding in the absence of doctrine and training which specifically highlighted 
the prohibited nature of these techniques. Furthermore, the discussion of the 
Brims ban on hooding will assess the extent to which the Baha Mousa Report 
demonstrates the potential liability of senior UK officials for war crimes under 
the principle of command responsibility. 
 
a. The Brims Ban on Hooding 
 
i. The Factual Circumstances Surrounding the Ban 
 
On what that the Baha Mousa Inquiry determined to be the 28th of March 2003, 
Major General Robin Brims visited the Prisoner of War handling facility located 
near the Iraqi town Um Qasr,123 so that, as stated in his inquiry statement, he 
could ‘have a look at the situation on the ground and ensure that things were 
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running properly’.124 During this time, Brims saw an individual ‘hooded such that 
he could not see where he was going’,125 and he stated that: 
 
“My immediate concern was that the hooding did not fit the type of 
operation we were doing. As my directive 1 had indicated, treating Iraqis 
decently and humanely (and being seen to do so) was of crucial 
importance. I felt that hooding at the POW Handling Facility was 
inconsistent with this approach and sent the wrong message to the Iraqi 
people.”126 
 
Brims issued an order banning the use even though he was aware that 1 (UK) 
Division Legal Advisor Nicholas Mercer and National Contingency Command 
Legal Advisors had different opinions on whether the use of hooding was 
legal.127 Mercer, after visiting the Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT) and 
witnessing individuals hooded and in stress positions,128 was of the view that 
such techniques were contrary to international law.129 National Contingency 
Command legal advisors were of the opinion that the use of hooding could be 
justified for security reasons.130  
 
In relation to how the ban was issued, Brims stated, ‘I told my CoS Colonel 
Marriott to relay this order, I do not know how or when he did so’.131 It was 
however stated that Brims was of the belief that Marriott would distribute the 
order by whatever means was required.132 The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report 
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stated that the order was issued between the 1st and 3rd of April 2003.133 The 
Inquiry Report also notes that the order was most likely given orally.134 This 
resulted in a situation whereby the Deputy Chief of Staff for 1 (UK) Division was 
unaware of the order having being issued.135 The Brigade Commander of 7 
Armoured Brigade, Brigadier Graham Binns,136 and his successor Brigadier 
Adrian Bradshaw were also unaware of the order banning hooding.137 
 
Brims stated that at the time the order was made, hooding was not a major 
priority as there were multiple issues that had to be dealt with in the context of 
an ongoing armed conflict.138 He confirmed this thinking in oral evidence to the 
inquiry.139 Brims was, however, ‘not aware at the time that some soldiers might 
have viewed hooding prisoners at the point of capture as a standard operating 
procedure’,140 and the 1 (UK) Division Chief of Staff was similarly unaware that 
hoods were being used as a matter of course by some troops.141 The inquiry 
did, however, note that the extent to which hooding was viewed as standard 
practice varied widely from individuals believing it was indeed standard practice 
to individuals not being aware of the use of hooding at all.142 
 
However, the Report clearly demonstrates that hooding continued to be used on 
at least some basis after Brims’ order was issued.143 It is not clear though 
whether any reports on the continued use of hooding actually reached Brims. 
S002, for example, stated that he reported the continued use of hooding arriving 
at the Prisoner of War Handling Facility to the 1 (UK) Division Legal Advisor, 
Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Mercer, and to the 1 (UK) Division Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Patrick Marriott.144 The Report stated that Chief of Staff Marriott and 
Legal Advisor Mercer were unaware of the continued use of hooding at the 
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JFIT,145 and concluded, ‘I think it unlikely that S002 reported this up to either 
Marriott or Mercer’.146 Additionally, at the time of issuing the Fragmentary Order 
which will be discussed in the next section, Mercer was of the belief that the 
Brims hooding ban had been distributed effectively.147 
 
This is of significance since, prior to the hooding ban being issued, a 
disagreement between Legal Advisor Nicholas Mercer and Senior Intelligence 
Officer S002, had resulted in the legality of the policy of hooding being referred 
up the Chain of Command to National Contingency Command.148 Following a 
visit to the JFIT where he saw detainees hooded and in stress positions,149 
Mercer argued in a memo to Brims that the use such techniques was contrary 
to international law.150 S002, in response, however defended the use of hooding 
for security purposes.151 Additionally, a complaint had been made by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in relation to the use of hooding at the 
JFIT to National Contingency Command Policy Advisor S034 and through other 
means.152 S002 was informed of this complaint by Marriott,153 and banned the 
use of double hooding and plastic hoods at this point, prior to the Brims ban.154 
 
Furthermore, a recording of prisoners being hooded during an operation 
conducted on 4 April 2003 by the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers was broadcast on 
UK news on 5 April 2003.155 Whilst the inquiry did not decide to comment on the 
specifics of the operation,156 it did state that it was not certain that Brims’ order 
was circulated to the Fusiliers by the time the operation took place.157 The 
Report did, however, note that ‘the fact that there was a broadcast of British 
prisoners hooded by British soldiers after Brims’ oral order banning hooding 
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ought to have registered as a sign that the order may not have been 
successfully communicated’.158 The Report additionally stated, ‘this was a 
missed opportunity for the MoD and the deployed forces to have noticed that 
there may have been shortcomings in the communication of the ban on 
hooding’.159 It is additionally clear that some soldiers who would go on to deploy 
to Iraq did see the footage.160 
 
In relation to the wider use of hooding after Brims issued his order, the Report 
does not examine exactly how widespread the practice of hooding was at this 
point, stating: 
 
“I did not consider it necessary or proportionate to investigate in detail 
the extent to which hooding may have continued in Op Telic 1 after the 
orders of Burridge and Brims. To do so fully would have involved taking 
evidence from many Op Telic 1 Battlegroups and would have been very 
far removed from the events at the heart of this Inquiry.”161 
 
It is then stated, ‘I am not able to make any findings as to quite how widespread 
the practice of hooding was following the bans by Burridge and Brims’.162 This 
has the potential to impact the extent to which the UK can argue the Baha 
Mousa Inquiry Report demonstrates that it has complied with the principle of 
complementarity. This is because in order to know the extent to which the 
actions taken by Brims to ban hooding were appropriate, or whether senior 1 
(UK) Division commanders should have had knowledge of potential 
international crimes continuing to be committed, it would appear necessary to 
know how widespread the practice of hooding actually was.  
 
This is especially the case when, as is about to be discussed, liability under the 
principle of command responsibility may arise under the Rome Statute where a 
commander ‘failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
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her power to prevent or repress’ criminal conduct.163 Additionally, a discussion 
of the extent to which the practice of hooding was actually used would serve to 
show the full extent that the lack of policy prohibiting the five techniques, 
discussed in the previous section, actually had on live operations. 
 
ii. The Potential Application of the Principle of Command 
Responsibility 
 
Brims stated that the failure for his order to be communicated widely was 
ultimately something that he was responsible for.164 The question that is of 
relevance, however, is whether from the evidence provided, it could be argued 
that Brims could be held responsible for any alleged war crimes resulting from 
the use of hooding by individuals within those Brigades and Battlegroups under 
the command of 1 (UK) Division. After setting out the principle of command 
responsibility as defined in Article 28 of the Rome Statute,165 this section will 
discuss whether the steps taken to ban the use of hooding were appropriate in 
the circumstances, whether a relationship of effective control existed between 1 
(UK) Division commanders and the individuals responsible for the perpetration 
of alleged crimes, and the level of knowledge of 1 (UK) Division commanders 
that international crimes were in fact taking place. This is important since, in 
their Joint Communication to the OTP, the European Center for Constitutional 
and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) state that an 
investigation into military commanders should be conducted to determine 
whether they can be held responsible for international crimes under the 
principle of command responsibility.166 
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It should be noted that in their Final Report into the UK Preliminary 
Examination, the OTP argued that: 
 
“a command responsibility case at the ICC could not base itself on the 
widespread practice of the use of hooding or other prohibited techniques, 
but would need to concentrate on a smaller sub-set of incidents where 
such conduct was carried out in a manner that resulted in cruel or 
inhuman treatment, and draw relevant inferences from a pattern of such 
incidents with respect to supervisory failures.”167 
 
The discussion to be conducted below will therefore serve to demonstrate 
whether the Baha Mousa Report allows for such an assessment to be made. 
 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute states the following: 
 
“a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her 
effective command and control, or effective authority and control 
as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such forces, where: 
i) That military commander or person either knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; and 
ii) That military commander or person failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
her power to prevent or repress their commission or 
to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.”168 
 
 





Necessary and Reasonable Measures 
 
In relation to the matter of whether 1 (UK) Division commanders took ‘all 
necessary and reasonable measures’,169 Brims did take steps to prevent crimes 
from taking place, as when he saw that hooding was being used, he decided to 
issue a ban on hooding. The Bemba Trial Chamber judgment confirms that one 
measure that can be taken in order to comply with Article 28(2)(a)(ii) of the 
Rome Statute is ‘issuing orders specifically meant to prevent the crimes, as 
opposed to merely issuing routine orders’.170 In the case of the Brims ban, as 
has already been shown, this was issued as a result of specific practice he had 
witnessed, so would not appear to fall within the confines of a routine order. The 
Baha Mousa Report does provide details of other orders issued which appear to 
fall within the context of routine orders. For example, prior to deployment, Brims 
issued a Directive which stated that UK troops had to maintain discipline and 
professionalism in the course of Operation Telic 1,171 which was praised by the 
Inquiry as it was stated: 
 
“I respectfully commend Brims for the way in which he sought to 
communicate his intent for 1 (UK) Div Operations. His intent set out the 
right blend of the determined use of force in what was a war but 
tempered by the need to avoid triumphalism, to bear in mind the needs of 
Phase IV, to restore and foster Iraqi dignity and to insist upon the highest 
standards of self discipline.”172 
 
Additionally, the Report highlights that in the lead up to deployment, 1 (UK) 
Division issued multiple directives which required that individuals who were 
detained by UK forces had to be treated in a manner which is consistent with 
international humanitarian law.173 Therefore, by issuing an order which 
specifically dealt with the use of a single technique, it would appear that Brims 
 
169 ibid Article 28(a)(ii) 
170 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) 
ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 March 2016), para 204 
171 Baha Mousa Inquiry Report Volume II (n 19) paras 7.29-7.31 
172 ibid para 7.202 




went beyond what was included within routine orders to address a specific 
practice. 
 
As has already been mentioned, the ban was poorly disseminated, and it 
therefore has to be asked whether Brims did take ‘all necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent’ crimes taking place as is required under Article 28(a)(ii) of 
the Rome Statute.174 One possible means to suggest that he did not take all the 
actions that he could have done can be seen in how the Brims hooding ban was 
issued. As has already been stated, the inquiry found that the ban was likely 
issued orally.175 The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report is critical of this means of 
disseminating an order, stating, ‘it would have been far better had Brims’ order 
prohibiting hooding been followed up by a written order’.176 However, the Report 
states: 
 
“In assessing whether Brims’ oral order to ban hooding should have been 
issued in writing I am very conscious of the beguiling precision of 
hindsight. If Brims’ order had been reduced to written form it is of course 
possible to speculate that its effect of banning hooding for all purposes 
might have been disseminated to the widest extent and down to each 
individual soldier on the ground. It is also possible that the 
communication difficulties experienced in theatre and the untold number 
of other complex issues and tasks simultaneously being faced by all 
levels of the Armed Forces during the combat operations would have 
otherwise stalled or hindered the message Brims’ order conveyed.”177 
 
To rephrase the findings of the report in a more succinct matter, it is not clear 
whether an additional means of distributing the order would have actually 
improved the extent to which the order was received and understood. 
Additionally, it is stated that the use of hooding being seen as a standard 
practice was ‘with hindsight’.178 As is stated in the Bemba Appeal judgment, 
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‘whether a commander took all “necessary and reasonable measures” must be 
based on considerations of what crimes the commander knew or should have 
known about and at what point in time.’179 The judgment then goes on to state: 
 
“There is a very real risk, to be avoided in adjudication, of evaluating 
what a commander should have done with the benefit of hindsight. 
Simply juxtaposing the fact that certain crimes were committed by the 
subordinates of a commander with a list of measures which the 
commander could hypothetically have taken does not, in and of itself, 
show that the commander acted unreasonably at the time… Abstract 
findings about what a commander might theoretically have done are 
unhelpful and problematic, not least because they are very difficult to 
disprove.”180 
 
Whilst it would be for a court to determine any liability in relation to crimes 
associated with the use of hooding which were committed as a result of Brims’ 
and Marriott’s failure to effectively communicate that hooding had been banned, 
it appears that this would largely depend on the extent to which high-ranking 
personnel were actually aware of the continued use of hooding at the time. In 
respect of attributing blame for the failure of the order prohibiting hooding, the 
Baha Mousa Inquiry states that: 
 
“Given their knowledge at the time, I find that the communication of 
Brims’ hooding ban is something in respect of which 1 (UK) Div, and 
Marriott as the Chief of Staff could have performed better, rather than 
being a matter that is deserving of personal criticism.”181 
 
A final factor to consider when assessing the extent to which the Brims hooding 
order constituted the pursuit of necessary and reasonable measures is the fate 
of a similar order made at the time of Brims’ order. The inquiry found that a ban 
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on hooding was also issued by the National Contingent Commander, Air 
Marshal Brian Burridge, who is above Brims in the chain of command.182 This 
came after Burridge was made aware of the complaint of the ICRC regarding 
the use of hooding.183 Additionally, the Report highlights that the ban was 
issued even though Burridge was of the opinion that the use of hooding was ‘a 
legal grey area’.184 However, the Report notes that ‘some senior staff officers in 
the NCHQ were clearly unaware that their commander, Burridge, had banned 
hooding.’185 This included Major Gavin Davies, Staff Officer Level 2 in NCHQ 
Legal, who was unaware of the actions taken by either Brims or Burridge in 
relation to a ban on hooding even though he attended a meeting with the 
International Committee at the Red Cross to discuss complaints about the use 
of hoods,186 in which it was stated that whilst it was believed that hoods could 
be used for security purposes, the UK had decided as a matter of policy to stop 
the use of hoods.187 
 
The fact that a ban imposed by a level in the chain of command higher up than 
that of 1 (UK) Division fell on similarly deaf ears as the ban introduced by 1 (UK) 
Division may serve to suggest that the action undertaken by Brims and Marriott 
to introduce their ban was not unreasonable action to take, and therefore, it 
would seem unfair to suggest that they should be held accountable for the 
actions of their subordinates based on the principle of command responsibility. 
However, as with the other elements required to establish liability under the 
principle of command responsibility, this is ultimately a matter which would have 
to be decided by a prosecutor deciding to whether to pursue a case or a court 






182 ibid para 8.252. For a ‘Op Telic 1 Simplified Chain of Command Diagram’, see Baha Mousa 
Inquiry Report Volume I (n 6) 39 
183 Baha Mousa Inquiry Report Volume II (n 19) paras 8.252 and 8.254 
184 ibid para 8.255 
185 ibid para 8.492 
186 ibid para 8.293 




Effective Command and Control 
 
The second element of the principle of command responsibility which will be 
discussed in this section is the relationship between Brims and those soldiers 
who may have committed war crimes through the continued use of hooding. 
Under Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, subordinates are required to be under 
a commander’s ‘effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be’.188 In relation to the distinction between the two 
types of relationship stated in Article 28(a), the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that ‘the degree of “control” required under both 
expressions is the same’,189 a position which was endorsed by the Trial 
Chamber.190 The definition of effective control cited by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and Trial Chamber in Bemba,191 comes from the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) case of Delalic, in which it was stated that a 
superior has to have ‘the material ability to prevent and punish’ crimes.192 As 
stated by the ICTY in the Blaškić appeal, ‘the indicators of effective control are 
more a matter of evidence than of substantive law’,193 a position agreed with by 
the Trial Chamber in Bemba,194 who provided a list of 10 factors which ‘may 
indicate the existence of “effective control”’ based on the practice of the ad-hoc 
tribunals.195 
 
Of these factors, one appears to be crucial in determining whether a 
relationship of effective control existed in relation to the Brims hooding ban, the 
commander’s ‘capacity to ensure compliance with orders including 
consideration of whether the orders were actually followed’.196 Additionally, as 
stated by the Trial Chamber in Bemba, ‘disregard or non-compliance with 
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orders’ is indicative of an absence of effective control.197 In this case, as has 
already been discussed, it is clear that a problem existed with the dissemination 
of orders from Brims, to brigade level, let alone battlegroup level. For example, 
successive commanders of 7 Armoured Brigade, who fell under the Command 
of 1 (UK) Division were unaware of the order banning the use of hooding.198 
Additionally, in relation to the Battlegroup 1 Black Watch, who were under the 
command of 7 Armoured Brigade (and in turn 1 (UK) Division), the inquiry found 
that they hooded people during Operation Telic 1,199 with the commanding 
officer even stating that hooding was used as a matter of course.200 The Inquiry 
stated that ‘It was clear that Brims’ oral order prohibiting hooding in early April 
2003 did not reach 1 BW.’201 
 
It may be the case that the failure to disseminate the ban on hooding reflects a 
lack of effective control on the part of Brims over soldiers on the ground, since 
the order did not always reach troops on the ground. However, it is also 
possible that dissemination difficulties may be reflective of the fact that senior 1 
(UK) Division Commanders did not take all necessary and reasonable 
measures to ensure that their order was communicated effectively, or that such 
failures were an unfortunate consequence of the difficulties associated with an 
ongoing armed conflict. In relation to this final point, the inquiry refused to rule 
out the possibility that a written order would not have led to wider dissemination, 
stating: 
 
“It is also possible that the communication difficulties experienced in 
theatre and the untold number of other complex issues and tasks 
simultaneously being faced by all levels of the Armed Forces during the 
combat operations would have otherwise stalled or hindered the 
message Brims’ order conveyed.”202 
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Difficulties in relation to the dissemination of a written order will be discussed in 
the next section’s discussion of orders issued by the 1 (UK) Division Legal 
Advisor Nicholas Mercer to expand the ban on hooding. Ultimately, however, 
which of these alternatives is applicable is a matter which would need to be 
determined with reference to the wider context of practice within Operation Telic 
1. 
 
Additionally, the possibility that a relationship of effective control cannot be 
established in a situation such as this may actually be reflective of the difficulty 
to apply the principle of command responsibility in general. Judges van den 
Wyngaert and Morrison stated in their separate opinion in the Bemba appeal 
that: 
 
“It is important not to get into a mind-set that gives priority to the desire to 
hold responsible those in high leadership positions and to always ascribe 
to them the highest levels of moral and legal culpability. Although article 
28 of the Statute can very well be applied to senior commanders, it is not 
always the right tool to link them directly to the conduct of the physical 
perpetrators.”203 
 
Knowledge of Crimes 
 
Should it be possible to establish a relationship of effective control, it is 
necessary to establish that the commander ‘knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that forces were committing or 
about to commit such crimes’.204 In Bemba, the Trial Chamber stated that 
‘actual knowledge on the part of a commander cannot be presumed. Rather, it 
must be established either by direct or indirect (circumstantial) evidence.’205 In 
relation to the latter standard, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba stated that: 
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“The factors... in relation to the determination of actual knowledge are 
also relevant in the Chamber’s final assessment of whether a superior 
“should have known” of the commission of the crimes or the risk of their 
occurrence. In this respect, the suspect may be considered to have 
known, if inter alia, and depending on the circumstances of each case: (i) 
he had general information to put him on notice of crimes committed by 
subordinates or of the possibility of the occurrence of the unlawful acts; 
and (ii) such available information was sufficient to justify further inquiry 
or investigation.”206 
 
Whilst the Baha Mousa Report does highlight that Brims was aware of the use 
of hoods on at least one occasion since witnessing a prisoner being hooded is 
what prompted him to issue the ban on hooding in the first place, it is uncertain 
that Brims had actual knowledge of crimes taking place. Brims and his Chief of 
Staff, Marriott, stated that they were unaware of the use of hooding being a 
standard practice for some UK personnel.207 Additionally, the Report stated that 
Legal Advisor Mercer and Chief of Staff Marriott were unaware of the continuing 
practice of hooding in the JFIT.208 
 
Furthermore, Brims and his successor as General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) 
Division, Major General Peter Wall who took over in May 2003 after serving as 
Chief of Staff at the National Contingent Command, both stated they did not 
discuss the practice of hooding,209 which would unlikely appear to be consistent 
with Brims being aware of the ongoing use of hooding. 
 
It is also unclear whether the Baha Mousa Report presents enough evidence to 
suggest that Brims had sufficient information to justify investigations into 
potential crimes that were either being committed or were about to be 
committed. As has already been shown, Sir William Gage stated that a wider 
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examination of the continued use of hooding after Brims’ order was issued 
would have been outside the scope of the inquiry,210 and was therefore unable 
to make any findings in regard to the continued use of hooding.211 However, in 
relation to the indicators stated by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba to be 
relevant in determining knowledge for the purposes of command responsibility, 
such as ‘the number of illegal acts, their scope, whether their occurrence is 
widespread, the time during which the prohibited acts took place, the type and 
number of forces involved’,212 more information regarding the continued use of 
hooding in the wider context of all forces under the command of 1 (UK) Division 
would be required in order to establish whether senior commanders within 1 
(UK) Division, and indeed potentially above, should have been aware of the 
perpetration of international crimes. 
 
It may be the case that the failure of the Baha Mousa Inquiry to investigate the 
wider use of hooding in 1 (UK) Division may undermine the effectiveness of the 
Inquiry’s investigation of torture, since the Principles on the Effective 
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment state that one of the purposes of a torture 
investigation is ‘clarification of the facts and establishment and 
acknowledgement of individual and State responsibility for victims and their 
families’.213 Furthermore, this investigative gap may be indicative of a need, as 
suggested by the United Nations Committee against Torture, to establish ‘a 
single, independent public inquiry to investigate allegations of torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iraq from 2003 to 2009’,214 as 
an examination of the full extent of hooding, and other techniques which may 
constitute an international crime, may only be possible through an investigative 
mechanism with wider terms of reference than the Baha Mousa Inquiry. The 
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United Kingdom government has however rejected the notion of such an 
inquiry.215 
 
In relation to a potential investigation by the ICC, it may be necessary for the 
UK to demonstrate that other lines of inquiry, such as the Iraq Historical 
Allegations Team, have examined whether or not senior commanders are 
responsible for international crimes. This is a factor of relevance since in their 
2018 Preliminary Examination Report, the OTP noted that ‘The information 
available indicates that the focus of the UK’s investigative and prosecutorial 
efforts regarding alleged crimes in Iraq has largely focused on low-level physical 
perpetrators and mid-level superiors’.216 The OTP’s Final Report does, 
however, make clear that command responsibility has been a focus of SPLI 
investigative efforts.217 
 
b. Divisional and Brigade Level Fragmentary Orders Regarding 
Hooding and the Handover between Operation Telic 1 and 
Operation Telic 2 
 
In May 2003, guidance written by the 1 (UK) Division Legal Advisor Nicholas 
Mercer was incorporated into Divisional Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 152 and 
by 7 Armoured Brigade in their FRAGO 63.218 This guidance stated that in the 
event that a unit had to detain a person for any reason that ‘the detained person 
should be treated with humanity and dignity at all times’,219 and that ‘under no 
circumstances should their faces be covered as this might impair breathing’.220 
Mercer’s evidence to the inquiry was that this guidance was intended to ensure 
that UK personnel would not be able to exploit any loopholes which may have 
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existed in Brims’ previous ban on the use of hooding.221 Whilst Sir William Gage 
does state that the ban on hooding could have been made more obvious,222 it is 
also stated that ‘any proper reading of Mercer’s FRAGO 152 should have led 
the reader to conclude that hooding was indeed banned’,223 and this is the 
manner in which it was understood by witnesses who testified on the matter at 
the inquiry.224 The Report chose not to fault Mercer for not stating more clearly 
that the use of hooding was prohibited,225 and indeed stated that he ‘deserves 
some credit for ensuring that this order was issued’.226 
 
However, the Inquiry Report does highlight that in the process of the handover 
between Operation Telic 1 and Operation Telic 2, the fact that hooding was 
prohibited, whether articulated by Brims or Mercer, was not something which 
received much attention. Indeed, the Inquiry Report states that at the divisional 
level, ‘The general tenor of the evidence suggested that the topic of prisoner 
handling was for the most part not given a high priority by senior officers of each 
Division during the handover.’227 It is however noted that the 3 (UK) Division 
legal advisor Lieutenant Colonel Charles Barnett did know about both the Brims 
order banning hooding and FRAGO 152 following the handover process,228 
though Sir William Gage states that this ‘was raised as one of a number of 
areas of concern rather than as the most important legal issue in theatre’.229 
The Report is also critical of the fact that ‘no single branch appears to have 
regarded it as its responsibility to lead in matters of prisoner handling and 
detention’,230 and that this ‘contributed to the patchy knowledge of the ban on 
hooding in both 1 (UK) Div and 3 (UK) Div’.231 This is something which is 
contrasted with modern practice where responsibility is assumed for such 
practices.232 
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The Report also notes that a similar pattern existed in relation to the handover 
process at the brigade level between 7 Armoured Brigade and 19 Mechanised 
Brigade whereby ‘prisoner handling was seemingly a relatively low priority and 
little more was effected than the physical handing over of hard copies of past 
orders, or the location of those orders on the computer systems’.233 Additionally, 
the Report states that brigade level legal advisors were made aware of the 
prohibition of hooding by their predecessors at divisional or brigade level.234 At 
the battlegroup level, the Report does state that FRAGO 63 was received by at 
least one Battlegroup within 7 Armoured Brigade, the Joint Nuclear Biological 
Chemical Regiment,235 though the Report states that the orders from Brims and 
Burridge banning the use of hooding did not likely reach this level.236 In relation 
to the handover between 1 Black Watch and 1 Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, 
the Report states that ‘the handover did not succeed in effectively conveying to 
1 QLR that hooding had been banned in theatre’.237 In relation to other 
battlegroups, it is stated that inquiry witnesses were not explicitly made aware 
of any ban on hooding during their handover process.238 
 
As to how this handover knowledge effected the level of knowledge of troops 
deployed during Operation Telic 2, Sir William Gage states that soldiers who 
were deployed during Operation Telic 2 primarily fell into three categories of 
knowledge regarding the policy around hooding – they didn’t know about the 
ban or the use of hooding at all, they knew about the ban but not the use of 
hooding, or they did not know about the ban but were aware of the continued 
use of hooding.239 However, Gage also states that in relation to those 
individuals who were aware of a ban on hooding, ‘there was, I find, a misplaced 
confidence among those who knew of a ban on hooding, that this knowledge 
was widely shared among their colleagues’.240 
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It is clear that despite the efforts of Brims and Mercer that hooding continued to 
be used after their orders prohibiting their use were issued – the Report, for 
example highlights the use of hooding during Operation Telic 2, not only by 
members of 1 QLR in the events leading up to the death of Baha Mousa,241 but 
also by other battlegroups.242 The Mercer guidance included within FRAGO 152 
is important because: 
 
“Mercer’s guidance on the detention of civilians was the only written 
order disclosed to the inquiry which was issued before Baha Mousa’s 
death and which contained an apparent reference to the prohibition on 
hooding prisoners”.243  
 
This shows how the failures highlighted by the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report 
served to have a cumulative effect. The failure to develop adequate military 
doctrine resulted in a situation whereby those responsible for developing policy 
prior to deployment were not aware of prohibited techniques, and that the 
prohibited nature of these techniques was not adequately communicated in 
training, and then when a ban was issued in theatre, those who were aware of a 
ban assumed that it had been distributed adequately. 
 
3. The Liability of Ministers for the Conduct of Military Personnel in 
Iraq 
 
In their Joint Communication to the OTP, the European Center for Constitutional 
and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) argue, based on 
the findings of the Baha Mousa Report, that, Geoffrey Hoon and Adam Ingram, 
as the then Secretary of State for Defence and Minister of State for the Armed 
Forces, respectively, can be held responsible for war crimes as civilian 
commanders under Article 28(b) of the Rome Statute.244 
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Despite the concerns raised by the ECCHR and PIL regarding the potential 
liability of government ministers for actions which took place in Iraq, there is no 
publicly available information which suggests that they are the focus of criminal 
investigations or prosecutions. This is the case even though the OTP has stated 
that ‘the UK authorities do not appear to have remained inactive in relation to 
broader allegations of systemic abuse or of military command or civilian 
superior responsibility’.245  
 
4. Implementation of the Baha Mousa Report’s Recommendations 
 
In relation to the OTP’s ongoing preliminary examination into the conduct of UK 
personnel in Iraq, Hansen states that: 
 
“One particularly critical aspect of the complementarity assessment will 
be whether, and if so how, domestic processes are able to tackle 
‘systemic issues’, understood to involve system failures such as poor 
supervision, lack of guidance and lack of training... To the extent the 
OTP concludes that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the court were committed on a large scale, the 
Office will expect domestic processes to address systemic issues for it to 
make a call that complementarity renders further steps by the Office 
unnecessary.”246 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Baha Mousa Inquiry as a means 
through which the United Kingdom may be able to demonstrate that it has 
complied with the principle of complementarity, it will be necessary to determine 
the extent to which the UK has addressed systemic failings following the 
publication of the Report. 
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Whilst the Baha Mousa Report does note that that improvements had been 
made to address systemic faults within the armed forces during the eight years 
between the death of Baha Mousa and the Report being issued,247 and that 
work on further reforms was underway prior to the final report even being issued 
as a result of the inquiry,248 the Inquiry did still ultimately issue 73 
recommendations for improvement within the MoD.249 As part of the 
government’s response to the release of the Report, Secretary of State for 
Defence, Liam Fox stated the following: 
 
“We are in no way complacent about the issues identified by Sir William, 
and I can inform the house that I am accepting in principle all his 
recommendations with one reservation. It is vital that we retain the 
techniques necessary to secure swiftly, in appropriate circumstances, the 
intelligence that can save lives. I am afraid that I cannot accept the 
recommendation that we institute a blanket ban, during tactical 
questioning, on the use of certain verbal and non-physical techniques.”250 
 
As a part of the government’s arguments in the Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) litigation, 
it was stated that work was ongoing in relation to the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Baha Mousa Report that had been accepted by the 
government,251 and Leggatt J said of the recommendations ‘the great majority 
of these have now been implemented’.252 In addition, in the Al Sweady Inquiry, 
Sir Thayne Forbes stated that he was ‘satisfied that the MoD had accepted and 
implemented those of Sir William Gage’s recommendations that might have 
formed the subject of my own’,253 a position which affected more than a third of 
the recommendations made by the Baha Mousa Report.254 
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The one technique that was rejected by the government was that the use of the 
harsh technique in tactical questioning be banned.255 In Hussein v Secretary of 
State for Defence, the High Court defined the harsh approach in the following 
terms: 
 
“The harsh technique included the following elements which could be 
deployed as the questioner considered necessary. The shouting could be 
as loud as possible. There could be what was described as uncontrolled 
fury, shouting with cold menace and then developing, the questioner’s 
voice and actions showing psychotic tendencies, and there could be 
personal abuse. Other techniques were described as cynical derision 
and malicious humiliation, involving personal attacks on the detainee’s 
physical and mental attitudes and capabilities. He could be taunted and 
goaded as an attack on his pride and ego and to make him feel insecure. 
Finally, he could be confused by high speed questioning, interrupting his 
answers, perhaps misquoting his replies.”256 
 
Whilst the Baha Mousa Inquiry declined to make a determination on the 
lawfulness of the technique,257 the Report stated that ‘even if the harsh 
approach as currently taught is lawful, its risks if used in forward deployed areas 
outweigh the benefits of its use.’258 In Hussein, both Collins J in the High 
Court,259 and Lloyd Jones LJ in the Court of Appeal stated their agreement with 
Sir William Gage’s comments on the unacceptable nature of the harsh 
technique.260 
 
The MoD replaced the harsh approach with a technique called the challenging 
approach in August 2011, with the Systemic Issues Working Group (SIWG) 
stating the new ‘approach makes clear that threats or insults are not to be 
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used’.261 Despite rejecting the recommendation that the harsh approach be 
banned in the context of tactical questioning, the Baha Mousa Report did still 
have an impact on the development of the challenging approach. For example, 
in Hussein, the High Court stated that the policy ‘has been developed following 
Sir William Gage’s report, has taken account of his recommendations and has 
sought to apply them so as to avoid the potential unlawfulness apparent in the 
‘harsh’ approach’.262 Additionally, the Court of Appeal stated that the Defence 
Secretary has taken into account Sir William Gage’s recommendations by 
ensuring ‘clear guidance is provided in training as to the proper limits of 
challenge direct’,263 removed comparisons between the tactical questioner and 
a drill sergeant,264 that the title of the approach has been changed to avoid the 
impression that illegal behaviour is allowed under the approach,265 and that its 
use requires ministerial approval.266 The High Court and Court of Appeal in 
Hussein would ultimately determine that use of the challenging technique was 
lawful.267 
 
The fact that the Baha Mousa Report had an effect on UK policy even in 
situations where the government had rejected recommendations shows how 
influential the Report was in relation to the UK’s attempts to address systemic 
issues. The contribution of the Baha Mousa Report in addressing systemic 
issues is a developing theme, as for example, in their July 2014 Report, the 
SIWG stated that interrogation training had been redesigned following the 
recommendations of the Baha Mousa Inquiry.268 Furthermore, as has already 
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been mentioned, in the context of the Al Sweady Report, the Baha Mousa 
Report made 28 recommendations which, in full or in part, ‘might have formed’ 
part of the recommendations at the conclusions of the Al Sweady Report.269  
 
Finally, in 2012, Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey announced that the Baha 
Mousa Inquiry Report would be examined as part of the Iraq Historic Allegations 
Team’s investigatory process ‘to assess whether more can be done to bring 
those responsible for the treatment of Baha Mousa to justice’.270 However, in 
the course of hearings in Al-Saadoon in 2017, Leggatt J was critical of delays 
by prosecuting authorities in deciding whether to conduct further prosecutions in 
the Baha Mousa case.271 In 2018, Director of Service Prosecutions Andrew 
Cayley stated that ‘Baha Mousa’s violent death provides a powerful and 
continuing justification for the SPLI, supported by the SPA, to complete its 
mandate’.272 In June 2020, Cayley, however, acknowledged that it is ‘quite 
possible’ that no prosecutions will arise out of the SPLI investigation process,273 
and the investigation into the death of Baha Mousa was ultimately closed 
without further prosecutions being brought.274 
 
Despite the contributions that the Baha Mousa Inquiry has made to the UK’s 
addressing of systemic issues, it can hardly be argued that the inquiries 
pursued by the UK have examined the full range of conduct subject to OTP 
scrutiny. The OTP has stated that: 
 
“on the basis of the information available, there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that, at a minimum, the following war crimes have been 
committed by members of UK armed forces: wilful killing/murder under 
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article 8(2)(a)(i)) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); torture and inhuman/cruel treatment 
under article 8(2)(a)(ii) or article 8(2)(c)(i)); outrages upon personal 
dignity under article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or article 8(2)(c)(ii)); rape and/or other 
forms of sexual violence under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or article 
8(2)(e)(vi)).”275 
 
For example, the Baha Mousa Report had a mandate ‘to investigate and report 
on the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment 
of those detained with him’.276 Additionally, the Al Sweady Inquiry’s terms of 
reference were stated in the following terms: 
 
“To investigate and report on the allegations made by the claimants in 
the Al-Sweady judicial review proceeding against British soldiers of (1) 
unlawful killing at Camp Abu Naji on 14 and 15 May 2004, and (2) the ill-
treatment of five Iraqi nationals detained at Camp Abu Naji and 
subsequently at the divisional temporary detention facility at Shaibah 
Logistics Base between 14 May and 23 September 2004, taking account 
of the investigations which have already taken place, and to make 
recommendations.”277 
 
Furthermore, in the case of the Chilcot Inquiry, because of the work of IHAT and 
the Baha Mousa and Al Sweady Reports,278 it was stated:  
 
“the Inquiry Committee decided that it should not examine issues relating 
to the question of detention. It appeared to the Committee that, if it was 
to do so, there was a danger that it might duplicate the work of these 
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This means that the scope of inquiries which specifically deal with matters 
relating to individuals in UK custody in Iraq do not address the full range of 
crimes alleged to have taken place. These inquiries also do not address 
potentially unlawful action during the full period in which UK personnel are 
alleged by the OTP to have committed international crimes. The two inquiries 
examining allegations of detainee abuse addressed conduct which took place in 
2003 and 2004. The OTP, on the other hand, examined conduct which took 
place between 2003 and 2009.280 
 
However, other investigatory steps taken by UK authorities have also been 
subject to criticism, suggesting that determining the adequacy of an 
investigation may not be as simple as looking at what type of investigation it is. 
For example, Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi have criticised the extent of 
investigations carried out as part of the Iraq Fatality Investigations mechanism, 
which was pursued by the UK government in order to comply with Article 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights,281 stating: 
 
“The decision to establish the IFI was important for public disclosure 
purposes, but IFI has not addressed all cases involving allegations of 
unlawful death and is not mandated to address cases relating to torture 
or other ill-treatment matters, nor is or was any other public inquiry (other 
than the narrowly-focused Baha Mousa inquiry).”282 
 
Additionally, the Systemic Issues Working Group has been criticised by Bates 
who states the following in relation to the effect of the definition of systemic 
issues adopted by the SIWG:283 
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“The term “systemic issues” primarily envisages shortcomings of doctrine, policy, 
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“It implies too glib a distinction between ‘unintentional breaches’ where 
policy, training or supervision is flawed, and ‘deliberate acts… in knowing 
contravention’ of law, training etc. It is possible for training to be flawed 
and for deliberate, knowing wrongdoing to coincide. The definition 
implies that deliberate criminal acts occur without a relevant, systemic 
organisational culture. This ignores the serious deliberate offences 
perpetrated against Baha Mousa and those detained with him… and the 
research on military culture’s relevance to the development of soldiers’ 
understanding and willingness to comply with applicable law.”284 
 
Furthermore, the SIWG has been criticised by Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi 
on the basis that neither it or any other mechanism has ‘considered the 
adequacy of investigations and prosecutions’ that have already been 
conducted,285 and that the failure for the SIWG process to lead to further 
prosecutions has the potential to reduce ‘the effectiveness of the policy changes 
and other measures that have appropriately been put in place to avoid repetition 




As stated at the beginning of this discussion, the purpose of examining the 
Baha Mousa Report was to assess the extent to which a non-criminal 
investigation process can contribute to the process of a State being able to 
demonstrate that it has complied with the principle of complementarity. The 
 
been flawed; where policies issued at different levels have been contradictory, leaving 
individuals unable to determine whether their actions are correct; and where supervision 
has been insufficient to identify and address such confusion, or failure to understand 
and apply training correctly. Deliberate acts by individuals in knowing contravention of 
the law and of doctrine, policy or training are not systemic issues, and are punishable 
through the Service Justice system.” 
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Baha Mousa Report does, undoubtedly, provide information on areas that 
should be of value to the OTP’s examination of allegations of misconduct by UK 
personnel in Iraq in areas such as the loss of doctrine dating back to the 1970s, 
the banning of the practice of hooding during Operation Telic 1, and measures 
taken by the UK to address failures in the time between the death of Baha 
Mousa and the publication of the Baha Mousa Report.  
 
However, it is unclear to what extent the Report does function as an effective 
investigation of torture in and of itself. The Principles on the Effective 
Investigation and Documentation and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment state that: 
 
“The purposes of effective investigation and documentation of torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment… include the 
following: 
(a) Clarification of the facts and establishment and 
acknowledgment of individual and State responsibility for 
victims and their families; 
(b) Identification of measures needed to prevent recurrence; 
(c) Facilitation of prosecution or, as appropriate, disciplinary 
sanctions for those indicted by the investigation as being 
responsible and demonstration of the need for full reparation 
and redress from the State…”287 
 
In relation to the first purpose of a torture investigation – to clarify the facts, and 
to establish the responsibility of individuals and the State – it appears that this 
has only been achieved in part. For example, in relation to the loss of doctrine, 
as has already been discussed in this Chapter, the Inquiry stated that ‘the only 
fair conclusion is that the position reached at the outset of Op Telic… resulted 
from a series of corporate failings and missed opportunities’,288 which cannot be 
said to be the same as establishing individual responsibility. Additionally, in 
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relation to the extent that to which the practice of hooding was employed, the 
Report stated that it was unable to make any findings on the use of hooding 
across 1 (UK) Division as a whole.289 This means that the Baha Mousa Report 
did not establish the full facts surrounding the use of hooding, and therefore 
serves to limit the extent to which the Inquiry can assist in facilitating 
prosecutions. However, in relation to the second purpose of a torture 
investigation, as was discussed in the previous section, the Baha Mousa Inquiry 
did contribute to the process of military reform in the UK. 
 
Notwithstanding the contribution that the Baha Mousa Report did make in terms 
of providing information about UK conduct in Iraq, and to the process of military 
reform, the gaps in coverage of the Baha Mousa Report make it difficult to 
disagree with the assertion of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, Juan Méndez, who states that 
‘By itself, a commission of inquiry is never sufficient to fully satisfy a State’s 
obligations under international law with regard to torture and other forms of ill 
treatment.’290 It is therefore unclear to what extent the Baha Mousa Inquiry does 
demonstrate that the UK has complied with the principle of complementarity, as 
whilst the Report is undoubtedly a valuable source of information, it does not 
constitute a full investigation into alleged detainee abuse. 
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Chapter Seven: The Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
 
This Chapter will discuss the criminal investigation process launched by the 
United Kingdom government to investigate allegations of wrongdoing in Iraq, 
the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT). IHAT was created in March 2010 to 
ensure that the UK’s investigations of alleged wrongdoing in Iraq ‘are carried 
out thoroughly and expeditiously, so that – one way or another – the truth 
behind them is established’.1 IHAT ultimately closed in June 2017 with its cases 
reassigned to a successor organisation, the Service Police Legacy 
Investigations (SPLI).2 By the time of IHAT’s closure in June 2017, it had been 
in operation for over three times its originally expected lifespan and had 
received 3405 allegations of ill treatment and unlawful killing.3 
 
The UK government has acknowledged the importance of IHAT as a part of 
investigative obligations under UK law.4 In October 2016, Attorney General 
Jeremy Wright stated the following regarding the relationship between the work 
of IHAT and the OTP’s preliminary examination: 
 
“As the Committee is well aware, the prosecutor’s office of the ICC has 
expressed interest in any offences that may have been committed by 
British armed forces, and therefore they have asked about the processes 
 
1 HC Deb 1 March 2010 vol 506 cols 93WS-94WS 
2 Ministry of Defence and Michael Fallon, ‘IHAT to close at the end of June’ (Ministry of 
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whereby this country demonstrates that it is investigating in a proper way 
whether or not any such offences may have been committed. The IHAT 
process was always envisaged as a way in which you could carry out 
those investigations, leading in appropriate cases to prosecutions.”5 
 
The purpose of this Chapter therefore is to discuss the extent to which the 
actions of the UK demonstrate that the UK is determined to conduct genuine 
investigations into alleged war crimes in Iraq. This will be done by discussing 
the extent to which the IHAT process was independent, efficient, subject to 
political interference, or involved attempts to avoid those who committed crimes 
being held accountable. 
 
It should, however, be noted that not all of the investigations conducted by IHAT 
fall within the scopes of the OTP’s preliminary examination.6 In their 2017 
preliminary examination report, the OTP stated that ‘there is no reasonable 
basis to believe that war crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were 
committed by British armed forces in the course of their military operations not 
related to the context of arrests and detentions.’7 IHAT’s final quarterly update, 
however, indicates that one of IHAT’s ‘strategic priorities’ was ‘allegations of 
unlawful killing following contact with British forces’.8 Additionally, IHAT’s table 
of work completed highlighted that it closed investigations in relation to 
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allegations where there was no identifiable criminal offence;9 situations where 
the allegations were more consistent with the practices used by other States;10 
where detainees were in the custody of other States;11 and, as highlighted by 
Minister for the Armed Forces Penny Mordaunt,12 a situation where Danish 
forces had previously accepted responsibility for the death.13 
 
1. Litigation Addressing the Independence of IHAT 
 
In March 2010, the High Court granted permission for a judicial review seeking 
to force the UK government to launch an inquiry into allegations of abuse 
perpetrated by UK personnel in Iraq.14 The issues at question in this case were 
whether IHAT was independent,15 and whether an immediate inquiry into these 
allegations was required for the UK to satisfy its investigative duty under Article 
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).16 Whilst the OTP 
stated in their final report that that ‘the ICC is not acting as a human rights 
court’,17 their assessment of the UK’s compliance with the principle of 
complementarity that they ‘cited human rights jurisprudence to the extent that it 
may assist in the interpretation of relevant terms in article 17(2)’.18 Additionally, 
 
9 For example, IHAT 123, where it was stated that ‘there are no further lines of enquiry for the 
IHAT to pursue in regards to identifying whether a crime has been committed by a British 
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<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/649525/20171003-IHAT_NEW_master_copy_website_work_completed_table-
HQComms_O.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 13. 
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as will be made clear in the remainder of this section, the UK’s obligations 
under the ECHR, rather than the Rome Statute, were the focus of judicial 
proceedings. It should therefore be noted that in Assenov, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated the following in relation to allegations of torture 
or inhuman treatment: 
 
“where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously 
ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and 
in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s 
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … [the] 
Convention”, requires that there should be an effective official 
investigation. This investigation… should be capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible… If this were not the 
case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance… would 
be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for 
agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with 
virtual impunity.”19 
 
The ECtHR has made similar statements in relation to alleged violations of the 
right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR.20 In relation to the investigation of 
alleged war crimes, the ECtHR stated in Brecknell v United Kingdom that: 
 
“there is little ground to be overly prescriptive as regards the possibility of 
an obligation to investigate unlawful killings arising many years after the 
events since the public interest in obtaining the prosecution and 
conviction of perpetrators is firmly recognised, particularly in the context 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”21 
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The court in Ali Zaki Mousa ultimately held that IHAT was independent.22 The 
court also determined that no immediate inquiry was required in order to satisfy 
the UK’s Article 3 ECHR obligations.23 The High Court’s discussion on the 
independence of IHAT concentrated on three areas: whether IHAT investigators 
were independent of the military chain of command to conduct investigations 
into the army,24 whether those responsible for charging individuals with crimes 
were independent,25 and whether the involvement of the RMP in Iraq meant 
they were not independent because, as IHAT’s investigators, the RMP would 
potentially be investigating the conduct of the RMP.26 
 
In relation to whether IHAT investigators were sufficiently independent of IHAT, 
the  High Court found that IHAT, as an institution, and its investigators operated 
outside the ordinary military chain of command,27 and stated that the fact that 
RMP personnel were members of the army did not automatically mean that any 
investigation into army personnel lacked independence.28 The court found that 
charging decisions did not lack independence because in relation to those 
offences which fall within Schedule 2 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, the 
decision about whether to prosecute rests with either the Director of Service 
Prosecutions or a commanding officer from a different unit to the one which the 
soldier under investigation belonged.29 It was also decided, based on evidence 
presented that (a) the primary role of General Police Duties (GPD) branch of the 
RMP was in front line police duties and the Service Investigations Branch’s 
(SIB) role was to investigate crimes involving UK personnel,30 (b) the GPD was 
not involved in IHAT,31 and (c) the role of the SIB in Iraq was ‘much more 
limited’ than that of the GPD,32 there was not ‘general cause for concern’ about 
 
22 Ali Zaki Mousa (n 15) para 87 
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the independence of IHAT investigators.33 The court did, however, state that 
IHAT did have to ensure that investigators were not involved in cases with 
which they were already familiar.34 
 
However, on appeal, it was held that the High Court’s decision in relation to the 
effect of the RMP’s involvement in Iraq on IHAT’s independence was based on 
a ‘misapprehension about the involvement of GPD members in IHAT’ and 
additional evidence not previously available.35 The Defence Secretary had 
accepted that the GPD were involved in IHAT.36 Additionally, the Court of 
Appeal found that the involvement of the RMP was much more substantial than 
the role presented by the High Court with the Military Police Service being found 
to be responsible for the oversight of detention facilities.37 It was also found that 
the Provost Marshal (Army), Brigadier Edward Forster-Knight, in his previous 
role as Provost Marshal for 1 (UK) Division, was in ‘direct command’ of troops 
deployed to support the Black Watch and the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of 
Fusiliers,38 and: 
 
“He also had a functional and coordinating responsibility for the other 
RMP units in theatre although they remained under the direct command 
of their respective formations or units to which they were providing 
support. Amongst other things, he acted as advisor to GOC 1 (UK) 
Armed Div on policing, custodial and detention matters. As PM, he had 
direct access to the GOC.”39 
 
Whilst the Court of Appeal stated that there was ‘no evidence’ that any IHAT 
investigators were implicated in any alleged wrongdoing in Iraq,40 it was held 
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“it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that IHAT lacks the requisite 
independence. The problem is that the Provost Branch members of IHAT 
are participants in investigating allegations which, if true, occurred at a 
time when Provost Branch members were plainly involved in matters 
surrounding the detention and interment of suspected persons in Iraq. 
They had important responsibilities as advisers, trainers, processors and 
“surety for detention operations”. If the allegations or significant parts of 
them are true, obvious questions would arise about their discharge of 
those responsibilities. SIB, GPD and MPS members would all come 
under scrutiny. Moreover, the PM (A) himself and his predecessors 
would also likely be called to account, given his position as head of the 
Provost Branch and the nature of his responsibilities in Iraq as Brigadier 
Forster-Knight described them. It is, of course, to him that IHAT is 
required to report.”41 
 
On the basis that IHAT lacked the required level of independence required for 
the UK to be able to discharge its investigative duties under Article 3 of the 
ECHR, the Court held that the UK’s approach of reserving judgment on whether 
an inquiry should be launched until IHAT had completed its work was no longer 
justifiable,42 and stated that it was for the Defence Secretary to decide how the 
UK would discharge its obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR.43 
 
On 26 March 2012, the Minister for the Armed Forces, Nick Harvey, announced 
that the government accepted the decision of the Court of Appeal and stated 
that the role of the RMP and Provost Marshal (Army) would be assumed by the 
Royal Navy Police and the Provost Marshal (Navy).44 At the same time, it was 
announced that IHAT would examine the case of Baha Mousa and any 
allegations referred to IHAT as a result of the judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights in al-Skeini.45 
 
 
41 ibid para 36 
42 ibid paras 40-48 
43 ibid para 49 





In Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2), the claimants again sought an inquiry and argued that 
IHAT was still not independent, even after the changes made to IHAT’s 
structure by the Ministry of Defence.46 In this case, prior to making a finding on 
the independence of IHAT as it was reformulated, the High Court made a 
number of points in relation to the role of the Royal Navy Police and Provost 
Marshal (Navy). These included that the involvement of the Royal Police (RNP) 
in investigations in Iraq was to ‘investigate isolated incidents in relation to the 
conduct of naval personnel who were drunk or involved in misconduct towards 
other naval personnel or in respect of one who had negligently discharged a 
firearm’,47 and that when RNP personnel did visit the Joint Forward 
Interrogation Team, it was to assist Iraqi police in an investigation.48 The court 
also stated that no RNP personnel who were still serving and had served in Iraq 
conducted interrogations of Iraqi civilians.49 Additionally, whilst it was found that 
members of the Royal Navy did serve in the Joint Forward Interrogation Team, 
there was no RNP involvement at the Joint Forward Interrogation Team.50 
Furthermore, it was found that ‘no senior officer in the Royal Navy Police had 
any involvement in the formulation of detention and interrogation policy or 
training’,51 and that ‘The role of other members of the Royal Navy Police in the 
development of land-based detention and interrogations policy and training was 
minor’.52 Finally, the Court found that in relation to investigations, the Provost 
Marshal (Navy) was independent of the armed forces and government.53 
 
The Court ultimately held that ‘IHAT is independent and objectively can be seen 
as independent’.54 This appears to be a conclusion that is shared by the OTP, 
who stated in their final report that IHAT did not operate in a manner which was 
inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the principle of complementarity.55 
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Despite finding that IHAT was independent, Silber J did still express concern 
about the progress that IHAT was making in the third year of its existence. For 
example, Silber J stated that ‘IHAT is not structured so that decisions can be 
effectively and promptly taken as to whether there is a realistic prospect of 
prosecution’,56 and stated that the Director of Service Prosecutions should be 
involved at an earlier stage in order to review whether prosecutions should be 
brought.57 Furthermore, concerns about delays to the IHAT process,58 and the 
failure of IHAT to examine systemic issues were also addressed.59 In a further 
decision in the Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) case, Silber J confirmed the appointment 
of Leggatt J as Designated Judge,60 with part of his role being to hold IHAT to 
account for further delays involving allegations of unlawful killings.61 These 
themes will be touched upon later in this Chapter. 
 
2. Political Interference in IHAT? 
 
Before assessing whether IHAT has been the subject of political interference, it 
is worth noting the comments of Silber J in Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) on the nature 
of the relationship between the executive and an investigative body: 
 
“It is axiomatic that decisions on whether to pursue an investigation and 
then whether to prosecute must be made independently of the Executive. 
No civil servant, let alone a Minister can be permitted to have any 
influence whatsoever. It is clear that in making such a decision the police 
are constitutionally independent of the Executive and of any local 
authority or official to which they are accountable in other matters… We 
can see no reason why the service police could be in any different 
position. They must be able to make their decisions entirely 
independently of the Secretary of State for Defence, any civil servant in 
 
56 Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) (n 46) para 182 
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that Ministry and, even more importantly, of anyone in the hierarchy of 
the armed forces.”62 
 
If the allegations that the UK has brought investigations to a premature end 
and/or damaged the work of IHAT through its public rhetoric, it would appear 
that in such circumstances, a UK court would be unable to declare that the 
IHAT process was independent. Such conduct should also have an effect on 
the ICC’s determination on whether the UK has complied with the principle of 
complementarity or not since Article 17(2)(c) of the Rome Statute states that 
one of the factors used to determine unwillingness is whether: 
 
“proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in 
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice”63 
 
This section will therefore discuss government criticism of those responsible for 
presenting allegations of misconduct by UK personnel in the lead up to the 
closure of IHAT as well as the circumstances surrounding the closure of IHAT. 
 
a. Government Criticism of Those Responsible for Presenting 
Allegations of Misconduct 
 
When responding to the publication of the Baha Mousa Report in September 
2011, Liam Fox spent the majority of his speech apologising for the mistakes 
which led to mistreatment of detainees and the death of Baha Mousa, 
expressed the view that those who were responsible for crimes should be held 
 
62 Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) (n 46) para 74. This is a duty that government ministers appeared to 
be aware of as Defence Secretary Michael Fallon wrote in an article in the Daily Mail that 
‘Anyone who thinks that civil servants have the authority to direct or to influence the decisions of 
criminal investigators or prosecutors does not understand our justice system, where 
independence is crucial.’: Michael Fallon, ‘Members of our armed forces were victims of a 
charismatic conman who exploited vulnerabilities in the legal system’ (Daily Mail, 10 February 
2017) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4213576/Troops-victims-charismatic-
conman.html> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
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accountable, and discussed the reforms that were made prior to the Baha 
Mousa Report and other actions that would be taken to ensure that such an 
incident never occurred again.64 However, the response to the publication of the 
Al Sweady Report in December 2014 was markedly different. Defence 
Secretary Michael Fallon only spent a small proportion of his speech discussing 
the findings that British troops had been responsible for mistreatment against 
Iraqi detainees,65 and instead stated that the inquiry was ‘unnecessary’.66 Fallon 
further criticised the conduct of those making allegations against UK forces and 
those lawyers representing them (the legal firms Leigh Day and Public Interest 
Lawyers),67 stating that the inquiry was ‘a shameful attempt to use our legal 
system – our legal system to attack and falsely impugn our armed forces’.68 
 
Whilst the Al-Sweady Report did find that UK personnel were responsible for 
mistreatment towards Iraqi detainees,69 it dismissed allegations that UK forces 
were responsible for unlawful killings and the desecration of bodies in the 
context of the Battle of Danny Boy and its aftermath.70 The inquiry’s chair Sir 
Thayne Forbes stated: 
 
“the vast majority of allegations made against the British military, which 
this inquiry was required to investigate… were wholly and entirely without 
merit or justification. Very many of those baseless allegations were the 
product of deliberate and calculated lies on the part of those who made 
them”.71 
 
64 HC Deb 8 September 2011 vol 532 cols 571-73 
65 HC Deb 17 December 2014 vol 589 col 1408 
66 ibid col 1409 
67 ibid cols 1407-1409 
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Forbes additionally stated, ‘the approach of the detainees and a number of the 
other Iraqi witnesses, to the giving of their evidence, was both unprincipled in 
the extreme and wholly without regard for the truth.’72 This was contrasted with 
the conduct of British troops whom Forbes stated that ‘Except where otherwise 
expressly stated, in general I found the military witnesses to be both truthful and 
reliable’.73 Williams stated that the findings of the Al Sweady Report ‘gave a fillip 
to the MoD’s argument long maintained that there was no need for any wide-
scale scrutiny into the army or the government’s planning for and conduct in 
Iraq’.74 
 
In the months and years that followed the Al Sweady Report’s publication, those 
who represented individuals presenting allegations of wrongdoing by UK 
military personnel were subject to criticism by high-profile political figures 
including the Minister for the Armed Forces,75 the Lord Chancellor,76 and 
successive Prime Ministers in David Cameron77 and Theresa May.78 In 
 
foundation and entirely the product of deliberate lies, reckless speculation and ingrained 
hostility’. 
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industrial scale is the enemy of justice and humanity, not our armed forces’. 
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response to a letter from a group of 7 Non-Governmental Organisations which 
stated that rhetoric from the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary about 
lawyers who bring claims alleging that members of the UK armed forces were 
responsible for misconduct in Iraq was ‘ill-judged and inappropriate, as well as 
damaging to the important ongoing work of the Iraq Historical Allegations 
Team’,79 Minister for the Armed Forces Penny Mordaunt defended the 
government’s conduct in completely unambiguous terms: 
 
“I do not see any impropriety – perceived or actual – in Ministers drawing 
attention to the fact that a significant proportion of the claims are false 
and to the impact that these investigations are having on Service 
Personnel and Veterans, particularly on those who have developed 
mental health problems as a result of their military service. Indeed, we 
would be failing in our duty to our Service Personnel and Veterans if we 
allowed the practice of bringing false or otherwise unmeritorious legal 
claims to remain unchallenged.”80 
 
There was clearly fault on the part of some of those representing Iraqi 
claimants. For example, the head of Public Interest Lawyers, Philip Shiner, was 
struck off the roll of solicitors after being found guilty of multiple counts of 
professional misconduct.81 This is, however, not true of all lawyers, as can be 
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demonstrated by the fact that professional misconduct allegations brought 
against Leigh Day in relation to the Al Sweady Inquiry were dismissed.82 
Additionally, as Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi point out, not all claims brought 
by Public Interest Lawyers have been found to be without merit with the Alseran 
case being a recent example of a Public Interest Lawyers case in which the 
claimants were successful.83 Furthermore, it is noted in the OTP’s final report 
on the UK preliminary examination that of the final 82 allegations being 
investigated by the SPLI, ‘71 of 82 allegations were in fact PIL-related.’84 
 
In a July 2017 letter to the Attorney General regarding the government’s use of 
rhetoric criticising the conduct of Leigh Day, Harriet Harman, who serves as the 
Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, wrote: 
 
“I am sure you will agree that it is not for the government to decide 
whether any case against it is justified. That is a matter for the court. It is 
not for the government to decide if any case is vexatious or wrongly 
brought. That too, is for the court. It is not for the government to decide 
who should be in the legal profession. That is for the profession and the 
independent Solicitors Regulatory Authority.”85 
 
It is also clear from other areas of law that rhetoric used by the government may 
have an impact on the independence and operation of the justice system. For 
example, in response to the Home Office describing immigration lawyers as 
‘activist lawyers’,86 the Law Society, the representative body for Solicitors in 
England and Wales issued a strongly worded rebuke, which stated that the 
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independence of the British justice system ‘hinges on lawyers and judges not 
being hindered or intimidated in carrying out their professional duties and not 
being identified with their clients or their clients’ causes’.87 
 
When referencing criticism of lawyers who presented allegations of misconduct 
by UK personnel in their final report, the OTP stated that: 
 
“the overall position of the UK government can perhaps best be 
described as forward looking, seeking to prevent a recurrence. In terms 
of addressing criminal accountability for past abuses, the approach 
suggests that the UK Government, and in particular the MoD, have at 
best been reluctant, if not at times hostile, partners to pursuing claims of 
criminal responsibility against members of UK armed forces.”88 
 
The OTP additionally found that government statements were based on a 
misapprehension of the findings of the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal and the 
Al-Sweady Report,89 and they stated that IHAT’s eventual closure was ‘driven 
largely by political considerations in the form of a publicly stated commitment to 
protect the UK armed forces’.90 Furthermore, it was noted that IHAT employees 
felt discomfort as a result of criticism of IHAT by political figures and the 
media.91 These factors appear not to have made a difference to the OTP’s 
ultimate assessment of the principle of complementarity, as the OTP decided to 
close their preliminary examination into the UK, as the OTP stated that: 
 
“The Office has carefully considered allegations that the MoD of the UK 
Government sought to interfere with the activities of IHAT. The Office 
does not discount the impact that such political pressure may have had 
on the timelines and material resources available to IHAT to complete its 
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work. However… the Office has not identified specific information that 
would substantiate the conclusion that political pressure to close IHAT 
undermined or jeopardised the independence or impartiality of 
IHAT/SPLI and the SPA’s work in the specific cases under investigation 
or referred for prosecution.”92 
 
b. The Closure of IHAT 
 
Discontent regarding the IHAT process was neither confined to the government 
frontbenches or just to lawyers, the mechanism through which soldiers were 
being investigated itself was subject to criticism from backbenchers. For 
example, in February 2016, when announcing that the House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee would investigate the work of IHAT, Johnny Mercer 
stated that ‘No other country is putting it’s service men and women through the 
shambolic process that is IHAT’.93 The report of this inquiry of the House of 
Commons Defence Sub-Committee,94 which was chaired by Mercer, was 
published in February 2017 and made it clear that the IHAT process had to end: 
 
“IHAT… has proved to be unfit for purpose. It has become a seemingly 
unstoppable self-perpetuating machine and one which has proved to be 
deaf to the concerns of the armed forces, blind to their needs, and 
profligate with its own resources. We look to the Secretary of State to set 
a firm and early date for the remainder of the investigations to be 
concluded, and for the residue of cases to be prosecuted by a 
replacement body which can command the confidence of the armed 
forces.”95 
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Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi state that the government’s approach to 
criminal investigation structures in relation to allegations of abuse in Iraq leaves 
the impression that it has been acting politically in order to evade accountability 
for any crimes that may have taken place.96 It is difficult to disagree with this 
notion since, in the midst of a process in which the Ministry of Defence and the 
Defence Sub-Committee were jostling with each other to make an 
announcement in relation to IHAT first, the MoD announced that IHAT would 
close.97 Hansen stated in relation to the connection between the findings of the 
Defence Sub-Committee and the MoD’s announcement to close IHAT that ‘it is 
hard to view the Committee’s recommendations as anything but a significant 
blow to positive complementarity.’98 
 
The announcement that IHAT would close may have an effect on the UK’s 
ability to demonstrate to the OTP that it has complied with the principle of 
complementarity. The reason for this is that when justifying the UK’s closure of 
IHAT, the UK government made it clear that the findings against Shiner had a 
significant effect on IHAT’s projected caseload. A statement released by the 
MoD stated that: 
 
“The exposure of the dishonesty of Mr Shiner meant that many of the 
allegations that his now defunct firm, Public Interest Lawyers, had 
brought forward were discredited and enabled the Defence Secretary to 
decide to close IHAT. IHAT’s caseload is expected to reduce from a peak 
of over 3000 allegations to around 20 investigations by the time it 
closes.”99 
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The reduction of expected IHAT investigations to 20 marked a two-thirds 
reduction in the number of investigations that IHAT had expected to be 
conducting by the Summer of 2017. Both the IHAT Deputy Director Commander 
Hawkins and the Defence Secretary Michael Fallon had told the Defence Sub-
Committee prior to Shiner being struck off the roll of solicitors that IHAT was 
projecting to investigate around 60 cases at that point.100 The government’s 
response to the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee further explained the 
reasons for the reduction in IHAT’s projected caseload stating that: 
 
“As Mr Shiner’s involvement has vitiated so many of the allegations, the 
Director of IHAT concluded, with the advice of the Director of Service 
Prosecutions, that by the summer the number of cases which should be 
investigated will be greatly diminished, probably to around 20.”101 
 
The announcement that IHAT would close was met by a barrage of criticism. 
For example, the Non-Governmental Organisation REDRESS stated that 
IHAT’s closure meant that allegations of mistreatment in Iraq may not be 
investigated.102 The ECCHR, whose initial joint communication with PIL to the 
OTP led to the opening of the Preliminary Examination into the UK, stated in a 
2019 follow-up communication to the OTP that the UK was attempting to use 
the striking off of Phil Shiner in an attempt to prevent British personnel from 
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being held accountable in Iraq.103 Additionally, the Legal Director of REDRESS, 
Carla Ferstman, expressed doubts about why IHAT’s investigation process 
would be affected by the disciplinary action taken against Shiner: 
 
“The ethics of a lawyer in a single case doesn’t say anything about the 
strength or weakness of the evidence itself, which should have been 
independently investigated and any underlying crimes prosecuted. 
Indeed, IHAT never relied exclusively on claimant lawyers for its 
evidence; IHAT undertook its own investigations, and there were a 
number of ICRC reports of abuse along with service personnel 
witnesses, some of whom had sounded their alarm about mistreatment 
as early as 2003.”104 
 
The problem with the justification for IHAT’s closure is that months earlier, the 
UK appeared to be of the view that IHAT investigations as well as IHAT itself 
could not be closed down purely based on the notion that a substantial 
percentage of allegations referred to IHAT originated from PIL. Attorney 
General Jeremy Wright, for example, told the Defence Sub-Committee, ‘I’m 
afraid, the obligation to investigate still exists, even if it came from Mr Shiner 
and his company’.105  
 
It should also be noted that IHAT’s successor organisation, the SPLI stated that 
it inherited 1260 allegations at the time it opened.106 Of these allegations, 1145 
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were subject to assessment,107 and the remaining 115 allegations were the 
subject of 42 investigations.108 Additionally, in their Final Report on the UK 
Preliminary Examination, it was stated that of the last investigations being 
conducted by the SPLI, ‘71 of 82 allegations were in fact PIL-related’.109 The 
fact that more than 20 investigations were ongoing as late as September 2019 
raises questions about the reasons why there was an expectation that IHAT 
would only be conducting 20 investigations by the time of its closure.110 
 
This is especially the case since IHAT had already subjected allegations 
originating from Public Interest Lawyers to extra filtering processes,111 which 
were subject to criticism by the OTP who stated that ‘IHAT and the SPA appear 
to have placed over-reliance on the SDT’s disciplinary findings against Phil 
Shiner and PIL to terminate lines of criminal inquiry that may have otherwise 
progressed.’112 The OTP additionally stated that the actions taken by IHAT were 
‘not the only reasonable course of action in the circumstances’.113 This serves 
to create a mixed picture about the extent to which the UK is genuinely willing to 
conduct investigations because the fact that IHAT did not achieve its expected 
case load suggests that genuine examinations of past misconduct did take 
place. On the other hand, the fact that IHAT created an expectation that it would 
decrease its caseload to such a large extent does raise questions about how 
PIL allegations were dealt with. 
 
Additionally, the publicly adopted positions of the UK and the OTP in relation to 
the validity of allegations originating from Public Interest Lawyers appear to be 
very different. The UK government has stated that Shiner’s involvement in the 
allegations has ‘vitiated’ them.114 On the other hand, the OTP has stated that: 
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“In assessing the credibility of the claims themselves, the Office has 
taken the position that individual statements received from PIL could be 
considered credible enough if substantiated with supporting material 
(such as detention records, medical certificates, photographs, etc.) 
and/or corroborated by information available from reliable third sources, 
including human rights reports, the findings of public inquiries in the UK 
and data pertaining to out-of-court compensation settlements or other 
relevant material.”115 
 
The OTP took this position even though Kerr noted that the striking off of Phillip 
Shiner may have served to provide a justification for the OTP to close the 
preliminary examination into the UK.116 The issue of why IHAT closed is a 
matter of concern since Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi highlight concerns 
regarding IHAT’s successor organisation because the level of publicly available 
information provided by the SPLI regarding how it is managing its cases 
minimal,117 and the work of SPLI does not contribute to the Systemic Issues 
Working Group in the same way IHAT’s work did.118 Despite all of the above 
though, the OTP stated that the approach taken by the UK did not serve to 
demonstrate that they had not complied with the principle of complementarity.119 
 
3. IHAT Inefficiencies 
 
As long as the IHAT/SPLI process has been ongoing, it has been subject to 
delay. When it entered into operation in November 2010, IHAT was meant to 
remain open for two years.120 10 years later, the latest SPLI update states that 
74 allegations of misconduct in Iraq related to the IHAT process are being 
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investigated.121 The Courts have acknowledged that delays have been a 
running theme of the IHAT process with Silber J stating in Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 
2) that ‘there seems to be a recurring slippage’,122 and Leggatt J in al-Saadoon 
stated that IHAT’s progress was ‘disappointing’,123 and that limited progress 
combined with increases in IHAT’s caseload meant that ‘the situation looks 
bleak indeed’.124 Doubts have also been raised about the extent to which IHAT 
is efficient: the High Court stated in 2013 that IHAT was not in a position to 
make decisions regarding prosecutions ‘promptly and efficiently’;125 and Leggatt 
J stated in 2015, ‘I do not doubt the thoroughness with which IHAT is carrying 
out its work. Whether IHAT is working in the most efficient way is not something 
for me to say nor am I in a position to judge.’126 
 
Investigative inefficiencies are a matter that should be being considered by the 
OTP as they decide whether the UK has conducted genuine investigations into 
alleged war crimes in Iraq since Article 17(2)(b) of the Rome Statute states that 
one of the factors in determining unwillingness exists where ‘there has been an 
unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’.127 Sir David Calvert-
Smith’s review of IHAT, when discussing the proposed end date for IHAT of the 
end of 2019 that existed at the time the report was written in 2016, made it clear 
that the length of the IHAT process was a matter of concern, stating ‘I venture to 
suggest that both domestic and international courts would find that end date 
alarming, although it would of course represent a significant improvement on 
figures mentioned… in judgments in the Divisional Court’.128 
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The Calvert-Smith Report found that there were numerous instances in IHAT’s 
workflow where steps could be removed from the process without harming the 
quality of IHAT’s work.129 Those particular inefficiencies will not be the focus of 
this section, however. Instead, this section will briefly discuss two changes to 
the IHAT process made as a result of the judgment of the High Court in al-
Saadoon in relation to determining ‘whether there is a realistic prospect of 
obtaining sufficient evidence to charge an identifiable individual with a service 
offence’,130 as well as in relation to the information that has to be provided in 
witness statements by those presenting allegations of wrongdoing to IHAT.131 
This analysis of these measures is required because the reasons why they 
were introduced serves to further highlight inefficiencies in IHAT. 
 
The evidential test endorsed by the High Court is expressed in the following 
terms: 
 
“It is appropriate to ask at an early stage whether there is a realistic 
prospect of obtaining sufficient evidence to charge an identifiable person 
with a service offence. If it is clear that the answer to the question is “no”, 
there can be no obligation on IHAT to make any further inquiries. In 
some cases where the answer is not immediately clear, it may well be 
possible to identify one or more limited investigative steps which, 
depending on their outcome, may lead to the conclusion that there is no 
realistic prospect of meeting the evidential sufficiency test. Examples of 
such steps might be carrying out a documentary search or interviewing 
the complainant or a key witness. It goes without saying that it will be a 
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matter for the judgment of the Director of IHAT in any particular case how 
the test formulated by the DSP is applied.”132 
 
The approval of this test, which was described as ‘a positive move’ in the 
Calvert-Smith Report,133 was welcomed by Director of Service Prosecutions 
Andrew Cayley who stated that ‘it gave judicial backing to the elimination of the 
many hundreds of cases where there was really no prospect whatsoever of 
developing a case where you could charge an identifiable individual with a 
service offence’.134 
 
If it was the case that hundreds of allegations of misconduct by UK personnel 
could be eliminated through the use of this evidential test, it has to be asked 
why such a test was not adopted earlier. In Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2), the Court 
stated that the DSP should be ‘involved in making a decision at the outset of 
each case involving death referred to IHAT as to whether prosecution was a 
realistic prospect’.135 The Court also stated that the DSP should have a similar 
involvement in relation to cases of alleged ill-treatment.136 This statement was 
acknowledged by the Court in al-Saadoon, prior to endorsing the test, where it 
was stated that whilst there had increased involvement of the Service 
Prosecution Authority in the IHAT process, the involvement of the DSP and 
SPA in IHAT had not been what was previously anticipated by the High 
Court.137 Exactly why this is the case is unclear because Andrew Cayley stated 
that the involvement of the SPA in IHAT had benefits for IHAT’s case 
management process, not only in relation to cases where prosecutions could be 
brought but also in those where there was no such prospect.138 This should also 
have been a priority in light of the fact that the DSP acknowledged that, in some 
cases, the information provided by claimants varied as the investigative process 
went on.139 This is also the case since, as will be discussed in more detail 
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below, the circumstances which led to the High Court taking action in relation to 
witness statements involved IHAT using resources to examine allegations that 
didn’t necessarily allege any criminality. 
 
In relation to witness statements, the High Court in al-Saadoon stated that: 
 
“I consider that IHAT can as a general rule properly decline to 
investigate… an allegation unless it is supported by a witness statement 
which is (i) signed by the claimant, (ii) gives the claimant’s own 
recollection of the relevant events, (iii) identifies any other relevant 
witness known to the claimant and the gist of the evidence which the 
witness may be able to give, and (iv) explains what, if any, steps have 
been taken or attempts made since the incident to bring it to the attention 
of British authorities.”140 
 
The Court also explained that IHAT could still choose to investigate an 
allegation absent such a witness statement.141 This witness statement 
requirement was designed to remedy a situation raised by the Director of IHAT, 
Mark Warwick, in October 2015 that since August 2014 Public Interest Lawyers 
had been providing far less information to IHAT to support claims than had 
previously been the case: 
 
“Mr Warwick explained that the early claims forwarded to IHAT by PIL 
usually included letters of claim sent under the judicial review pre-action 
protocol and a first witness statement from the claimant. This information 
enabled investigators to identify the date and location of the alleged 
incident and relevant witnesses and to conduct searches for relevant 
military records. Since August 2014, however, the only information 
supplied when claims have been notified to IHAT has generally been the 
claim summary prepared for the purpose of adding the claim to the 
register. The summary typically contains much less information than was 
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previously provided, leading to a corresponding increase in the amount 
of work that IHAT has to do at the outset of the process. This in turn 
causes delay and adds significantly to the work involved in making 
preliminary assessments of allegations.”142 
 
The Deputy Director of IHAT, Commander Hawkins, in evidence to the Defence 
Sub-Committee, stated that ‘a lot of these allegations did not outline a criminal 
offence – they did not even mention a criminal offence – but they came to us for 
assessment.’143 The decrease in information made available to IHAT also came 
at a time when the IHAT caseload increased dramatically as Mark Warwick 
stated that 3000 allegations were referred to IHAT between July 2014 and 
September 2015.144  
 
Whilst it is not possible to know whether IHAT’s use of resources to overcome 
the lack of information provided to them by those presenting allegations of 
wrongdoing meant that investigations into credible allegations of misconduct in 
Iraq were fatally hampered, IHAT already had a difficult mandate to fulfil. It had 
to act in situations where there may be only limited evidence available;145 where 
a large amount of time had passed, the Calvert-Smith Report noted, at that 
point, the most recent allegations of unlawful killing took place almost a decade 
earlier;146 and investigations are, to use the words of Leggatt J, ‘a time-
consuming process’.147 It would surely have been better to address the issues 
posed by decreased levels of information earlier, especially since the High 
Court had already expressed concerns about delays in the IHAT process. The 
Designated Judge, Leggatt J, even stated during the time that IHAT was 
receiving a reduced level of information that: 
 
“It seems to me essential, given the large number of cases recently 
added to its caseload, that IHAT should continue to develop processes 
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for sifting cases so as to identify those involving the most serious 
allegations to which priority needs to be given and also to identify at as 
early a stage as possible those cases where there is no credible 
allegation that an unlawful killing or ill-treatment amounting to a serious 
criminal offence occurred, and which it is therefore not necessary for 
IHAT to investigate.”148 
 
Acting earlier may also have served to prevent the possibility that victims of 
alleged mistreatment were unable to present their allegations as Ferstman, 
Arajärvi and Hansen state one of the consequences of the closure of Public 
Interest Lawyers is that many of its clients were left without legal representation 
and would find it difficult to amend witness statements.149 The OTP ultimately 
found, however, that the IHAT process had not been subject to unjustifiable 
delays,150 and that the two tests adopted by the High Court ‘appear reasonable 
in the circumstances’.151 
 
4. Allegations of Cover-ups and MoD Attempts to Stop IHAT 
Investigations 
 
In November 2019, The Sunday Times and BBC Panorama jointly reported 
allegations that IHAT had found that members of the UK armed forces were 
responsible for the mischaracterisation of the circumstances surrounding the 
deaths of a number of detainees in Iraq, and that investigations conducted by 
IHAT were being shut down prematurely as a result of pressure from the 
MoD.152 
 
For example, the reporting states that when approached by IHAT, an alleged 
eyewitness to the killing of Raid al-Mosawi, which had been characterised as a 
death which occurred in self-defence, stated that they were not actually an 
 
148 ibid para 39 
149 Ferstman, Hansen and Arajärvi (n 83) 30 
150 Office of the Prosecutor (n 11) para 433 
151 ibid para 312 
152 Insight, ‘Revealed: the evidence of war crimes ministers tried to bury’ (The Sunday Times, 
17 November 2019) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/revealed-the-evidence-of-war-crimes-




eyewitness to the offence at all.153 Additionally, in relation to the death of Radhi 
Nama at Camp Stephen in May 2003, IHAT investigators found that Nama had 
suffered multiple injuries as a result of mistreatment and that ‘a letter arrived 
from a senior officer saying Nama had suffered a heart attack and suggesting 
the family check on him at the hospital. In fact, a soldier had taken his body to 
the morgue two days before.’154 Another death resulting from alleged 
mistreatment by British forces at Camp Stephen, that of Mousa Ali, occurred 
just a matter of days later.155 Former Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord 
Macdonald, said of allegations in relation to Camp Stephen that ‘the evidence 
suggests that many crimes witnessed there were not spontaneous, but 
sanctioned at senior levels’.156 In relation to IHAT inquiries, one IHAT 
investigator stated ‘Cases were being shut down against the wishes of senior 
investigating officers’,157 and another investigator stated that IHAT was ‘a failure 
of the British justice system’.158 
 
In the immediate aftermath of these allegations, the OTP stated that they 
‘appear on their face highly relevant to its assessment of the genuineness of 
national proceedings’.159 The Ministry of Defence denied the claims made by 
The Sunday Times and BBC Panorama with a spokesperson stating that 
‘throughout the process the decisions of prosecutors and the investigators have 
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In the House of Commons, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, 
Johnny Mercer, went further in the criticism of the reporting presented by The 
Sunday Times and BBC Panorama, stating that the basis of the allegations 
were inaccurate: 
 
“The Sunday Times and the BBC assert that the closure of IHAT was 
intended to ensure that alleged war crimes in Iraq went unpunished… 
Factually, they cite two cases in support of this wholly untenable position: 
the shooting of an off-duty Iraqi policeman and the deaths of Radhi 
Nama and Abdul Jabar Mousa Ali at Camp Stephen. In fact, both cases 
were taken over by SPLI when IHAT closed. SPLI’s investigations into 
both cases only finished in early 2019. This means that the information 
that forms the basis of comments by former IHAT investigators and by 
Lord MacDonald… was incomplete and at least two years out of date.”161 
 
It should however be noted that in their final report, the OTP stated that ‘It has 
been confirmed to the Office that Lord Macdonald had sight of the 
documentation which was used to support the referral to the SPA’.162 
 
The fact that these allegations exist at all should be concerning to any observer 
of the UK’s investigative efforts, and the OTP is right to assess whether the 
allegations have any impact on their preliminary examination.163 This is 
especially important since Article 17(1)(b) of the Rome Statute states that cases 
are inadmissible before the ICC if a State chooses genuinely not to bring a 
prosecution.164 In their final report, the OTP noted that the information they 
received from former IHAT personnel ‘corresponds to the reports made in the 
BBC Panorama programme and in the Sunday Times’,165 but concluded that 
they could not find sufficient evidence to justify a finding that allegations had 
been covered up,166 or closed as a result of political pressure.167 
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This Chapter has served to highlight a number of concerns with how the UK 
managed the process designed so that ‘investigations are carried out 
thoroughly and expeditiously, so that – one way or another – the truth behind 
them is established’ in relation to the extent to which IHAT was subject to 
political pressure, delays and allegations of cover ups.168 Additionally, it has 
also been shown that IHAT has been subject to challenges in relation to 
whether it was able to conduct independent investigations. The very fact that 
these concerns exist raises significant questions about the extent to which the 
UK has been committed to the idea of criminal accountability. The OTP has 
even gone as far as to state that ‘the UK government, and in particular the MoD 
have at best been reluctant, if not at times hostile, partners to pursuing claims of 
criminal responsibility against members of UK armed forces.’169 This is also a 
concern since, as referred to earlier, representatives of the UK government 
stated the importance of IHAT to the preliminary examination process. 
However, what is perhaps more alarming is that the OTP have identified several 
relating to the IHAT process, some of which have been discussed in this 
Chapter,170 but still determined that the approach taken by IHAT was not 
inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the principle of complementarity. 
This serves to raise significant questions about the future application of the 
principle of complementarity.
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Chapter Eight: The Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and 
Veterans) Bill 
 
This Chapter, which is the final chapter discussing how the United Kingdom has 
addressed allegations of misconduct in relation to the armed conflict in Iraq, will 
discuss the criminal law provisions found within Part 1 of the Overseas 
Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill. This Bill, in the government’s 
own words, seeks to: 
 
“introduce a presumption that once five years have elapsed from the date 
of an incident, it will be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that a 
service person or veteran should be prosecuted for alleged offences on 
operations outside the UK. The Bill will create a new ‘triple lock’ in order 
to give service personnel and veterans greater certainty, including 
obtaining the consent of the Attorney General before a prosecution can 
proceed.”1 
 
This Bill has been defended by government ministers with Defence Secretary 
Ben Wallace stating that it will ‘protect our veterans against repeated 
reinvestigations’,2 and Minister for Defence People and Veterans Johnny 
Mercer stated that it would ‘deal with the threat of prosecution for alleged 
historical offences many years after the event’.3 However, it has been the 
subject of criticism from across the political spectrum, including by a former 
Defence Secretary and Attorney General.4 The Bill has also been criticised by 
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numerous non-governmental organisations,5 senior military figures,6 and the 
former Director of Service Prosecutions Bruce Houlder stated that the notion of 
implementing the presumption against prosecution ‘is really outrageous’.7 
Additionally, the International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has 
expressed concern about the implementation of the Bill, arguing that ‘The effect 
of applying a statute of limitations to block further investigations and prosecution 
of crimes alleged committed by British service members in Iraq would be to 
render such cases admissible before the ICC’.8 
 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/sep/21/malcolm-rifkind-criticises-bill-restrict-
british-soldiers-tried-torture> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Joanna Cherry, ‘Joanna Cherry: 
Decriminalising torture does our soldiers a disservice’ (The Herald, 22 September 2020) 
<https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/18736205.joanna-cherry-decriminalising-torture-
soldiers-disservice/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Dan Jarvis, ‘The Overseas Operations Bill 
is damaging to both our troops and our international standing’ (The House, 23 September 2020) 
<https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/overseas-operations-bill-is-damaging-to-both-
our-troops-and-our-international-standing> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
5 See, for example, Amnesty International and Others, ‘Joint Response to UK government plans 
not to prosecute acts of torture after five years’ (REDRESS, 18 March 2020) 
<https://redress.org/news/joint-response-to-uk-government-plans-not-to-prosecute-acts-of-
torture-after-five-years/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Chris Esdaile, ‘Overseas Operations 
Bill: True Freedom Requires the Rule of Law and Justice’ (REDRESS, 17 June 2020) 
<https://redress.org/news/overseas-operations-bill-true-freedom-requires-the-rule-of-law-and-
justice/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Liberty, ‘Liberty: The Overseas Operations Bill is Bad 
News for Soldiers and Civilians Alike’ (Liberty, 23 September 2020) 
<https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-the-overseas-operations-bill-is-bad-news-
for-soldiers-and-civilians-alike/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Amnesty International UK, ‘UK: 
Military prosecutions bill will have a “devastating impact on reputation of armed forces”’ 
(Amnesty International UK, 18 March 2020) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-
military-prosecutions-bill-will-have-devastating-impact-reputation-armed-forces> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021); Centre for Military Justice, ‘Don’t believe the hype. Service Personnel must be 
bound by – and protected by – the Human Rights Act’ (Centre for Military Justice, 18 March 
2020) <https://centreformilitaryjustice.org.uk/dont-believe-the-hype-service-personnel-must-be-
bound-by-and-protected-by-the-human-rights-act/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
6 Charles Guthrie, ‘Don’t give wriggle room to torturers’ in Letters to the Editor, ‘Letters to the 
Editor: EU double standard on trade deal talks’ (The Sunday Times, 7 June 2020) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/letters-to-the-editor-eu-double-standard-on-trade-deal-talks-
b3p2tkgq6> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Freedom from Torture, ‘Senior military officials write 
to the Prime Minister’ (Freedom from Torture, 18 September 2020) 
<https://www.freedomfromtorture.org/news/senior-military-officials-write-to-the-prime-minister> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021); Nicholas Mercer, ‘The UK government is attempting to bend the 
rules on torture’ (The Guardian, 20 September 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/20/overseas-operations-bill-uk-
government-bend-rules-torture-soldiers> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
7 Helen Warrell, ‘Former army chiefs attack UK move to limit torture prosecutions’ (Financial 
Times, 22 September 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/e68a174d-30c7-49af-be40-
b6244f1fcbaf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
8 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (International Criminal Court, 9 
December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 479. The OTP had previously stated that if 
enacted, ‘the Office would need to consider its potential impact on the ability of the UK 
authorities to investigate and/or prosecute crimes allegedly committed by members of the British 
armed forces in Iraq’: Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 





This Bill is likely to have, at most, a limited impact on the prosecution of alleged 
offences taking place in Iraq, since only 74 allegations were the subject of 
investigations as a part of the Service Personnel Legacy Investigation (SPLI) 
process as of 30 June 2020,9 and the Bill only applies to prosecution decisions 
made after the Bill enters into law.10 However, it is clear that the Bill would still, 
in theory, apply to allegations of misconduct in Iraq. Bill Minister Johnny Mercer 
stated the following in this respect: 
 
“The statutory presumption… will only apply to proceedings that start 
after the Bill has become law. Although alleged criminal offences relating 
to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred more than five years ago, 
meaning that the presumption could be applied in any relevant 
prosecutorial decisions, it is likely that any remaining investigations of 
those allegations will be complete before the Bill becomes law. If any 
new credible allegations relating to Iraq and Afghanistan should arise, 
however, they will obviously be subject to investigation and, where 
appropriate, consideration by a prosecutor. Any decision to prosecute 
such a case after the Bill has become law must, in accordance with the 
presumption, be exceptional.”11 
 
It is also clear that the experience of allegations raised in the context of the 
conflict in Iraq have influenced the government’s decision to introduce the Bill. 
 
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), para 174. 
These comments were made in relation to a consultation process launched by the UK 
government in July 2019 which included a proposal for a year presumption against prosecution 
after 10 years, rather than after 5 years: Ministry of Defence, ‘Legal Protections for Armed 
Forces Personnel and Veterans serving in operations outside the United Kingdom’ (Ministry of 
Defence, 22 July 2019) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/919822/20190718-MOD_consultation_document-FINAL.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 
9 
9 Service Police Legacy Investigations, ‘SPLI – Quarterly Update – 1 April 2020 to 30 June 
2020’ (Service Police Legacy Investigations, 1 July 2020) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/909154/20200708-SPLI_QTR_RPT-1APR20-30JUN20-FINAL.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021). SPLI’s caseload of 74 allegations outstanding constitutes a significant reduction 
compared to the 1280 allegations that the SPLI has received. 
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When announcing the launch of the consultation preceding the Bill, then 
Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt stated that the government ‘wants not to 
repeat the type of situation that has evolved under the Iraq Historical Allegations 
Team’,12 and that the IHAT process ‘was hijacked by unscrupulous lawyers’ 
before going on to refer to the impact of Phil Shiner and Public Interest 
Lawyers.13 Additionally, in the context of the Bill’s Second Reading Debate in 
the House of Commons, Mallory states that ‘the central villain was clear – Phil 
Shiner and the, now disbanded, Public Interest Lawyers’,14 though Mallory also 
notes that ‘looking beyond the activities of this one firm, there was a clear 
narrative advanced that all members of the legal profession who pursued claims 
against the military or state were equally disgraced.’15 
 
The purpose of this Chapter will therefore to be to discuss whether this Bill 
indicates whether the UK is willing to conduct investigations or prosecutions for 
offences, such as those which allegedly took place in Iraq, where they occurred 
in the context of overseas operations more than five years ago. This will be 
done by examining the clauses contained within Part 1 of the Overseas 
Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill in turn. 
 
1. The Presumption against Prosecution: Clauses 1 to 4 
 
Under Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill, it is stated that a prosecution shall only be 
launched, or continued, in relation to crimes committed by members of the 
armed forces in the context of an overseas operation more than five years ago 
in exceptional circumstances.16 
 
12 Penny Mordaunt, ‘Legal Protections and Support for Armed Forces Personnel and Veterans’ 
(UK Parliament, 21 May 2019) <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-
statements/detail/2019-05-21/HCWS1575> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
13 ibid 
14 Conall Mallory, ‘Folk Heroes, Villains and the Overseas Operations Bill’ (UK Human Rights 
Blog, 12 October 2020) <https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2020/10/12/folk-heroes-villains-and-
the-overseas-operations-bill-conall-mallory/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
15 ibid 
16 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (n 10) cls 1-2. The Bill states in 
clause 1(6), ‘In this Part “overseas operations” means any operation outside the British Islands, 
including peacekeeping operations and operations for dealing with terrorism, civil unrest or 
serious public disorder, in the course of which members of Her Majesty’s forces come under 





When reaching this decision, under Clause 3 of the Bill, prosecutors will be 
required to consider two factors ‘so far as they tend to reduce the person’s 
culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution’.17 The first of these factors is: 
 
“the adverse effect (or likely adverse effect) on the person of the 
conditions the person was exposed to during deployment… including 
their experiences and responsibilities (for example, being exposed to 
unexpected or continuous threats, being in command of others who were 
so exposed, or being deployed alongside others who were killed or 
severely wounded in action”18 
 
When weighing up this factor, the prosecutor is also required to ‘have regard to 
the exceptional demands and stresses to which members of Her Majesty’s 
forces are likely to be subject while deployed on overseas operations, 
regardless of their length of service, rank or personal resilience.’19 The second 
requirement which must be considered is the ‘public interest in finality’ which 
applies ‘where there has been a relevant previous investigation and no 
compelling new evidence has become available’.20 
 
The inclusion of a presumption against prosecution after five years within the 
Bill has been the subject of criticism on the basis that it amounts to an effective 
statute of limitations for crimes that took place more than five years ago. For 
example, the Equality and Human Rights Commission in a briefing ahead of the 
Bill’s Second Reading in the House of Commons stated that ‘the proposed 
‘presumption against prosecution’ amounts to a statute of limitations’.21 The Law 
Society stated that the presumption constitutes ‘a quasi-statute of limitations 
 
17 Ibid cl 3(1) 
18 Ibid cl 3(2)(a). The term ‘adverse effect’ is defined in cl 3(4). 
19 Ibid cl 3(3) 
20 Ibid cl 3(2)(b) 
21 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Briefing: Overseas Operations (Service Personnel 
and Veterans) Bill House of Commons, Second Reading’ (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, September 2020) 
<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/parliamentary-briefing-overseas-
operations-bill-house-of-commons-second-reading-september-2020_0.docx> (Last accessed 15 




and would likely lead to some meritorious prosecutions not being brought’.22 A 
group of United Nations human rights experts also stated that: 
 
“By introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution and statutes 
of limitations, this bill undermines the absolute and non-derogable nature 
of the prohibition of torture and violates human rights law, as well as 
international criminal and human rights law.”23 
 
A discussion of the Bill’s compatibility with international law will be conducted in 
the final section of this Chapter examining the offences which the presumption 
against prosecution will apply to. 
 
The government has defended the Bill from these accusations, with Defence 
Secretary Ben Wallace arguing that: 
 
“The Bill is about doing the right thing by our troops. Our soldiers and 
values must uphold the highest international standards. The Bill is not an 
amnesty, a statute of limitation or the decriminalisation of erroneous acts. 
We will continue to protect the independence of our prosecutors and our 
service police, and we will investigate, and if necessary, prosecute 
service personnel who break the law. But what we will not accept is the 
vexatious hounding of veterans and our armed forces by ambulance-
chasing lawyers motivated not by the search for justice, but by their own 
crude financial enrichment.”24 
 
 
22 Law Society, ‘Parliamentary briefing Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) 
Bill – House of Commons second reading’ (Law Society, 23 September 2020) 
<https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/human-rights/parliamentary-briefing-overseas-operations-
bill-house-of-commons-second-reading> (Last accessed 20 March 2021) 
23 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UK Parliament must not introduce 
impunity for war crimes, say UN experts’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 
October 2020) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26342&LangID=E> 
(Last accessed 15 May 2021) 




Additionally, Johnny Mercer has stated that ‘there is no time bar on any of the 
offences in the Bill’,25 and that ‘in the circumstances where our service 
personnel fall short of the high standards of personal behaviour and conduct 
that is expected of them, it is vital they are held to account.’26 
 
However, it is unclear what the precise basis for introducing a presumption 
against prosecutions for service personnel and veterans is. Wallace states that 
‘this presumption against prosecution legislation is a solution in search of a 
problem’ because there have been very few prosecutions in relation to the 
offences which would be subject to the presumption against prosecution even in 
circumstances where there is evidence of criminality.27 This is brought further 
into focus by the fact that in evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Johnny Mercer was unable to name a single example of a vexatious 
prosecution has been brought,28 and the government stated in the Bill’s impact 
assessment that ‘it is not possible to estimate how many potential future 
prosecutions will not proceed as a result of the statutory presumption against 
prosecution measure’.29 Additionally, in evidence to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, Damian Parmenter, the Director of the Defence and Security 
Industrial Strategy at the Ministry of Defence, noted that there have only been 
27 prosecutions brought against service personnel for ‘an offence committed 
against a local national in Afghanistan or Iraq’ and that they were all brought 
within 26 months of the alleged offence taking place.30 
 
 
25 ibid col 1050 
26 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 October 2020 col 183 
27 Stuart Wallace, ‘Written evidence from Dr Stuart Wallace (OOB0009)’ (Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 8 September 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11248/pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 
para 3 
28 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Oral evidence: The Overseas Operations Service 
Personnel and Veterans) Bill, HC 665’ (Houses of Parliament, 5 October 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/985/pdf/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), Q16 
29 Ministry of Defence, ‘Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill: Impact 
Assessment’ (Ministry of Defence, 25 August 2020) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/918954/Impact-assessment-OO_SPV__Bill-_Final__002_.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021), 8 
30 Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 28) Q16. See also, Ministry of Defence, ‘Letter, dated 3 
November 2020, to Roseanne Burke, CEASEFIRE’, available at <https://www.ceasefire.org/wp-




On this basis, it is difficult to disagree with Wallace’s notion that the Bill is 
addressing a problem that doesn’t need to be solved.31 This is further 
emphasised by the OTP in their Final Report on the UK Preliminary 
Examination as they stated that ‘the impact of SDT’s findings against Phil 
Shiner/PIL in justifying the need to introduce legislation aimed at curbing the 
phenomena of vexatious litigation has been considerably exaggerated.’32 
 
A number of commentators have also criticised the UK government for not 
focusing on the issues caused by a lack of contemporaneous investigations 
conducted in relation to the alleged criminality of members of the UK armed 
forces. For example, the Centre for Military Justice state that ‘the Bill is 
completely silent’ on the issue of preventing repeated investigations.33 
Goodwin-Hudson argued that the Bill ‘does not address the root cause of the 
problem, namely that the MOD does not appear to prioritise, nor have the 
mechanisms in place, to conduct timely, independent or effective investigations 
into allegations of civilian harm’.34 Liberty additionally highlight that the failure of 
the UK to conduct timely investigations is what causes the major discrepancies 
between when an offence was committed and when any prosecution takes 
place,35 and that: 
 
“most repeat investigations or delayed prosecutions in recent years have 
been the direct result of failures by the MoD itself. Rather than put 
forward proposals which tackle the real reason behind any repeat 
investigations or delayed prosecutions, this Bill instead proposes 
 
31 Wallace (n 27) para 3 
32 OTP Final Report (n 8) para 474 
33 Centre for Military Justice, ‘Written evidence from the Centre for Military Justice (OOB0017)’ 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 11 September 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11552/pdf> (Last accessed 20 March 2021), 
para 8. For a discussion of the issue of investigations see paras 1-8. 
34 Mark Goodwin-Hudson, ‘Written evidence from Mark Goodwin-Hudson (OOB022)’ (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, 11 September 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11592/pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 
para 2 
35 Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ Inquiry into the 
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill’ (Liberty, September 2020) 
<https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/LIBERTY-SUBMISSION-
JCHR-INQUIRY-INTO-THE-OVERSEAS-OPERATIONS-BILL-SEPTEMBER-2020.pdf> (Last 




unprecedented and dangerous legal protections which will create a legal 
regime that mandates impunity for serious offences and inequality before 
the law for victims of abuse and Armed Forces personnel.”36 
 
The former Judge Advocate General, Jeff Blackett, also questions the Bill’s 
focus on prosecutions and its ability to fulfil its stated aim of preventing repeat 
investigations: 
 
“The Bill is effectively looking at the wrong end of the telescope. It is 
looking at the prosecution end, and you have got to remember that you 
do not prosecute until you investigate – and you have got to investigate. 
This will not stop people being investigated and it will not stop people 
being re-investigated and investigated again. Lots of investigations do 
not go anywhere, but the people who are investigated do not see that.”37 
 
The Bill’s lack of focus on the investigatory process has also been noted by 
several MPs during the Bill’s progress through the House of Commons.38 
 
However, it has been noted by a critic of the Bill, Clive Baldwin, the Senior 
Legal Advisor at Human Rights Watch that reform to the investigation process 
‘would be better done in a wholescale reform of the military criminal justice 
system’.39 The government has acknowledged that the issue of investigations 
does need to be improved, and on 13 October 2020, Defence Secretary Ben 
Wallace stated that ‘there should be timely consideration of serious and credible 
allegations and, where appropriate, a swift and effective investigation followed 
 
36 ibid para 12 
37 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 8 October 2020 col 120 
38 See, for example, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Julian Lewis, at HC 
Deb 23 September 2020 vol 680 cols 987-88; Lloyd Russell-Moyle at cols 993-94; Stewart 
Malcolm McDonald at col 1001; Dan Jarvis at col 1009; and Gavin Robinson at col 1022 
39 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 6 October 2020 col 72. 
Baldwin had previously stated that ‘if passed, the bill would greatly increase the risk that British 
soldiers who commit serious crimes will avoid justice’: Clive Baldwin, ‘UK Bill a License for 
Military Crimes?’ (Human Rights Watch, 20 March 2020) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/20/uk-bill-license-military-crimes> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021). Additionally, the Director of Liberty, Martha Spurrier, stated that even if the Bill were to 
include a focus on investigations, this would not fix the flaws of the bill: Overseas Operations 




by prosecution, if warranted’.40 To this end, Wallace announced a review into 
how military justice investigations are conducted.41 
 
The question, however, is why the government chose to attempt to implement a 
presumption against prosecution when it is not clear that there have been any 
vexatious prosecutions, and that where prosecutions have taken place they 
have taken place well ahead of the five year period after which the presumption 
against prosecution would come into force, and which does not necessarily 
affect the investigation process – Mercer acknowledged that ‘the presumption 
will not directly impact on investigations’.42 It seems difficult to explain that the 
presumption against prosecution does not amount to an unwillingness to 
prosecute if the Bill does not fulfil its aims of preventing a cycle of 
reinvestigation or stopping vexatious prosecutions. If it is the case that the 
government is unwilling to conduct prosecutions, it appears likely that the 
following assessment of the Bill by Judge Blackett is correct: 
 
“What this Bill does is exactly the opposite of what it is trying to do. What 
it is trying to do is to stop ambulance-chasing solicitors and vexatious 
and unmeritorious claims… What it actually does is increase the risk of 
service personnel appearing before the International Criminal Court.”43 
 
In their 2019 Preliminary Examination Report, published more than three 
months before the publication of the Overseas Operations Bill, the OTP stated 
that they would have to consider the impact of the implementation of a 
presumption against prosecution as a part of their complementarity 
assessment.44 It is questionable therefore why the government would seek to 
introduce any legislation that could be perceived to limit the potential for 
investigations or prosecutions especially when, as discussed in the previous 
chapter’s discussion of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, the government has 
already been subject to allegations of political interference in the criminal 
 
40 HC Deb 13 October 2020 vol 682 col 9WS 
41 ibid 
42 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 October 2020 col 193 
43 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 8 October 2020 cols 117-18 




investigation process. The question applies equally as to why the UK 
government are proceeding with the Bill when the OTP stated in their final 
report, closing the preliminary examination into the UK, that the application of 
the presumption against prosecution may result in the UK being found not to 
have complied with the principle of complementarity.45 
 
This is an additional problem when it is considered that the government has not 
provided what could be considered a robust explanation of why the presumption 
against prosecution is applicable five years after the offence took place. The 
government, in their initial consultation, proposed that the presumption against 
prosecution would come into effect after ten years.46 However, as noted 
elsewhere, the Bill was published without an explanation of why the 
presumption would now apply after only five years has passed.47 In their 
response to the initial consultation, published six months after the Bill was 
unveiled, the government stated the following: 
 
“As the issue we are seeking to address relates to historical alleged 
offences, we did not feel able to apply the presumption without a 
timeframe; but given the strength of the views expressed, we felt that a 
time frame of less than ten years would be more appropriate. The 
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Similar explanations were also provided during the Bill’s Committee Stage 
proceedings in the House of Commons,49 and in a letter to the Chair of the 
House of Commons Defence Select Committee.50 
 
This explanation seems to indicate that there is no definitive reason why the 
presumption against prosecution has been set at five years. This is especially 
concerning because one of the prosecuting authorities expected to apply the 
presumption against prosecution, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (who 
the government stated had been consulted on the contents of the Bill)51 
expressed concern about the presumption and its impact on justice in their 
evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights: 
 
“The statutory time limitation is inconsistent with the practice of the CPS 
which is to prosecute non-recent cases if they pass the Full Code Test 
(FCT) in The Code for Crown Prosecutors and do not amount to an 
abuse of the court’s process. We note that the time limitation has been 
reduced from 10 years in the consultation document to 5 years in the Bill. 
The shorter time period will increase the risk that victims of serious 
offences may be denied justice.”52 
 
The CPS also note that a failure to launch a prosecution based on the 
application of the presumption against prosecution may lead to the risk of ICC 
intervention.53 This again raises questions about exactly what the government’s 
intention when introducing the Overseas Operations Bill was since one of the 
authorities expected to apply the presumption has stated their opposition to it. 
 
49 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 October 2020 col 150 
50 Johnny Mercer, ‘Letter, dated 18 September, from the Minister for Defence People and 
Veterans, in relation to vexatious claims against veterans and the Overseas Operations Bill’ 
(House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 18 September 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2676/documents/26551/default/> (Last accessed 
15 May 2021) 
51 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 October 2020 col 190 
52 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Written evidence from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
(OOB0032)’ (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 11 September 2020) 





This again makes it difficult to accept the notion that the Bill does not act as a 
barrier to prosecutions. 
 
The final aspect to be discussed in this section is the requirement that in order 
to rebut the presumption against prosecution in relation to offences allegedly 
committed by armed services personnel, exceptional circumstances must exist. 
Exactly when these requirements will be met is not defined in the Bill. The 
Ministry of Defence stated that: 
 
 “We decided against defining the term “exceptional” in order to 
safeguard prosecutorial independence and also because it would be very 
difficult to set out all the circumstances in which an alleged offence could 
be considered “exceptional”. However, we are confident that prosecutors 
will recognise the high bar it introduces and that they will be able to 
effectively and accurately apply it to their decision making.”54 
 
This is a matter which has raised concern with the CPS who state that ‘the 
rebuttable presumption against prosecution may be inconsistent with the public 
interest stage of the FCT... The risk is that the presumption may fetter 
prosecutorial discretion.’55 Additionally, the fact that the exceptional 
circumstances requirement will also apply to crimes including torture and war 
crimes,56 has led critics of the Bill to state that the Bill makes it increasingly 
difficult to prosecute such crimes.57 
 
54 Ministry of Defence Consultation Response (n 48) 14 
55 Crown Prosecution Service (n 52) 1 
56 Johnny Mercer stated during the Bill’s Committee Stage that ‘On a case-by-case basis, a 
prosecutor can determine that a case against an individual in relation to war crimes, torture or 
genocide is “exceptional” and that a prosecution is therefore appropriate, subject to the approval 
of the Attorney General’: Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 
October 2020 col 206. See also, Johnny Mercer ‘We must not let our veterans down – the 
Overseas Operations Bill will stop the endless cycle of investigations’ (The Telegraph, 20 
September 2020) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/09/20/must-not-let-veterans-the-
overseas-operations-bill-will-stop/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
57 See, for example, Jarvis (n 4) and (n 38); Cherry (n 4); Guthrie (n 6); Sam Johnstone Hawke, 
‘How the UK government could effectively decriminalise torture in 3 easy steps’ (Reprieve, 11 
September 2020) <https://reprieve.org/uk/2020/09/11/how-the-uk-government-could-effectively-
decriminalise-torture-in-3-easy-steps/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Conor Gearty, ‘The 
Overseas Operations Bill: a licence for atrocity’ (Prospect Magazine, 25 September 2020) 
<https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/overseas-operations-bill-armed-forces-military-
human-rights-law-labour-party> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); and Juan E Mendez and Others, 





This is an issue which is further complicated by the potential for clauses 2 and 3 
of the Bill to combine to prevent a prosecution from taking place. As Johnny 
Mercer stated when leading the Bill through its Committee Stage proceedings: 
 
“The prosecutor must consider the presumption against prosecution 
under clause 2 to determine whether a case meets the exceptional 
threshold. The prosecutor, as required by clause 3, must also give 
particular weight to matters that may, in effect, tip the balance in favour 
of not prosecuting. Clause 3 is therefore integral to supporting the high 
threshold set in clause 2 for a prosecutor to make a decision to 
prosecute.”58 
 
This is problematic since Quenivet highlights that the requirement that the 
factors listed in clause 3 of the Bill which have to be considered by prosecutors 
‘so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against 
prosecution’,59 runs contrary to the provisions of international criminal law in that 
they do not serve to provide soldiers with a justification for committing offences, 
with the reality being that adverse effects on soldiers only serve as possible 
mitigation during sentencing.60 Additionally, it is highlighted that where offences 
were committed as a result of the circumstances of conflict, this would be an 
aggravating factor at sentencing.61 
 
Furthermore, the government appear to accept that the factors listed within 
Clause 3 of the Bill are already considered by prosecutors.62 However, Mercer 
states that enshrining the consideration of these factors in law serves to 
 
Rights & Humanitarian Law (OOB0029)’ (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 11 September 
2020) <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11637/pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 
2021), para 10. 
58 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 14 October col 204 
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reassure members of the armed forces that the context of armed conflicts will 
be taken into account by prosecutors.63 
 
Judge Blackett states that ‘Clause 3 is engaged after five years. It seems 
bizarre to me that in deciding to prosecute, you have a post-five-year test, but 
not a pre-five-year test.’64 The fact that there is no requirement for prosecutors 
to consider the factors listed in Clause 3 before five years have passed makes it 
difficult to understand how the Bill cannot be seen to restrict prosecutorial 
independence to at least some degree, something which the government stated 
they were trying to avoid when enacting Clause 2, since they are requiring 
prosecutors to consider specific factors when making decisions about whether 
to initiate a prosecution or not. This may give pause for concern, as it could lead 
to the OTP deciding to launch an investigation if prosecutorial decisions could 
be interpreted as ‘shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for 
crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court’,65 a factor for determining 
unwillingness under Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute. The OTP have even 
stated that the impact of the Bill could lead to the Preliminary Examination into 
the UK being reopened.66 
 
2. Clause 5: Consent to Prosecute 
 
Under Clause 5 of the Bill, the consent of the Attorney General is required in 
order to prosecute a crime to which the presumption against prosecution 
applies.67 This has been subject to criticism on the basis that since the Attorney 
General is a member of the government, there is the potential for prosecutorial 
decisions to be subject to political considerations.68 Whether the requirement of 
consent does actually subject prosecutorial decisions to such considerations is 
unclear however, since as has been pointed out elsewhere, the consent of the 
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Attorney General is required in order to prosecute a number of offences 
including those under the International Criminal Court Act 2001, Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957 and torture as defined in the Criminal Justice Act 1988.69 
Additionally, it is stated in the Framework agreement between the Law Officers 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions that ‘when taking a decision whether to 
consent to a prosecution, the Attorney General acts quasi-judicially and 
independent of government applying well established prosecution principles of 
evidential sufficiency and public interest.’70 On this basis, it appears unlikely that 
the requirement of Attorney General consent would prevent the prosecution of 
criminal offences. 
 
3. Clause 6 and Schedule 1: The Crimes Included/Excluded from the 
Presumption against Prosecution 
 
As stated in clause 6 of the Overseas Operations Bill, all offences under UK law 
are included in the presumption against prosecution, with the exception of those 
offences included within Schedule 1 of the Bill.71 In the version of Schedule 1, 
as originally introduced, the only crimes subject to this exclusion from the 
presumption against prosecution are sexual offences.72 There is no specific 
exclusion for the full range of international crimes listed within the Rome 
Statute, with Bill Minister Johnny Mercer stating in a letter to the Chair of the 
House of Commons Defence Select Committee Chair Tobias Ellwood that the 
government ‘do not believe that such an exclusion to the Bill is necessary. The 
 
69 Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Deb 8 October 2020 col 125. See 
also, Elizabeth Wilmshurst: Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Oral evidence: The Overseas 
Operations Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, HC 665’ (Houses of Parliament, 28 
September 2020) <https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/949/pdf/> (Last accessed 15 
May 2021), Q7. For the relevant provisions of the Acts referred to, see: International Criminal 
Court Act 2001, s. 53(3); Geneva Conventions Act 1957, s. 1A(3); Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 
135. 
70 Attorney General’s Office and Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Framework agreement between 
the Law Officers and the Director of Public Prosecutions’ (13 March 2019), para 50. 
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72 ibid Schedule 1. Clause 6(6) of the Bill allows the list of offences included within Schedule 1 
to be changed through statutory instruments, which Stubbins Bates argues is ‘concerning for 
Parliamentary sovereignty and scrutiny, as it suggests that whatever the Parliamentary debate 
on amendments to Schedule 1, the executive can add and remove offences from the list at will.’: 
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measures contained in the Bill do not amount to an unwillingness or inability to 
investigate or prosecute’.73 
 
During the Bill’s Committee Stage, Mercer provided a further explanation as to 
why sexual offences are excluded from the presumption against prosecution but 
offences such as war crimes, torture and murder were not: 
 
“In the discharge of your military duties, you can expect to be accused of 
assault, unlawful killing, murder and torture when using violence. There 
is no scenario in which our people will be asked to operate in which they 
can legitimately commit sexual offences. This country has a strong 
commitment against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and 
that is why it is in the Bill.”74 
 
Similar sentiments were also expressed by the Defence Secretary during the 
Bill’s Second Reading debate.75 The position taken by the government in failing 
to exclude non-sexual offences from the presumption against prosecution does 
not appear to make sense if the assertion of Nicholas Mercer, the former 1 (UK) 
Division Legal Advisor in Iraq, that ‘torture was originally included in the same 
category as sexual offences’ is accurate.76 It is difficult to see how an offence 
could be interpreted as worthy of inclusion within the Bill in the early stages of 
drafting but then only prosecutable under exceptional circumstances by the time 
the Bill was formally laid before Parliament. This serves to raise further 
questions about the government’s justification of the Bill. 
 
Additionally, the Bill as currently written may serve to undermine the UK’s 
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“Schedule 1’s selectivity undermines the enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. In keeping only one category of war crimes outside the 
Bill’s scope, the drafters fail to acknowledge that international 
humanitarian law foresees no time limit on the obligation to prosecute or 
extradite those suspected of grave breaches of the Four Geneva 
Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol I.”77 
 
Additionally, it is recognised that under customary international humanitarian 
law, States are under an obligation to conduct prosecutions for war crimes in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts,78 and that statutes of 
limitations are not applicable in relation to such offences.79 Whilst the 
presumption against prosecution contained within the Overseas Operations Bill 
has yet to be formally classified as a statute of limitations by a competent 
tribunal, it is worth noting the commentary to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross customary international humanitarian law database states that: 
 
“The recent trend to pursue war crimes more vigorously in national and 
international criminal courts and tribunals, as well as the growing body of 
legislation giving jurisdiction over war crimes without time-limits, has 
hardened the existing treaty rules prohibiting statutes of limitation for war 
crimes into customary law. In addition, the operation of statutory 
limitations could prevent the investigation of war crimes and the 
prosecution of the suspects and would constitute a violation of the 
obligation to do so”80 
 
Michael Clarke, the former Director General of the Royal United Services 
Institute, has stated that the perception that the UK could be perceived to have 
enacted a statute of limitations would be a matter of concern for military leaders 
 
77 Bates (n 72) 
78 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes’ 
(International Humanitarian Law Database) <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
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as this could result in armed forces personnel being prosecuted for crimes by 
the ICC or on the basis of universal jurisdiction.81 This leads to further questions 
regarding why the UK would run the risk of being seen to be in breach of its 
international obligations by seeking to enact legislation designed to protect the 
military that the military themselves do not necessarily support. 
 
It is additionally clear that it is not just in the area of international humanitarian 
law that the United Kingdom may run the risk of being seen to be in violation of 
its international obligations, as the European Court of Human Rights has 
consistently noted that amnesties and statutes of limitations cannot act to 
prevent prosecutions for violations of the right to life under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights or the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman treatment under Article 3 of the European Court of Human Rights.82 
Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee in their General Comment Number 
36 on the right to life under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights state that: 
 
“Immunities and amnesties provided to perpetrators of intentional killings 
and to their superiors, and comparable measures leading to de facto or 
de jure impunity, are, as a rule, incompatible with the duty to respect and 
ensure the right to life, and to provide victims with an effective remedy.”83 
 
The United Nations Committee against Torture in their General Comment 
Number 2 also state that: 
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“Article 2, paragraph 2, provides that the prohibition against torture is 
absolute and non-derogable. It emphasizes that no exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State Party to justify 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction… The Committee is 
deeply concerned at and rejects absolutely any efforts by States to justify 
torture and ill-treatment as a means to protect public safety… The 
Committee considers that amnesties or other impediments which 
preclude or indicate unwillingness to provide prompt and fair prosecution 
and punishment of perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment violate the 
principle of non-derogability.”84 
 
The Committee has also expressed these sentiments in respect of the right to 
redress for victims of torture under Article 14 of the Torture Convention.85 
 
That the Bill may serve to violate the UK’s obligations under international law 
can also be demonstrated by recent communications from officials within the 
United Nations. For example, in a letter sent by the Torture Committee in 
September 2020, it is stated: 
 
“With regard to the Committee’s recommendation to refrain from enacting 
legislation that would amnesty or pardon troops who could have been 
implicated in mistreatment, the Committee is seriously concerned at 
reports indicating that the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and 
Veterans) Bill… would be akin to a statute of limitations and risks 
creating impunity for torture and other serious offences.”86 
 
 
84 United Nations Committee against Torture, ‘General Comment No.2: Implementation of 
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Additionally, as has already been referred to, a group of UN experts in October 
2020 stated that the Overseas Operations Bill ‘undermines the absolute and 
non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture and violates human rights law, 
as well as international criminal and human rights law’.87 
 
As well as potentially being seen to represent a violation of international law, the 
presumption against prosecution may also serve to create a situation where the 
application of criminal law is seen to be selective. One critique of the Bill, 
presented by the former Attorney General Dominic Grieve, is that in situations 
where an allegation involves both sexual and non-sexual offences, it may be the 
case that because of the presumption against prosecution, a prosecution may 
only be pursued in relation to the sexual offence allegations.88 This creates 
another potential difficulty for the UK in attempting to demonstrate to the ICC 
that they have complied with the principle of complementarity, as the OTP’s 
Preliminary Examination focused on both sexual and non-sexual offences.89 It 
may be the case that the OTP decides to launch an investigation into UK 
personnel if the presumption against prosecution is seen to limit prosecutions 
for non-sexual offences, and therefore results in the UK not conducting 
prosecutions for the same conduct as the ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Lubanga did state that ‘it is a conditio sine qua non for a case arising from the 
investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case 
before the court’.90 
 
It is unclear why the UK government decided that it was worth running the risk 
of breaching its obligations under international law by seeking to enact a 
presumption against prosecution which, based on past prosecutorial practice, 
will only have a limited impact. It is also difficult to envisage how the Bill serves 
to protect service personnel since the OTP have stated that it could lead to the 
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Preliminary Examination into the UK being reopened.91 The OTP have also 
referred to the Bill as creating a ‘statute of limitations’,92 and stated that the 
impact of the Bill means that it ‘could effectively provide an amnesty to current 
and former service personnel for allegations arising from Iraq’.93 The Office of 





This Chapter has discussed the contents of Part 1 of the Overseas Operations 
(Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill in order to explore whether it signals that 
the UK is willing to conduct investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 
offences under examination by the ICC. Whilst the Bill may only impact a small 
number of prosecutorial decisions in relation to Iraq, it is far from certain that the 
Bill does indicate that the UK is willing to conduct prosecutions in relation to the 
conflict. This is because the presumption against prosecution means that, apart 
from sexual offences, prosecutions could only occur in exceptional 
circumstances. The OTP will have to decide whether the Bill, once enacted, 
indicates that the UK is unwilling to conduct prosecutions into alleged war 
crimes. 
 
This decision is one that will no doubt be complicated by the seeming difficulty 
in explaining what the purpose of the Bill is. As has previously been stated, the 
government stated that one of the objectives of the Bill was to bring to an end to 
the notion that service personnel will be subjected to multiple investigations in 
relation to the same allegations.95 However, the Bill Minister conceded that ‘the 
presumption will not directly impact on investigations’.96 Furthermore, the 
government stated that ‘we have never suggested that service personnel or 
veterans have been subject to unfair trials’,97 but at the same time advocated for 
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a rebuttable presumption against prosecution where ‘the threshold for rebutting 
that presumption will be high’.98 It is therefore justifiable for the OTP to question 
whether the Bill signals a reluctance to prosecute alleged war crimes on the part 
of the UK. 
 
Additionally, there does not appear to be a convincing explanation as to why 
there is a need for either a presumption against prosecution to apply five years 
after an alleged offence takes place, or for why only sexual offences are 
excluded from the presumption against prosecution. Whilst neither of these 
factors necessarily mean that the UK is unwilling to conduct investigations and 
prosecutions into allegations of serious crimes, they are particularly noteworthy, 
since as discussed in the context of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, the UK 
government has faced allegations that investigations have been subject to 
political interference. It would therefore be expected that the UK may have to 
answer questions about the Bill, especially when, as referred to previously, they 
have cited the IHAT experience as a reason for pursuing the Bill. 
 
Whether or not the Bill ultimately impacts the OTP’s assessment of UK 
compliance with the principle of complementarity, the Bill has impacted the UK’s 
reputation internationally. For example, in their report on the Bill, the Joint 
Committee of Human Rights stated that the Bill may have an impact on future 
military operations,99 and that: 
 
“We regret the impact that the introduction of the Bill has already had on 
the reputation of the Armed Forces and of the UK internationally. We 
would further call on the Government to consider very carefully the 
message that it sends to troops about accountability and compliance with 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”100
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The purpose of this thesis has been to explore and critique the extent to which 
States faced with allegations that their personnel are responsible for war crimes 
comply with the principle of complementarity found within Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.1 In order to achieve this aim, this thesis has discussed the situation in 
two States where the International Criminal Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) has scrutinised allegations of war crimes – the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America.2 This has involved the discussion of criminal law 
relevant to the offences under scrutiny by the OTP within both states and the 
investigative processes deployed by both States. This conclusion will 
summarise the findings of the thesis and discuss the potential implications for 
international criminal justice as the ICC approaches its twentieth year in 
operation. 
 
1. The United States of America 
 
The analysis of the situation in the United States conducted within Chapters 
Two-Four of this thesis have served to illustrate that there are serious doubts 
about the extent to which the United States is either willing or able to conduct 
investigations or prosecutions as required under Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.3 For example, in Chapter Two’s discussion of criminal law in the United 
States, it was highlighted that the current version of the War Crimes Act in 
effect, which retroactively applies to the time period when the OTP alleges that 
most offences committed by US personnel were committed, does not include 
the crime of outrages upon personal dignity which forms part of the focus of the 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Article 17. Because this thesis has served to critique the extent to 
which the UK and US have complied with the principle of complementarity, this conclusion will 
not make any recommendations for reform of the investigatory processes employed by the two 
States examined or the principle of complementarity. To do this would require a wider 
examination of the investigative processes employed by States relating to allegations of war 
crimes. 
2 For a full explanation of why the conduct of these two States have been analysed, see supra 
2-9 




OTP’s ongoing investigation.4 Additionally, it was shown that it is questionable 
whether members of the United States military could be prosecuted for sexual 
offences allegedly committed in Afghanistan under the definitions of rape and 
indecent assault found under the versions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice which was in force at the time offences were allegedly committed due to 
in the case of rape an incomplete actus reus, and in the case of indecent 
assault, a potential lack of mens rea.5 Furthermore, in relation to the crimes of 
torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, Chapter Two also highlighted that the 
definitions of these offences mean that it would be very difficult to prosecute US 
personnel for these offences, a task made more difficult as a result of memos 
produced by the Office of Legal Counsel which restricted the definition of torture 
to only the most extreme actions.6 
 
This raises questions about the extent to which the United States would be able 
to claim that it has complied with the principle of complementarity since the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber held in Lubanga that in order to satisfy the principle of 
complementarity, States have to investigate the same conduct which forms the 
focus of investigations conducted by the OTP.7 It should be remembered that 
cases involving United States personnel are potentially admissible before the 
ICC because the alleged conduct took place in the context of the armed conflict 
in Afghanistan, who are a party to the Rome Statute, and Article 12(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute allows the ICC to assert jurisdiction where alleged crimes have 
taken place in the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute.8 
 
Whilst the United States has maintained that it has held individuals who are 
responsible for war crimes and torture to account,9 Chapter Four’s analysis of 
 
4 supra 54-57 
5 supra 60-63 
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arrest, Article 58) ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red (10 February 2006), para 31; for discussion of 
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2016’ (United States Department of State, 15 November 2016) <https://2009-
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criminal investigations in the United States showed that there were difficulties in 
determining the precise nature of accountability measures pursued by US 
authorities.10 It was also shown that the United States has adopted measures 
which serve to limit the extent to which individuals responsible for abuses 
committed against detainees can be held responsible for offences in the form of 
a formal defence where there has been good faith reliance on legal advice,11 
and a policy adopted by the Attorney General not to prosecute in such 
situations.12 This raises further questions about the extent to which the United 
States is willing to conduct investigations into alleged offences committed by 
their personnel. 
 
Finally, Chapter Three examined two reports of the United States Senate 
investigating the detention and interrogation programs operated by the 
Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, respectively. The 
analysis conducted in this chapter highlighted raised further doubts about the 
extent to which the United States could have complied with the principle of 
complementarity. It was shown that both detention and interrogation programs 
were formulated based on practices that were previously used to train members 
of the armed forces to resist unlawful interrogations by enemy forces.13 
Additionally, in both programs, the individuals responsible for oversight were 
unaware of the extent to which detention and interrogation practices were being 
used or did very little to ensure that authorised practices were being conducted 
in a manner compatible with guidelines.14  
 
In the context of the DoD’s interrogation program, it was also shown that there 
was significant opposition to the techniques that were approved for use at 
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Guantanamo Bay but which ultimately came to be used in Afghanistan.15 
Furthermore, it was also shown that in relation to the CIA’s detention and 
interrogation program, that there were concerns in relation to the quality of staff 
involved in the program at the time the program was in operation,16 and that 
there was resistance within the CIA to internal accountability mechanisms.17 
 
However, despite the considerable findings of these reports, Chapter Three also 
showed that they did not result in the individuals responsible for the creation 
and operation of the two detention and interrogation programs being held to 
account.18 This shows further a seeming lack of commitment on the part of the 
United States to individuals who are responsible for alleged war crimes being 
held to account. Such a finding can be reached without even considering the 
fact that in relation to the Report of the United States Senate Committee, the 
utility of the report as being a statement of fact has been undermined by 
disagreements between the major political parties and the CIA about the factual 
findings and conclusions.19 It is therefore unlikely in the case of the United 
States that the use of non-criminal investigative mechanisms demonstrates 
compliance with the principle of complementarity. 
 
The notion that the approach taken by the United States does not necessarily 
comply with the principle of complementarity should not be seen as being a total 
surprise since the US has been resistant to the notion of the ICC being able to 
assert jurisdiction over its personnel ever since the creation of the Rome 
Statute.20 For instance, in remarks from senior officials in administrations which 
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bookend the period between the creation of the Rome Statute to the time of 
writing, Bill Clinton stated in 2000 that ‘Court jurisdiction over U.S. personnel 
should come only with U.S. ratification of the treaty’;21 and in 2020, Defense 
Secretary Mark Esper proclaimed ‘Rest assured that the men and women of the 
United States Armed Forces will never appear before the ICC – nor will they 
ever be subjected to the judgments of unaccountable international bodies.’22 
 
However, in this case, complying with the principle of complementarity should 
not be that controversial since it would mean that the United States of America 
is living up to the stated values of the United States of America. For example, 
the foreword to the DoD’s Law of War Manual makes it clear that compliance 
with international humanitarian law is required for the military to function 
effectively during an armed conflict.23 In the context of torture, the argument 
against torture was stated eloquently by Assistant Secretary of State Tom 
Malinowski in 2014 when it was stated: 
 
“The United States was founded on the principle of respect for the dignity 
of the individual, and no crime offends human dignity more than torture. 
The prohibition of torture and cruel treatment is part of our Constitution, 
and it binds our federal government and all 50 of our states. We believe 
that torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are forbidden in 
all places, at all times, with no exceptions. The legal and moral argument 
against torture would be dispositive under any circumstances. It would 
not matter to that argument if torture were effective; our experience also 
taught that it is not. It not only devastates its victims, but harms people 
and countries that employ it.”24 
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In respect of the allegations being investigated by the OTP, it is clear that 
United States personnel did commit torture. A sitting President of the United 
States has even admitted that. Speaking before the release of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee’s Report into the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program, Barack Obama stated, ‘we tortured some folks. We did some things 
that were contrary to our values’.25 It should therefore be overwhelmingly in the 
interests of the United States to ensure that those who are responsible for acts 
of torture are held responsible, since this would not only remove the potential 
for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over US personnel, but it would allow for the 
United States to live up to what they state they believe in. 
 
Instead, as has been shown in this thesis, the US has only taken limited action 
to ensure that individuals responsible for such heinous actions have been held 
accountable. A failure to hold people accountable is something which continues 
to have effects within the United States. For example, Hajjar states that a lack 
of accountability for torture is not only one reason that ‘torture haunts US 
politics’ but it also ‘undermines the strength of the anti-torture norm globally’.26 
Additionally, Schmidt and Sikkink argued that the Obama Administration’s 
‘failure to enforce the United States’ normative commitments has contributed to 
continued weakness of the norm against torture in the United States and 
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2021) 
25 White House, ‘Press Conference by the President’ (White House, 1 August 2014) 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01/press-conference-
president> (Last accessed 15 May 2021). Obama additionally stated following the release of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report that ‘some of the actions that were taken were contrary 
to our values. That is why I unequivocally banned torture when I took office’: White House, 
‘Statement by the President Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’ (White 
House, 9 December 2014) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/12/09/statement-president-report-senate-select-committee-intelligence> (Last 
accessed 15 May 2021) However, it should also be noted that Obama stated that those who 
relied on flawed legal advice in good faith should not be subject to prosecution: White House, 
‘Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos’ (White House, 16 April 
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26 Lisa Hajjar, ‘The Afterlives of Torture: The Global Implications of Reactionary US Politics’ 




elsewhere’.27 To use the words of Katherine Hawkins, ‘Obama’s opposition to 
looking backward made it impossible to look forward’.28 
 
Furthermore, under the Trump Administration, attacks on the ICC have resulted 
in senior ICC personnel including the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, having their 
visas revoked,29 and having economic sanctions imposed against them.30 
These sanctions were criticised by Daniel Fried, who served in numerous 
diplomatic positions including as the State Department’s Coordinator for 
Sanctions Policy,31 as ‘It creates the reality, not just the impression of the United 
States as a unilateralist bully with contempt for international law and norms’.32 
Prior to the imposition of economic sanctions, Jorgensen stated that attacks by 
the United States on the ICC served to lend credence to the idea that the US 
would not cooperate with any investigation into allegations of war crimes in 
Afghanistan.33 Actions taken by States such as the United States do have an 
effect on the ICC though. The Independent Expert Review of the ICC, for 
example, states the following: 
 
27 Averell Schmidt and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Breaking the Ban? The Heterogenous Impact of US 
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28 Katherine Hawkins, ‘We Can’t “Look Forward” on the Trump Administration’s Abuses’ (Just 
Security, 11 December 2020) <https://www.justsecurity.org/73825/we-cant-look-forward-on-the-
trump-administrations-abuses/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
29 Marlise Simons and Megan Specia, ‘U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing War 
Crimes’ (New York Times, 5 April 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/us-
icc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
30 Julian Borger, ‘US imposes sanctions on top international criminal court officials’ (The 
Guardian, 2 September 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/sep/02/us-sanctions-
international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda> (Last accessed 15 May 2021) 
31 United States Department of State, ‘Daniel Fried’ (United States Department of State) 
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<https://justiceinconflict.org/2020/06/18/crossing-the-line-trump-approves-sanctions-against-
staff-at-the-icc/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); Leila Sadat, ‘First They Came for Me and My 
Colleagues: The U.S. Attack on the Int’l Criminal Court’ (Just Security, 29 June 2020) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/70996/first-they-came-for-me-and-my-colleagues-the-us-attack-
on-the-intl-criminal-court/> (Last accessed 15 May 2021); and, Susan Akram and Gabor Rona, 
‘Why the Executive Order on the ICC is Unconstitutional and Self-Defeating’ (Opinio Juris, 13 
August 2020) <http://opiniojuris.org/2020/08/13/why-the-executive-order-on-the-icc-is-
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“While a lack of cooperation from certain non-states parties has been an 
issue dogging the work of the Court from the start, in recent years it has 
faced an even bigger challenge in the adoption by certain countries of 
policies of active opposition to the Court. This has resulted in threatened 
sanctions against members of the Court, including the Prosecutor 
herself, as well as a questioning of the integrity of the Judges and of the 
OTP. This intimidation has not only impacted the morale of the Court, but 
has undermined its credibility in certain quarters, including in countries 
that hitherto had provided at least some cooperation.”34 
 
The Independent Expert Review recommended that because of the ICC’s 
inability to defend itself from attacks as a result of its need to avoid any 
perception of bias, States should speak out to defend the ICC.35 In fairness to 
the international community, States have spoken out against attacks by the US 
on the ICC,36 but the idea that the US would be resistant to an ICC investigation 
should not be a surprise. For example, John Bellinger, who served as the State 
Department Legal Advisor during the second term of the George W Bush 
Administration, stated that ‘No American administration, Republican or 
Democratic, would fail to respond to an actual or threatened criminal 
investigation of U.S. military personnel and officials or fail to warn the court 
about the consequences of such an investigation.’37 
 
 
34 Panel of Independent Experts, ‘Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court 
and the Rome Statute System Final Report’ (ICC Assembly of States Parties, 30 September 
2020) <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/IER-Final-Report-ENG.pdf> (Last 
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35 ibid para R169 
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enshrined in the Rome Statute’ (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New 
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37 John Bellinger, ‘The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet to the ICC. The Court 
Should Decline the Challenge’ (Lawfare, 10 September 2018) 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-throws-down-gauntlet-icc-court-should-




While it is questionable whether any other administration would have acted in 
the same manner as the Trump Administration did – the Trump Administration 
showed a reluctance to engage with international law,38 it is also, at best, 
questionable that the strategies being pursued by the ICC to encourage the 
United States to pursue investigations and prosecutions themselves are 
working. This may be reflective of a broader trend as Guilfoyle argues that 
prosecutions involving non-member State party nationals are unlikely to 
succeed under the current ICC system as there is no incentive for such States 
to cooperate with the ICC, and that a key challenge for the ICC moving forwards 
will be how it manages situations involving non-member States.39 
 
The findings of this thesis therefore indicate a clear need for the ICC to improve 
its ability to persuade States that it is in their interests to conduct investigations 
and prosecutions themselves in order to avoid potential ICC jurisdiction. Such 
an endeavour should be in the interests of the ICC since it would allow them to 
edge closer to their goal of ending impunity for international crimes,40 whilst 
respecting the right of States to not ratify the Rome Statute. In the case of the 
United States, this persuasion should not be necessary since a sitting President 
of the United States has admitted that US personnel were responsible for 
torture. 
 
2. The United Kingdom 
 
The analysis conducted in this thesis in relation has shown that despite the UK 
having the capability to prosecute the alleged crimes which formed the basis of 
the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) Preliminary Examination, as illustrated by 
Chapter Five’s analysis of a cross-section of applicable criminal law, there are 
 
38 See, for example, Hathaway’s discussion of the international agreements the Trump 
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serious questions about the extent to which the UK has complied with the 
principle of complementarity.41 Chapter Six’s analysis of the Baha Mousa 
Report demonstrated that as a result of institutional issues within the Ministry of 
Defence, techniques which had been held by the European Court of Human 
Rights to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment nearly thirty years earlier 
were used in Iraq.42 Additionally, despite attempts to ban the use of hooding, 
the practice still continued to be used to what in the case of Baha Mousa were 
devastating consequences.43 It was also shown that despite the findings of the 
Baha Mousa Inquiry, a referral to the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), and 
its successor organisation the Service Police Legacy Investigations (SPLI), 
ultimately resulted in no prosecution being brought because of ‘lack of 
evidence’.44 
 
Chapter Seven’s discussion of IHAT showed that IHAT had the perception of a 
credibility problem with its independence being subject to challenge,45 as well 
as accusations of political interference,46 cover-ups,47 and being subject to 
constant delays.48 Finally, Chapter Eight’s discussion of the Overseas 
Operations Bill demonstrates that the UK government intends to enact 
legislation to address the perceived problem of vexatious prosecutions, a 
problem which not only does not exist, but may result in the UK being seen to 
be unwilling to prosecute those service personnel who have been accused of 
the most serious of crimes found within international law.49 
 
 
41 supra Chapter Five, in particular 154-59 for discussion of the International Criminal Court Act 
2001 
42 Ireland v UK (1978) Series A No 25 para 168; supra 178-90 
43 supra 195-200 and 211-14 for discussions of attempts to ban hooding 
44 Service Police Legacy Investigations ‘Information for Complainants Table’ (Service Police 
Legacy Investigations, 6 July 2020) 
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2021); Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Iraq/UK: Final Report’ (International Criminal Court, 
9 December 2020) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/201209-otp-final-report-iraq-uk-
eng.pdf> (Last accessed 15 May 2021), 77-79 
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The analysis conducted in this thesis does however demonstrate why UK 
prosecutors may not have pursued prosecutions against individuals alleged to 
have been involved in the commission of war crimes. For example, Chapter 
Six’s discussion of the application of command responsibility based on 
information within the Baha Mousa Report demonstrates how difficult it would 
be to apply the principle in the context of UK involvement in Iraq, as there was 
no indication found within the Report that senior military officials were aware of 
the continued use of hooding after an order to ban the use of hooding had been 
issued.50 Additionally, the analysis of the Baha Mousa Report also highlights 
that inadequate training provided to military personnel was the result of 
institutional failures, and therefore may serve as a mitigating factor in instances 
where individuals may have committed actions which were not perceived to 
have been unlawful.51 Furthermore, despite IHAT being subject to criticism, 
there is no question that the personnel acting within IHAT were acting in 
anything other than a professional manner in order to fulfil what was a very 
difficult investigative obligation,52 and even sought to ensure that allegations 
which could not be proven were disposed of in a manner which was judicially 
endorsed.53 
 
However, this cannot serve to justify the UK’s failure to hold personnel 
accountable for alleged crimes committed by UK personnel in Iraq, as according 
to information disclosed by the MoD in November 2020, ‘there have been a total 
of five prosecutions relating to Iraq since 2003’.54 This is the case even though 
the OTP stated that, as a minimum, there is ‘a reasonable basis’ to believe that 
there have been 7 victims of the war crime of wilful killing,55 54 victims of the 
war crimes of torture or inhuman/cruel treatment and outrages upon personal 
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Office, 15 September 2016) 
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dignity,56 and 7 victims of the war crimes of rape and sexual violence.57 Based 
on these prosecutorial inconsistencies alone, questions have to be asked about 
how the UK can possibly have complied with the principle of complementarity. 
The findings of this thesis in relation to the UK’s investigative steps only serve 
to intensify these questions. 
 
The findings in relation to the UK were reached on the basis of research 
conducted predominantly before the OTP released their final report on the 
Preliminary Examination into the UK. The OTP declined to launch an 
investigation into the UK and decided to close the preliminary examination into 
the UK,58 and stated that they: 
 
“cannot conclude that the UK authorities have been unwilling genuinely 
to carry out relevant investigative inquiries and/or prosecutions (article 
17(1)(a)) or that decisions not to prosecute in specific cases resulted 
from unwillingness genuinely to prosecute (article 17(1)(b)). Specifically, 
for the purpose of article 17(2), the Office cannot conclude that the 
relevant investigative inquiries or investigative/prosecutorial decisions 
were made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court…”59 
 
Despite the decision of the OTP to not pursue an investigation into the UK, the 
findings of this thesis remain the same. It is questionable that the UK complied 
with the principle of complementarity, and the OTP’s findings serve to highlight 
why it is questionable that the UK complied with the principle of 
complementarity. Whilst a number of these reasons have been highlighted 
within earlier chapters, it is still worth noting one example of the OTP’s 
conclusions here – those made in relation to the role of Public Interest Lawyers. 
In relation to the discussion of IHAT’s closure being the result of a desire by the 
UK to dismiss allegations presented by Public Interest Lawyers because of their 
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founder being removed from the Roll of Solicitors,60 the OTP’s Report states 
that ‘IHAT and the SPA appear to have placed over-reliance on the SDT’s 
disciplinary findings against Phil Shiner and PIL to terminate lines of criminal 
inquiry that may have otherwise progressed.’61 The OTP additionally stated that 
the filtering process adopted as a result of this was ‘more conservative than 
may have been warranted’,62 and ‘was not the only reasonable course of action 
in the circumstances’.63 Despite making these findings, the OTP did not make a 
finding that the UK was unwilling or unable to conduct investigations into 
alleged war crimes, as they state that explanations provided by UK authorities 
about why they proceeded in the way they did were ‘generally reasonable’.64 
For example, in relation to the previously mentioned finding that IHAT may have 
closed investigations into allegations derived from Public Interest Lawyers 
earlier than may otherwise have been the case, the OTP stated:  
 
“IHAT and SPLI continued to consider the most serious and well 
supported claims originating from PIL… even if the Office disagrees with 
approach adopted, it was not so unreasonable or deficient as to 
constitute evidence of unwillingness to carry out relevant investigations 
or prosecutions genuinely, in the sense of showing an intent to shield 
perpetrators from criminal justice.”65 
 
Baldwin states that ‘the report gives the impression that the Office often bends 
over backwards to give the UK the benefit of the doubt, even when the evidence 
is against it’.66 Heller additionally questions the evidential basis on which the 
OTP justified their decision, stating that the OTP was insistent on requiring a 
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higher level of evidence than was required under the Rome Statute for the 
purposes of requesting an investigation.67 
 
Based on the above, it is difficult to do anything but draw unflattering 
comparisons between the OTP’s decision not to launch an investigation into the 
UK with the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber not to approve the Prosecutor’s 
request to open an investigation in relation to Afghanistan.68 The Afghanistan 
decision had been criticised by Ochs who stated that ‘by rewarding the United 
States for its failure to cooperate, the PTC sends the message that Western 
powers are immune from international prosecution for war crimes’.69 Labuda 
also argued that ‘there is certainly a perception that, in avoiding a clash with the 
world’s superpower, this decision serves primarily the ICC’s own institutional 
self-interest’.70 In the case of the UK, the OTP demonstrated why launching an 
investigation into the conduct of one of the Court’s most politically influential 
allies in the UK could be justified but has chosen not to investigate. 
 
The perception that the OTP’s decision is damaging to international justice can 
be seen in the reaction of a number of human rights NGOs who have been 
critical of the OTP’s decision. For example, Matthew Cannock of Amnesty 
International stated: 
 
“The Prosecutor’s decision to conclude the preliminary examination 
provides a road-map for obstructionism. It rewards bad faith and delays 
brought about by the failure of the UK military and authorities to conduct 
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independent and impartial investigations in the immediate aftermath of 
the conflict in Iraq.”71 
 
Additionally, Human Rights Watch legal advisor Clive Baldwin argued that the 
OTP’s decision ‘will doubtless fuel perceptions of an ugly double standard in 
justice, with one approach for powerful states and quite another for those with 
less clout’.72 Wolfgang Kaleck of the European Center for Constitutional and 
Human Rights stated that the OTP report ‘reinforces longstanding double 
standards in international justice and shows once again that powerful actors can 
get away with systematic torture’.73 
 
Academic reaction to the OTP’s decision has also questioned whether the 
decision could have an impact on the ICC’s ability to hold individuals 
accountable. Sterio, for example, states: 
 
“In light of this decision, it may become relatively easy for other powerful 
states to evade the ICC’s reach by launching their own “genuine” 
investigations… Complementarity may become a shield in and of itself, 
despite the fact that complementarity is actually supposed to ensure that 
perpetrators aren’t shielded from ICC’s prosecutorial reach. If states are 
able to avoid the ICC on complementarity grounds in the future, this 
could seriously undermine the court’s legitimacy.”74 
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This not only adds to the perception that the OTP may have damaged the 
perception of international criminal justice but the fact that the OTP reached 
such a decision should also be concerning because of the State the decision 
concerns. The UK is a founder member of the International Criminal Court and 
when debating the legislation to implement the Rome Statute into UK law, 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook proclaimed, ‘British service personnel will never 
be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court because any bona fide 
allegation will be pursued by the British authorities.’75 This means that there 
should not have been any question about whether the UK complied with the 
principle of complementarity. 
 
However, as previously stated, the OTP concluded that there was evidence to 
suggest that British personnel were responsible for war crimes, and that 
concerns existed in relation to the investigatory processes pursued by the UK. 
The OTP additionally stated that ‘the UK Government, and in particular the 
MoD, have at best been reluctant, if not at times hostile, partners to pursuing 
claims of criminal responsibility against members of UK armed forces’.76 For the 
OTP to decide not to launch an investigation in such circumstances is therefore 
a matter of concern, as it raises the question of how the OTP will react in future 
situations where complementarity is at issue. If the ICC is to ever fulfil its 
mandate, the OTP will have to conduct investigations in situations where it is 
difficult to make a determination about the principle of complementarity.77 In this 
situation, the OTP suggested that a reason for not pursuing an investigation 
was the potential for a successful request to defer any OTP investigation under 
Article 18 of the Rome Statute.78 However, as Heller argues, it would surely 
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have been better for justice if there actually was an Article 18 process rather 
than for the OTP to have decided independently that any challenge to 
jurisdiction would have been successful.79 
 
The response of the UK to the OTP’s findings has been one of seeming 
jubilation. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace stated that the OTP’s report 
‘vindicates our efforts to pursue justice where allegations have been founded. I 
am pleased that work we have done, and continue to do, in improving the 
quality and assurances around investigations has been recognised’.80 This 
approach is misplaced, as this thesis and the OTP’s findings demonstrate that 
the UK’s investigatory process into alleged war crimes has been subject to 
many problems which can be criticised on the basis that they are inconsistent 
with the UK’s investigative obligations under international law. The OTP even 
stated that their Report should not be viewed as ‘an endorsement of the UK’s 
approach’.81 
 
The UK is clearly still engaged with the ICC, as can be demonstrated by the 
successful campaign to elect Joanna Korner as a judge at the ICC which was 
endorsed by the Foreign Secretary,82 and the fact that the UK has joined in with 
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efforts denouncing attacks on the ICC by the United States.83 It is also clear, 
however, that in future, any investigations carried out by the UK should be seen 
unequivocally as satisfying Article 17 of the Rome Statute. This is especially the 
case if ‘the United Kingdom believes the Court forms an important part of the 
rules based international system’,84 as the UK Ambassador to the United 
Nations Jonathan Allen stated was the case in November 2020. However, 
considering the OTP’s findings and the critique of the decision not to launch an 
investigation, it cannot be said that the UK has unequivocally satisfied the 
principle of complementarity through its criminal and non-criminal investigative 
processes. 
 
3. Concluding Thoughts 
 
This thesis has sought to discuss the extent to which the investigations into 
alleged war crimes committed by the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom have satisfied the principle of complementarity at the ICC. The 
findings do not illustrate that the two States examined complied with the 
principle of complementarity in the manner envisaged when the Rome Statute 
was created, despite both States being having a clear interest to ensure that 
those responsible for such crimes are held accountable. This, alone, should be 
a matter viewed with dismay by advocates for international justice. However, it 
may also be the case that how these two States have addressed allegations of 
war crimes is indicative of a potential need to reform how the ICC deals with the 
principle of complementarity, as it is not necessarily clear how the risk of ICC 
intervention has impacted how these States have conducted their 
investigations. 
 
Determining what reforms are required and how they would be implemented 
will, however, require further study. The role of non-criminal processes in 
determining whether a State has complied with the principle of complementarity 
 
83 Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York (n 36) 
84 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Jonathan Allen, ‘Promoting 
international criminal justice and the rule of law’ (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development 
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will also have to be considered in the reform process because, as shown in 
Chapter One, there is no reason in principle why such processes are 
incompatible with the idea of complementarity.85 This is the case despite the 
findings of this thesis in relation to the particular non-criminal processes 
employed by the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
 
At the present time, however, it is clear that the Court is nowhere near 
achieving ‘the absence of trials by the ICC, as a consequence of the effective 
functioning of national systems’, a goal articulated by the OTP in a 2003 policy 
document.86
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